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ARTICLE

Environmental Controversies
“Between Two or More States”
ROBERT D. CHEREN†
“Controversies between the States are becoming frequent, and
in the rapidly changing conditions of life and business are likely to
become still more so.”*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Controversies abound between distinct political communities
that routinely interact with and affect one another, and the several
states are no exception. The Constitution prevents the states from
using the full range of diplomatic methods ordinarily available in
controversies between nations. And while the Commerce Clause
empowers Congress to unilaterally resolve controversies that are
commercial in nature, the enumeration of congressional power in
Article I, Section 8 limits those controversies between states that
may be unilaterally resolved by Acts of Congress. Rather, the
plenary constitutional mechanisms for resolving state
controversies are: (1) litigation in the original and exclusive
†Associate, Squire Sanders (US) LLP. J.D. 2013, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law. This Article received the 2013 Stanley I. and Hope S.
Adelstein Environmental Law Award for Best Paper on Environmental Law.
The Article addresses controversies between two or more states litigated in the
Supreme Court of the United States under its original and exclusive
jurisdiction. As these are not appellate cases, each controversy yields several
decisions and orders. When an entire controversy for which the Court granted
leave to file a bill of complaint is referred to rather than the contents of a
specific decision, the name of the states and year of the first decision or order
that appears in the reports are given like so: Kansas v. Colorado (1902).
*Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 80 (1907).
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jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over “controversies between two
or more states,” and (2) trilateral negotiation of interstate
compacts enforceable against states by Acts of Congress and by
states through suits filed in the Supreme Court.1
The state controversy jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court was created by the Constitution’s extension of the
“judicial power” of the Court “to controversies between two or
more states” over which the Supreme Court has “original
jurisdiction.”2 The compacting power of the states is recognized
by the Constitution’s prohibition of states from entering into
binding agreements and compacts without the assent of
Congress.3 Valid compacts may be enforced by Acts of Congress
and by states through enforcement suits against states under the
Court’s state controversy jurisdiction.4
The state controversy jurisdiction is so far most frequently
used to resolve disputes over territory and interstate waters.
States have also invoked this mechanism to obtain Supreme
Court determinations of the constitutionality of the laws of other
states and to determine the domicile of citizens. Suits “between
two or more states” constitute a small portion of the Court’s
docket and only a tiny fraction of the docket of the entire federal
judiciary.5 This state controversy jurisdiction is invoked by states
submitting requests for leave to file bills of complaint against
other states. To date, the states have sought leave to file a bill of
complaint against other states on 135 occasions. The Court held
ninety-nine of these requests were proper invocations of the
1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend . . . to
controversies between two or more states . . . . In all cases . . . in which a state
shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”); U.S. Const.
art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(2012).
2. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend . . . to
controversies between two or more states . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2
(“In all cases . . . in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction.”).
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).
4. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918).
5. This is due in part to the limited class of potential plaintiffs—only
thirteen at the founding and still only fifty today.
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Court’s state controversy jurisdiction and thirty-six were
improper. The Court’s opinions and orders arising from the
proper invocations of the Court’s jurisdiction appear on roughly
4100 pages of the United States Reports. The Court’s opinions
and orders arising from the improper invocations appear on
roughly 200 pages. The state controversy cases are, to say the
least, a small and specialized body of law. But the Supreme
Court’s constitutional role in resolving state controversies is
highly important, especially in environmental law. Among the
ninety-nine exercises of the Court’s state controversy jurisdiction,
numerous federal common law suits and compact enforcement
suits have played a substantial role in the resolution of
environmental controversies between states.
The Supreme Court’s resolution of environmental
controversies falls into two categories. First, the Court apportions
natural resources among states through federal common law suits
and by enforcing resource apportionment compacts. Second, the
Court protects state natural resources from inequitable disruption
by other states through federal common law suits and by enforcing
resource protection compacts. The Court has to date asserted its
state controversy jurisdiction to apportion territory, water, and fish
and to protect navigation, land use, and water. Noticeably absent
from these ninety-nine exercises of the Court’s state controversy
jurisdiction are suits seeking protection of air from pollution.
To determine the viability of air pollution suits, this Article
first considers in detail the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over
controversies between states, the scope of the Court’s remedial
power in controversies between states, and the rule of decision in
suits between states. From this analysis, this Article concludes in
Part V.A. that suits seeking protection from air pollution against
upwind states are available to downwind states under federal
common law. In Part V.B. this Article further concludes that while
suits challenging emissions from individual sources are displaced
by the Clean Air Act, this unilateral Act of Congress does not
provide the rule of decision in a suit seeking protection from the
aggregate emissions of an upwind state and therefore aggregate
state emission suits are not displaced and remain a viable
mechanism for resolving air pollution controversies.

3

CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED

108

3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

Part I outlines the constitutional limitations on resolution of
controversies between states through state self-help and
unilateral Acts of Congress. Part II outlines the plenary judicial
power of the Supreme Court and the plenary legislative power of
compacts to resolve environmental controversies between states.6
Part III recounts the Court’s resolution of environmental
controversies between states in resource apportionment and
protection suits. Part IV analyzes in detail the Court’s authority
under the Constitution to resolve controversies between states by
considering the scope of the state controversy jurisdiction, the
scope of the Court’s remedial power, and the constitutional
determination of the rule of decision in state controversy suits.
Part V demonstrates the availability of air pollution protection
suits filed in the Supreme Court by downwind states against
upwind states for inequitably excessive aggregate state emissions
notwithstanding the Clean Air Act’s displacement of suits seeking
protection from individual sources of emissions. An Appendix
catalogs the ninety-nine state controversy suits properly filed and
the thirty-six improper requests for leave to file state controversy
suits.
II. LIMITED ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSY
RESOLUTION
Nations and landowners have a panoply of mechanisms to
resolve disputes with neighbors. But the options for the states to
resolve environmental controversies with other states through
self-help are limited, and so too is Congress constitutionally
limited in its power to unilaterally resolve state controversies
over the environment.
A. State Self-Help
States are constitutionally prohibited from wielding the full
range of diplomatic options usually available between
independent political communities: “Bound hand and foot by the
prohibitions of the constitution, a complaining state can neither

6. Plenary here denotes the relative absence of constitutional restrictions
compared with the powers of Congress and states outlined in Part I.
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treat, agree, or fight with its adversary, without the consent of
congress . . . .”7 So New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Louisiana need not fear messing with Texas because the
Constitution effectively forbids states from using their muscle to
resolve disputes with one another.8 Texas cannot ban the export
of natural gas into Arkansas. Texas cannot pass a law forbidding
the import of Oklahoma cattle. And Texas cannot build a wall on
its border with New Mexico.
These constitutional restrictions are imposed not because
these acts are always wrongful and unjustified and could not
serve as a productive way to resolve disputes between Texas and
its neighbors. Indeed, if the states were not united, these actions
would be referred to as “diplomacy.” Rather, the constitutional
provisions banning this conduct reflect a belief that on the whole,
the ability to deploy these measures of self-help would work great
evil to the union. The Framers held this view because “[t]rade
barriers, recriminations, [and] intense commercial rivalries had
plagued the colonies.”9 There are of course, less forceful means of
“diplomacy” that are constitutionally permissible, namely begging
and bribing. But the former is weak and the latter impracticable.
Thus, the strictures of the Constitution disable states from
exercising ordinary and effective means of dispute resolution
between sovereigns.10

7. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 726 (1938); see also
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (“When a State enters the
Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.”).
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Kansas v. Colorado I, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902)
(“The States of this Union cannot make war upon each other. They cannot
‘grant letters of marque and reprisal.’ They cannot make reprisal on each other
by embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations and make treaties.”);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519 (“Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode
Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”).
9. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
10. States may, however, exercise petty and ineffective means of dispute
resolution because the Supreme Court exercises its discretion in granting leave to
file exclusive original jurisdiction cases. See California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S.
1027 (1981) (denying leave to file a bill of complaint “to adjudicate a controversy
with . . . West Virginia arising out of an alleged breach of contract covering
athletic contests between two state universities”); McKusick, supra note 5, at 209
(noting athletic contests at issue were “football games between San Jose State
University and the University of West Virginia”). So a state may be able to issue
an ultimatum to another state—stop polluting our interstate river or our state

5
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B. Acts of Congress
The Constitution limits the ability of Congress to unilaterally
resolve interstate environmental conflicts.
Congress’s
enumerated powers do not necessarily extend to all
environmental controversies between states.
And the
Constitution prevents Congress from compelling state legislative
and regulatory action even as a necessary and proper exercise of
one of the enumerated powers.
The enumeration of the proper subject matter of
congressional regulation in Article I does not explicitly include
The
the environment or the “interstate environment.”11
Commerce Clause together with the Necessary and Proper Clause
have been interpreted broadly enough to encompass emissions
controls and endangered species protection.12 But much of the
nation’s environmental regulations were passed during the postNew Deal détente, now a distant memory in the wake of NFIB v.
Sebelius.13
Further,
the
Constitution
forbids
congressional
commandeering of state governments except in the enforcement of
compacts because the several sovereign “States are not mere
political subdivisions of the United States” and “State governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the

university football teams will refuse to play your state university football teams.
But see California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The fact that two sovereign States have been unable to resolve this matter
without adding to our burdens does not speak well for the statesmanship of either
party but does not, in my opinion, justify our refusal to exercise our exclusive
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1251(a).”).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. See James R. May, Heathcare, Environmental Law, and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis Under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Tax and
Spending Clauses, 43 ENVTL. L. 233, 245 (2013).
13. Nat’l Fed. Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Jonathan
H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90
IOWA L. REV. 377, 379 (2005) (“From the New Deal through the 1980s the
Supreme Court showed little interest in policing the division of state and federal
power. Beginning in the 1990s, however, the Court reasserted the importance of
state sovereignty and enumerated powers . . . .”); id. at 390–91 (“For most of the
latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that there were justiciable limits
on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power was a dead letter. In the
name of regulating commerce, Congress could regulate just about anything.”).
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Federal Government.”14 Simply put, the Constitution “confers
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”15
Thus, as the Court held in New York v. United States, “Congress
may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program,’”16 and as the Court held in Printz v. United
States, neither may Congress simply commandeer the executive
functions of the States.17
Short of directly compelling state regulation, Congress may
still coax states into regulating according to federally set
guidelines.18 This coaxing method of regulation is usually
referred to as cooperative federalism. For the purposes of
resolving environmental controversies that arise between states,
the process is best referred to as indirectly compelling state
regulation, to fashion a term by negation of Justice O’Connor’s
proscription in New York v. United States of “directly compelling”

14. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
15. Id. at 166.
16. Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)); see also id. at 162 (“While
Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in
areas of intimate concern to the states, the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern
according to Congress’ instructions.”); id. at 166 (“[E]ven where Congress has
the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting
certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts . . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce
Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce
directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’
regulation of interstate commerce.”).
17. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
18. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166–68 (“Congress may urge a
State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. . . . First,
under Congress’ spending power, ‘Congress may attach conditions on the receipt
of federal funds.’ . . . Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate
private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’
power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. . . . By either of
these methods, as by any other permissible method of encouraging a State to
conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the State will comply. . . . By contrast, where the
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state
and federal officials is diminished.”).
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regulations.19 This method is widely used, but it is meaningfully
limited by the constitutional rule that Congress can never
directly compel a state to adopt a regulatory program necessary
to resolve an environmental controversy between states.
Congress may also “regulate state conduct . . . . so long as
they do not regulate states as states, but rather only regulate
states as private actors, such as employers or owners of
databases.”20 This includes congressional regulations that limit
proprietary state actions that injure other states, but would not
extend to any state controversies involving the exercise or nonexercise of the legislative, executive, and administrative functions
of the states.21
The constitutional limitations on congressional power to
enact federal statutes render some environmental controversies
unresolvable by the unilateral acts of Congress.22 In others, the
constitutional limitations may prohibit otherwise desirable
means of resolving environmental controversies.23 Furthermore,
the Court’s recent cases interpreting the scope of the Commerce
Clause and the limits on congressional commandeering of state
governments may portend successful challenges to some federal
environmental statutes.24 Thus, the Court’s respect for the states
has circumscribed Congress’s role as an arbiter of interstate
environmental disputes.
Indeed, the United States argued
against the limit on congressional regulation imposed by New
York v. United States on this very ground, to no avail.25

19. Id. at 161.
20. Adler, supra note 13, at 400; see also Garcia v. San Antonia Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Reno v. Condon 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
21. As will be shown below, states are responsible for more than the injuries
that state action directly causes to other states.
22. See Part IV.C.b; Part V.B., infra.
23. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149 (“We conclude that while
Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States
to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their
borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability to simply
compel the States to do so.”).
24. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
25. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 179-80 (“[T]he United States . . .
argues that the Constitution envisions a role for Congress as an arbiter of
interstate disputes. The United States observes that federal courts, and this
Court in particular, have frequently resolved conflicts among States. . . . The

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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III. PLENARY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSY
RESOLUTION
What are the states to do given the limitation of their own
power and the power of Congress to resolve environmental
controversies between states? The states may turn to two
plenary means of resolving state controversies: state controversy
suits and compacts.
A. The Supreme Court’s Plenary State Controversy
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court’s extensive authority over interstate
controversies is entirely set out and defined by the first two
sections of Article III and the first section of 28 U.S.C. 1251.
Article III, Section 1 provides: “The judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court . . . .”26 And
Article III, Section 2, in defining the jurisdictional scope of that
judicial power, provides: “The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies between two or more states . . . . In all Cases . . . in
which a State shall be Party, the [S]upreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction.”27
Congress’s sole statutory provision
regarding this jurisdiction is to make it exclusive to the Supreme
Court: “The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”28
The sum total of these provisions is that the judicial power of the
United States vested in the Supreme Court extends to
United States suggests that if the Court may resolve such interstate disputes,
Congress can surely do the same under the Commerce Clause. . . . While the
Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate
commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes
that were common under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not
intend that Congress should exercise that power through the mechanism of
mandating state regulation.”).
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see also Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77
(1992) (“[T]he uncompromising language of 28 U. S. C. § 1251(a), which gives to
this Court ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or
more States’ (emphasis added). Though phrased in terms of a grant of
jurisdiction to this Court, the description of our jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’
necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court.”).

9
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controversies between two or more states over which the Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction. As foundations of federal
jurisdiction go, this framework is as simple as it gets.29
Supreme Court historian Charles Warren in his book on the
subject declares at the outset: “The great function of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in adjudicating controversies between
sovereign States of the Union has its roots in history.”30 Indeed,
the history of the “between two or more states” clause is so deeply
engrained in the constitutional woodwork that the Supreme
Court has treated its development as precedent and as important
as any interpretive decision of the Court.
The Articles of Confederation “contained, amongst other
provisions, one entirely new expedient of statecraft.”31 Benjamin
Franklin on July 21, 1775 had suggested “that a Congress,
representing all disputes and differences between colony and
colony about limits or any other cause if such should arise.”32
The first draft of such a provision was proposed by John
Dickinson of Delaware on July 12, 1776.33 Article IX, Clause 2 of
the Articles of Confederation ultimately provided a complex
mechanism for congressional resolution of “disputes and
differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between
two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other
causes whatever.”34 Though Congress was denominated the “last
resort on appeal,” this power was to be exercised through a court
either selected by the “joint consent” of the contravening states
or—if the states do not agree—by a court created by Congress to
hear the matter composed of between five judges and nine judges

29. The Exceptions Clause does not apply because the jurisdiction is not
appellate and the lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction because it is
withdrawn by 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
30. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 2 (1924).
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 4 (quoting 6 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 420 (1904)).
33. Id. at 126, n.5. The Committee of Congress prepared the second draft
based on Dickinson’s provision which provided: “The United States assembled
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . settling all disputes and
differences now subsisting or that may hereafter arise between two or more
Colonies concerning boundaries, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever.” Id.
at 126.
34. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 2.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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appointed through an elaborate process.35 This authority was
exercised precisely once before the Articles of Confederation were
supplanted by the Constitution.36 While it was innovative, the
drawbacks of this mechanism were one of the motivations for the
Constitutional Convention.37
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers set out to
provide a replacement for Article IX, Clause 2. The Virginia Plan
proposed on May 29, 1787 by Edmund Randolph included a
provision giving the national judiciary jurisdiction to “hear and
determine . . . ‘questions which may involve national peace or
harmony.’”38 The Committee of the Whole on June 19 reported a
draft following this suggestion with a provision “[t]hat the
jurisdiction of the Natl. Judiciary shall extend to all . . . questions
which involve the national peace & harmony.”39
Rather than going forward with this Virginia Plan language,
the Framers next drew upon the Articles of Confederation
provision of jurisdiction over “all disputes and differences now
subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more
States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes
whatever”40 by splitting this power in two. The power to decide
territorial controversies was given to the Senate for trial, and the
power to decide other causes was given to the Supreme Court.41
The Committee of Detail report on August 6 in Article IX, Section
2 gave the Senate power to try “all disputes and controversies
now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or
more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory” and “[a]ll
controversies concerning lands claimed under different grants of
35. Id.
36. Pennsylvania v. Connecticut, 131 U.S. Appendix liv (1781).
37. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 3 (1919) (“[T]he 9th Article was a prophecy of
better things, rather than a realization; for only one case was decided and only
one commission was appointed under this procedure ; and when the government
under the Constitution succeeded the government under the Articles there were
controversies between eleven States concerning their boundaries, to mention
only differences of this nature, unsettled between the States.”).
38. Id. at 3 n.1 (quoting 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 163 (Gaillard
Hunt, ed.)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 3-4.

11
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two or more states” utilizing procedures similar to those in the
Articles of Confederation.42 That same draft in Article XI,
Section 3 provided that “[t]he Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
shall extend . . . to controversies between two or more States
(except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction).”43 The
Court has long found significance in this stage in the drafting
because it evidences that the “controversies between two or more
states” that the Framers had in mind must include much more
than territory and jurisdiction controversies, given the draft
provision of jurisdiction included everything but these.44
At this point in the debates the Framers amalgamated the
jurisdiction of the Senate over territory and jurisdiction
controversies and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over all
other controversies into one provision.45 To do this, the Framers
eliminated the Senate’s role and simply dropped the exception
language from the provision for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
The Committee on Style on September 12 reported extending the
judicial power “to Controversies between two or more States.”46
It is this language that appears in the final constitutional
provision of the state controversy jurisdiction: “The judicial power
shall extend . . . to controversies between two or more states . . . .”47
During the ratification, James Madison in Federalist No. 39
noted that the state controversy jurisdiction as an example of an
exception to the general principle that the federal government
under the Constitution operates on the people and not the
states.48
42. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 4 (1919) (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 101-03 (Gaillard Hunt, ed.)).
43. Id. at 4 (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 104-05 (Gaillard
Hunt, ed.)). Story reports a slightly different draft with the jurisdiction over
controversies “between two or more states, except such as shall regard territory
or jurisdiction.” 2 STORY, CONST. § 1673 n.1.
44. This drafting history makes clear the Framers did not intend to limit the
jurisdiction to territory and jurisdiction because they had language before them
that did just that in the Senate provision and they did not use it. No one has
ever attempted to interpret the provision so narrowly.
45. 2 STORY, CONST. § 1673 n.1 (citing JOURNAL OF CONVENTION 226); SCOTT,
supra note 35, at 4.
46. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 4.
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
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Alexander Hamilton provides a more extensive discussion in
Federalist No. 80 that has proved influential in the interpretation
of the Court’s authority over state controversies.49
Hamilton begins by listing the proper objects of the judicial
power vested in the Supreme Court, two of which he argues
include controversies between states: (1) “all those [cases] which
involve the peace of the confederacy”; and (2) “all those [cases] in
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and
unbiased.”50
Hamilton pointed to the “horrid picture of the dissensions
and private wars” among German states in the 1400s “which
distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of” a
court to resolve controversies among them as a justification for
the Court’s “power of determining causes between two states.”51
Hamilton also argued that the federal government must have
power to enforce federal law in controversies between states and
that the Supreme Court is the body best suited to do so because
the Court has no “local attachments” and is therefore “likely to be
impartial between the different States.”52
Two portions of the Federalist No. 80 are worthy of special
notice. First, Hamilton argues that “[w]hatever practices may
have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are
proper objects of federal superintendence and control.”53 Second,
Hamilton pointed out the need for a mechanism for states to
resolve even those disputes that had never before arisen and were
not yet foreseen.54

49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (“[T]here are many other sources, besides interfering claims of
boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the
members of the Union. . . . . [T]hough the proposed Constitution establishes
particular guards against the repetition of those instances which have
heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend that the
spirit which produced them will assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen
nor specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to
disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal
superintendence and control.”).
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During the ratification debates, the anti-federalists did not
challenge the utility of the state controversy resolution power,
either because the jurisdictional provision in the Articles of
Confederation was substantively coextensive with that proposed
in the Constitution and, or perhaps because, they agreed that
providing for jurisdiction over state controversies was a good
idea.55
Congress determines whether the Court’s original
jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent with the lower federal
courts.56 Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
state controversy jurisdiction has been exclusive.57
As of this Article, the Supreme Court has exercised this
power in ninety-nine state controversies. As one compiler puts it,
the cases “run like threads of gold” through the many volumes of
the United States Reports.58 These ninety-nine controversies and
the thirty-six improperly brought controversies are summarized
in the Appendix, and Part III reviews in detail the environmental
controversies between the states that have been resolved to date.
B. Interstate Compacts as Plenary Legislative Power
The Constitution permits states, with congressional assent,
to enter into binding compacts resolving interstate controversies
that become the supreme law of the land and are enforceable
against one another through enforcement suits brought in the
Supreme Court and by Acts of Congress.59
55. Interstate
Disputes,
HERITAGE.ORG,
http://www.heritage.org/
constitution#!/articles/3/essays/112/interstate-disputes (last visited Sept. 25,
2013) (“The logic of this position was such that even Anti-Federalists, such as
Brutus, conceded the utility of the provision, and there is little or no recorded
opposition to this grant of federal jurisdiction in the ratifying debates.”).
56. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 n.1 (1992).
57. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80–81 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is
a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state
and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (“The Supreme Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more
States.”).
58. Scott, supra note 35, at vii.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2

14

CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED

2014]

3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM

CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES

119

Some commentators believe the Compact Clause prohibits
state collusion without the assent of Congress.60 The better view
is that states can collude without congressional approval, and
this cannot be challenged. What states cannot do is enter into
binding agreements enforceable against states without
congressional approval.61 Though, the Court has found implied
congressional assent, it has never enforced an agreement between
states that did not have the assent of Congress. The Court has
articulated a test for when the congressional assent is required,
but this is meaningful whether the consequence is limited to the
availability of compact enforcement suits in the Supreme Court.62
Properly understood, the Compact Clause operates in the same
manner as the statute of frauds—the Compact Clause renders
agreements not enforceable against states if they are made
without congressional assent.
But this does not mean that the agreements cannot bind
citizens. Suppose a citizen challenges the assessment of an
interstate tax commission. The citizen argues the interstate tax
commission was created by state agreement but without
The Exceptions Clause in Article I, section 10 could be grammatically read to
apply to each of its restrictions as opposed to merely the final restriction on
engaging in war. This is undermined by the reference to “time of Peace” in the
standing army limitation. Id. Still, it is worth pondering whether states during
the Civil War could have entered into compacts without the consent of Congress.
60. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional
Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285 (2003); Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007).
61. States can probably waive sovereign immunity in a compact that does not
implicate federalism concerns, and this would be sufficient to make it binding at
least in the state’s own courts without congressional consent. But without a
continuing voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity a state may only be sued by
another state in the Supreme Court because the Eleventh Amendment prevents
suits by citizens, and a state cannot be sued in the Supreme Court under a
compact that has not been assented to by Congress. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
62. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976) (“The application
of the Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are ‘directed to the
formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States.’ . . . Whether a particular agreement respecting boundaries is
within the Clause will depend on whether ‘the establishment of the boundary
line may lead or not to the increase of the political power or influence of the
States affected, and thus encroach or not upon the full and free exercise of
Federal authority.’” (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20, 22
(1893))).
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congressional assent. The commission’s assessment is binding on
the citizen so long as the state under whose authority it is
enforced has properly delegated the necessary authority to the
commission. That another state has done so as well does not
matter, nor does it matter that the state under whose authority
the citizen is bound is collecting the tax on behalf of another
state.
To argue otherwise would be to argue that the
Constitution makes service for one state incompatible with
service for another state. The Constitution contains no such
provision, and to say that it is implied by the Compact Clause is
to put too much upon those words which speak only of compacts
and nothing of delegation.63 If the Framers intended the
Constitution to forbid interstate officers without congressional
assent, it is unthinkable they would have left the matter implied
in a Compact Clause that can simply and functionally be
understood as a limit on enforceability of agreements between
states, not the lawfulness of interstate collusion.
There are environmental disputes that can be resolved
through non-binding collusion, just as agreements between
landowners do not always require judicial enforcement. Just as
with landowners and the statute of frauds, it is those disputes
that can only be resolved by judicially enforceable agreements
that are limited by the constitutional limit in the Compact
Clause. When an environmental controversy can be resolved by
an agreement that produces mutual gains to the contending
states, compacting should occur unless the costs of negotiating
with one another and obtaining congressional assent are too
high.64 Of course, when the performances by the states are not
simultaneous, the existence of the Supreme Court’s authority
(and willingness) to enforce compacts is crucial to their inception.
Other environmental controversies are less likely to be resolved
by compacting absent some other remedy for the states—those in
which the controversy is asymmetrical.
For example, an

63. The Constitution express provision in the Incompatibility Clause that “no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office” supports the view that the Constitution
does not forbid officers of one state from simultaneously serving as officers of
other states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
64. Full consideration of this point is outside the scope of this Article.
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environmental controversy between upriver and downriver states
over the use and pollution of river water is unlikely to be resolved
by compacting unless the downriver states have some leverage.
A little discussed case from 1918 held that compacts may also
be enforced by the unilateral Acts of Congress.65 The significance
of this holding was made clear by New York v. United States
because the 1918 Court explicitly held that the Constitution does
not limit congressional commandeering of state governments when
Congress passes Acts to enforce compacts: “[T]he lawful exertion of
[the national power’s] authority by Congress to compel compliance
with the obligation resulting from the contract between the two
States which it approved is not circumscribed by the powers
reserved to the States.”66 Thus, if two states enter into an
environmental controversy resolving compact, Congress would
gain enforcement powers to regulate the underlying environmental
problem that Congress may not otherwise have.

65. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918).
66. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918) (“The vesting in
Congress of complete power to control agreements between States, that is, to
authorize them when deemed advisable and to refuse to sanction them when
disapproved, clearly rested upon the conception that Congress, as the repository
not only of legislative power but of primary authority to maintain armies and
declare war, speaking for all the States and for their protection, was concerned
with such agreements, and therefore was virtually endowed with the ultimate
power of final agreement which was withdrawn from state authority and
brought within the federal power. It follows as a necessary implication that the
power of Congress to refuse or to assent to a contract between States carried
with it the right, if the contract was assented to and hence became operative by
the will of Congress, to see to its enforcement. This must be the case unless it
can be said that the duty of exacting the carrying out of a contract is not, within
the principle of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, relevant to the power to
determine whether the contract should be made. But the one is so relevant to
the other as to leave no room for dispute to the contrary. Having thus the
power to provide for the execution of the contract, it must follow that the power
is plenary and complete, limited of course, as we have just said, by the general
rule that the acts done for its exertion must be relevant and appropriate to the
power. This being true, it further follows, as we have already seen, that, by the
very fact that the national power is paramount in the area over which it
extends, the lawful exertion of its authority by Congress to compel compliance
with the obligation resulting from the contract between the two States which it
approved is not circumscribed by the powers reserved to the States.”).
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSY SUITS
BETWEEN STATES
The Court resolves environmental controversies between
states: (1) by apportioning scarce environmental resources; and
(2) by protecting environmental resources from interference. The
controversies brought before the Court within these two
categories to date are as follows:
Apportioned
Resources
State Territory
Interstate Waters
Migratory Fish

Protected
Resources
Waterway Navigability
Interstate Waters
Land Use

These are by no means the only resources that the Court may
apportion and protect.Indeed, Part V shows that the Court has
jurisdiction to resolve controversies between states over air
pollution.67
This Part will survey the apportionment and protection suits
litigated to date without detailing the jurisdictional, remedial,
and rule of decision issues, as these matters are treated in depth
and by issue in Part IV rather than by the substance of the
controversies as the controversies are related here.
A. Apportioning Environmental Resources Among States
There is perhaps no more classically legal dispute than
between two competing claimants to a resource.68 The same is
true as between states. To date, the majority of controversies
litigated before the Supreme Court between two or more states
meet this description.

67. Speculative discussion of other environmental controversies that fall
within these two categories is relegated to the lengthy note 111, infra.
68. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2

18

CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED

2014]
a.

3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM

CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES

123

Apportioning Territory

Adjacent states have most frequently contended with one
another in the Supreme Court over the sovereign ownership of
land.69 The Supreme Court historian Charles Warren noted in
1924 that the seriousness of state controversies over territory is
gravely evidenced by “the fact that in at least four instances—
New Jersey v. New York in the 1820’s; Missouri v. Iowa in the
1840’s; Louisiana v. Mississippi in the 1900’s; and Oklahoma v.
Texas in [the 1920’s], armed conflicts between the militia or
citizens of the contending States had been a prelude to the
institution of the suits in the Court.”70
In the state controversy cases over territory, the states assert
conflicting claims to land based on differing definitions of the
interstate boundary.71 The problems giving rise to these suits are
not limited to technical failings of cartographers. For instance,
what happens if a river that forms a boundary between two states

69. New York v. Connecticut (1799); New Jersey v. New York (1830); Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts (1833); Missouri v. Iowa (1849); Florida v. Georgia
(1850); Alabama v. Georgia (1859); Virginia v. West Virginia (1870); Missouri v.
Kentucky (1870); Indiana v. Kentucky (1890); Nebraska v. Iowa (1892); Iowa v.
Illinois (1893); Virginia v. Tennessee (1893); Missouri v. Nebraska (1904);
Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906); Washington v. Oregon (1908); Missouri v.
Kansas (1908); Maryland v. West Virginia (1910); Arkansas v. Tennessee (1912);
North Carolina v. Tennessee (1914); Arkansas v. Mississippi (1919); Georgia v.
South Carolina (1919); Minnesota v. Wisconsin (1920); Oklahoma v. Texas
(1920); New Mexico v. Texas (1923); New Mexico v. Colorado (1925); Vermont v.
New Hampshire (1925); Michigan v. Wisconsin (1926); New Jersey v. Delaware
(1929); Wisconsin v. Michigan (1932); Arkansas v. Tennessee (1935); Kansas v.
Missouri (1940); Mississippi v. Louisiana (1953); Louisiana v. Mississippi (1963);
Illinois v. Missouri (1965); Ohio v. Kentucky (1966); Michigan v. Ohio (1967);
Arkansas v. Tennessee (1968); Texas v. Louisiana (1970); Mississippi v.
Arkansas (1971); New Hampshire v. Maine (1973); South Dakota v. Nebraska
(1976); California v. Nevada (1977); Georgia v. South Carolina (1977); Tennessee
v. Arkansas (1978); Texas v. Oklahoma (1980); Louisiana v. Mississippi (1980);
Arkansas v. Mississippi (1982); Illinois v. Kentucky (1986); Louisiana v.
Mississippi (1993); New Jersey v. New York (1998); New Hampshire v. Maine
(2000); New Jersey v. Delaware (2006). There are also controversies over
proprietary ownership of land. Massachusetts v. New York (1926); Nebraska v.
Iowa (1964); California v. Arizona (1978).
70. WARREN, supra note 28, at 38.
71. A large number of boundaries are defined as the main channel of a river
and are accordingly subject to change.
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changes course?72 What if landfill extends the area of an
island?73 Only a minority of the border controversies resolved to
date arose from disagreement over the location of unchanging
reference points.74 And new disputes of this description are
limited by the Court’s recognition of sovereign acquiescence and
prescription to resolve the problem of ancient boundary
mistakes.75
Many of these territory controversies involve interpretations
of boundary compacts. This is because Congress may not reduce
the territory of a state without its consent, and so the usual
manner for legislative settlement of a boundary between two
states is a compact entered into by the states and assented to by
Congress.76 It is not worth noting which cases are and which
cases are not grounded in the interpretation of a boundary
compact because they are no different from cases in which the
document to be interpreted is a grant of land by Congress to the
various sovereign states.

72. The wonderful principles of thalweg, accretion, and avulsion apply.
73. The terms of the territorial grants and the principles of accretion and
avulsion apply.
74. See Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1 (1910); North Carolina v.
Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U.S. 30 (1925); New
Mexico v. Texas, 275 U.S. 279 (1927); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 1101 (1985) (summarily
adopting master’s report); Oklahoma v. Arkansas, 473 U.S. 610 (1985) (“It Is
Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed That: . . . Arkansas has exercised continuous
sovereignty, dominion, control, and exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction over
the disputed tract since . . . 1905; that Sebastian County, Arkansas, has
continuously levied and collected real property taxes within the disputed tract;
and that Le Flore County, Oklahoma, has never levied or collected taxes within
the disputed tract. . . . [T]he doctrine of acquiescence applies to the boundary
dispute between . . . Oklahoma and . . . Arkansas. Therefore . . . the disputed
tract has become and continues to be a part of . . . Arkansas under the doctrine
of acquiescence.”).
76. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the
Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two
or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). The unusual manner would be a
state ceding territory to the Federal Government or another state because this
does not create a consent issue. It is possible therefore for Congress to
“purchase” this consent. The Federal Government’s power of eminent domain
does not extend to the forced cessation of sovereignty, only title to land.
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The majority of the territory controversy cases have been
over water boundaries in part because of the lesser certainty of
aquatic boundaries but also because “great [f]inancial interests”
are at stake for the citizens of the contending states.77 For
example, in one controversy the fisherman of the victor would
gain access to valuable “oyster fisheries in the waters between
the two states.”78 In another controversy, “control of the very
valuable salmon fisheries” in the Columbia River hung in the
balance.79 And in another controversy, lobster fishing rights
were at stake.80 Recent droughts in the Southeast have led states
to consider disputing borders to increase access to water.81 As to
this last example, gaining sovereign ownership of rivers and lakes
is not the only nor the most frequent way states have sought to
gain access to water in the Supreme Court.
b.

Apportioning Water

Requests for apportionment of interstate water resources are
the second most prominent category of state controversy litigation
in the Supreme Court even though the first litigated controversy
did not arise until the turn of the twentieth century.82 In these
77. WARREN, supra note 28, at 43.
78. Id. at 44 (discussing Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906)).
79. Id. (discussing Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205 (1909)).
80. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 364, 364 n. 1 (1976) (“Maine’s
regulatory laws, if applicable, are more restrictive than those of New
Hampshire. For example, Maine requires a license, available only to Maine
residents, for the taking of lobsters in Maine waters. . . . Maine also imposes
stricter minimum- and maximum-size requirements. . . . Before the original
action was filed, efforts to settle the dispute failed, and violence over lobster
fishing rights in the area was threatened.”).
81. The Georgia legislature passed “[a] Resolution proposing a settlement of
the boundary dispute between the State of Georgia and the State of Tennessee;
and for other purposes” and it has been sent to the Governor. H.R. Res. 4, 2012
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/
Legislation/20132014/128071.pdf.
See also Andrew Exum, Graveyard of
Peaches: How Tennessee Will Win Its War Against Georgia, WIRED (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/tennessee-georgia-war/all/.
82. Kansas v. Colorado (1902) (Arkansas River); Wyoming v. Colorado (1917)
(Laramie River); Wisconsin v. Illinois (1926) (Lake Michigan); New Jersey v.
New York (1929) (Delaware River); Arizona v. California (1930) (Colorado
River); Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (Connecticut River); Washington v.
Oregon (1931) (Walla Walla River); Nebraska v. Wyoming (1934) (North Platte
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cases, the states request an equitable determination of amounts
of water the citizens of each state within a watershed may
withdraw from it. The underlying dispute is analogous to the
disputes long resolved by common law courts regarding
landowner rights to surface waters. The common law of the
individual states generally follows either a riparian rights or
appropriation doctrine for allocating rights to surface waters.
The Supreme Court has developed its own approach of equitable
apportionment that recognizes the equal dignity of the states and
the equal right of each state’s citizens to utilize the watershed.
A majority of these water apportionment controversies
involve nonnavigable rivers, and for good reason.83
The
Commerce Clause gives to Congress “the general power over
navigation” and Congress “control[s], in general, the use of
navigable waters.”84 In 1902, when the first case arose in a
dispute over the Arkansas River, it was conceded by the United
States that Congress did not have power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the Arkansas River because it was not
navigable.85 The existence of interconnected resource systems
that cross state lines but that, as Justice Holmes put it in his
cautionary note in Missouri v. Illinois, do “not fall within the
power of Congress to regulate” leaves only two possibilities for

River); Colorado v. Kansas (1942) (Arkansas River); Colorado v. New Mexico
(1978) (Vermejo River); South Carolina v. North Carolina (2007) (Catawba
River).
83. Kansas v. Colorado (1902) (Arkansas River); Wyoming v. Colorado (1917)
(Laramie River); Washington v. Oregon (1931) (Walla Walla River); Nebraska v.
Wyoming (1934) (North Platte River); Colorado v. Kansas (1942) (Arkansas
River); Colorado v. New Mexico (1978) (Vermejo River).
84. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 22 (1824).
85. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). The Court noted that it
might be possible that Congress could regulate the Arkansas River under other
clauses of the constitution but reserved the question. Interestingly, “[t]he
Arkansas River is unique in that the pronunciation of its name changes from
State to State. In Colorado, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, it is pronounced as is the
name of the State of Arkansas, but in Kansas, it is pronounced Ar-KAN-sas.”
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 677 (1995). It would be profitable for the The
Green Bag 2d. to publish an analysis, in the same vein as Jay D. Wexler’s Laugh
Track, of the pronunciation used by the justices at oral argument and their votes
for and against Kansas in Arkansas River dispute cases.
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peaceful and efficient allocation.86 Either the states must come to
an agreement or the Supreme Court must resolve the
controversy. As the likelihood of the states reaching an efficient
agreement is increased if the downriver state has a remedy
against a non-cooperative upriver state, the Court recognized the
cause of action for equitable apportionment of interstate waters
in the Kansas v. Colorado controversy in 1906.87
Having recognized the cause of action in part because of the
perceived absence of congressional power, the Court nevertheless
recognizes a cause of action for equitable apportionment of
navigable waters.88 The first such case, Wisconsin v. Illinois, is
interesting in that the contending states intended the water for
very different uses. Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago
pumped 8,500 cubic feet of water per second from Lake Michigan
into an artificial canal so as to enable it to be used to dispose of
sewage from the residents of the city of Chicago. This massive
quantity of water was required to get the sewage to move through
the canal, otherwise it would stand still. This copious withdrawal
decreased the water level of Lake Michigan, the other Great
Lakes, and their connecting waterways by inches.
This
diminishment threatened navigation, not the consumptive use of
water. The Court issued an injunction requiring graduated
reductions in the water the Court found was wrongfully

86. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 (1906). This assumes the absence
of Coasian coordination without interposition of a judicial remedy.
87. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95–96 (1907) (“Now the question
arises between two States, one recognizing generally the common law rule of
riparian rights and the other prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of
flowing water. Neither State can legislate for or impose its own policy upon the
other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the
flow of that stream. It does not follow, however, that because Congress cannot
determine the rule which shall control between the two States or because
neither State can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy
ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power which can take
cognizance of the controversy and determine the relative rights of the two
States. Indeed, the disagreement, coupled with its effect upon a stream passing
through the two States, makes a matter for investigation and determination by
this court.”).
88. Wisconsin v. Illinois (1926) (Lake Michigan); New Jersey v. New York
(1929) (Delaware River); Arizona v. California (1930) (Colorado River);
Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (Connecticut River); South Carolina v.
North Carolina (2007) (Catawba River).
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withdrawn from Lake Michigan at the expense of the other states’
interests in navigation.
Wisconsin v. Illinois had features sufficient to distinguish it
from a request by states for apportionment of interstate navigable
water systems (as opposed to nonnavigable water systems).
Thus, recognition of a cause of action in Wisconsin v. Illinois did
not compel the Court to extend the equitable apportionment
cause of action to navigable waterways. But it seems no
defendant state raised this argument. Accordingly, the Court
continued to recognize actions for navigable water apportionment
in the New Jersey v. New York controversy over the Delaware
This was followed by the Arizona v. Colorado
River.89
controversy over the Colorado River arising out of the plan to
construct what is now the Hoover Dam.90 In the Arizona v.
Colorado controversy, the Court again recognized its jurisdiction
to equitably apportion interstate navigable waters, but also held
that Congress had a concurrent power to apportion the use of
navigable waters amongst states under the Commerce Clause
and that the exercise of this power displaced the Court’s power to
do so.91 The states have brought two other controversies over
apportionment of navigable waters before the Court, bringing the
number of navigable water apportionment cases to five.92
As noted above, even where Congress does not have the
power to apportion interstate waters because they are
nonnavigable, the Supreme Court is not alone in its power to
issue a binding resolution of the controversy. The states can
agree as to the proper apportionment of the water system. For
that agreement to bind the states, it must be a compact formed by
the mutual assent of the states and Congress. If it is not binding,
the states following the agreement are simply cooperating with
one another and there is no legally enforceable resolution of the
controversy as between the states.
After the Court recognized the cause of action for equitable
apportionment of interstate water systems in 1906, many states
89. New Jersey v. New York (1929) (Delaware River).
90. Arizona v. California (1930) (Colorado River).
91. Id.
92. Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (Connecticut River); South Carolina
v. North Carolina (2007) (Catawba River).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2

24

CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED

2014]

3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM

CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES

129

entered into compacts apportioning the waters between them,
including the waters of the Arkansas River. They did so not only
spurred by the Court’s recognition of the action, but at the behest
of the Court which encouraged states to avoid equitable
apportionment litigation by entering into compacts and to resolve
any problems with the Court’s apportionment determinations by
compacting around them. The States heeded this advice, and the
results give rise to another form of environmental controversy
between states—breach of resource apportionment compact
controversies.
The Supreme Court generally has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce state compliance with interstate resource
apportionment compacts.93 To date, all seven resource compact
enforcement proceedings brought before the Supreme Court have
been interstate water apportionment compacts.94 But, other
compacts exist apportioning other resources, and upon their
breach, actions can be brought before the court. The enforcement
jurisdiction exists and so do the compacts, and this is no
coincidence. Why would any state expend resources entering into
and complying with a compact that cannot be enforced? If

93. The Court has rejected the sole attempt by a commission created by a
compact to itself bring an enforcement suit against another state because the
commission is not a sovereign state and so a controversy between it and another
state is not a controversy between two or more states. See Se. Interstate LowLevel Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Comm’n v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 926 (2001).
Such a commission cannot bring a suit in Federal Court against a non-compliant
state because this is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. But see Alabama v.
North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010) (permitting the Commission to be joined
as a party plaintiff with other states seeking the same relief as the commission
from a state over the dissent of Chief Justice Roberts that this violates the
Eleventh Amendment). A state could be sued in state court under the compact
because the compact qualifies as federal law for Supremacy Clause purposes,
but it would be sovereignly immune from such a suit without its consent. It is
an open question whether a state can irrevocably waive sovereign immunity to
suit by a compact commission. Such a consent is after all the basis of the
Court’s jurisdiction in interstate controversy cases. Perhaps a state can give an
irrevocable consent to waive sovereign immunity in proceedings brought by an
interstate compact commission only through processes equivalent to those used
to ratify the Constitution. Even if this is not a necessary condition for such a
waiver, it should be sufficient.
94. Texas v. Colorado (1967); Texas v. New Mexico (1975); Kansas v.
Colorado (1986); Oklahoma v. New Mexico (1987); Kansas v. Nebraska (1998);
Virginia v. Maryland (2000); Montana v. Wyoming (2007).
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enforcement is not thought necessary, the states can simply agree
to the allocation of the resources.
As outlined above, the Court encourages states to enter into
resource apportionment compacts. If these give rise to breach of
compact proceedings, what is the gain? The rule of decision in an
equitable apportionment of interstate waters case is federal
common law, whereas in a breach of compact case the rule of
decision regarding the allocation of the resources is set by the
compact.95 This is preferable because allocations set by the
agreement of the parties are likely to be more efficient than those
set by the court and determining the proper allocation requires
the expenditure of significant judicial resources.96
c.

Apportioning Fish

As noted above, many of the territory disputes are proxies for
disputes over the bounty of the rivers and seas.97 Much of this
bounty, like interstate waters, migrates between states and,
accordingly, the sizes of each state’s catch are inextricably
intertwined. And so, there is a potential for the Supreme Court
to equitably apportion catch shares amongst the states. Recent
research into voluntary catch share agreements suggest they
advance both conservation and the economic productivity of
fishing grounds by resolving commons problems.98 But there are
impediments to private implementation of catch shares.99 Just as
with interstate water resources, the states may enter into
interstate catch share compacts without recognition of an

95. However, the rule of decision as to the principles to be applied in
interpreting the contract, any obligations of good faith and fair dealing, and the
availability of remedies not specified in the compact is federal common law. See
Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295.
96. The portion of those expenditures borne by a special master assigned to
controversies by the Court is assessed as costs to the states.
97. See WARREN, supra note 28, at 43-44 and accompanying text. See also
New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 364, 364 n.1 (1976).
98. See generally Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent
Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. 1678 (2008).
99. See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as
Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2004); see
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine
Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9 (2002).
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equitable apportionment of fisheries action by the Supreme Court
but they are more likely to do so if a compact-less remedy for
inequitable consumption of the bounty by a state exists in the
Court. And just as with navigable interstate waters, Congress
may only resolve the matter by adopting federal regulations of
individual appropriations, not by regulating states directly.
There are efficiency advantages of compacts over federal
regulation that make recognition of a cause of action that
increases the use of compacts worthwhile. For these reasons it is
fortunate the Court has recognized a cause of action for equitable
apportionment of interstate fisheries in the absence of
compacts.100 And it is probable that there are more fishery
management compacts today than there would be without this
recognition.
***
The non-territorial controversies detailed in this section arise
out of the existence of interstate resources. When a state’s
consumption of a resource reduces the available portion of
resources that can be consumed by other states, the Supreme
Court may be called upon to equitably apportion the usage of the
resource amongst the several states. In all of the environmental
apportionment controversies, territorial and non-territorial, the
contending states desire more of something, whether it be more
territory, more water, or more fish. And in resolving these
controversies, the Court allocates a scarce resource amongst
multiple claimants, just as the court in Pierson v. Post allocated
one fox between two hunters.101
B. Protecting State Environmental Resources from
Interference
Just as the controversies outlined above are epitomized by
Pierson v. Post, the environmental controversies discussed in this
100. See Idaho v. Oregon (1975). The recognition of the cause of action as well
as the recognition of the interstate water apportionment cases seem to pose
state action problems because the appropriators of the water and fish are
usually private parties. The court has evidently applied an inverse parens
patriae doctrine in recognizing these actions. This is discussed in depth below.
See infra, Part III.B.d.
101. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805).
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section are epitomized by Aldred’s Case. In these controversies,
the decisions of one state are alleged to interfere with another
state’s enjoyment of environmental resources.
a.

Protecting Navigation

In the earliest case of this description, South Carolina alleged
Georgia and agents of the United States were improperly
obstructing the navigation of the Savannah River and thereby
interfering with South Carolina’s enjoyment of that resource.102
While several of the territory controversies that centered around
water boundaries were rooted in a state’s desire to gain access to
a greater share of the bounty of the rivers and seas, the others
were concerned with increasing each state’s ability to use rivers
for their primary purpose—navigation. This is reflected by the
Court’s default rule for river boundaries.103 Once a state has
jurisdiction over this valuable resource, it has a strong interest in
keeping its portion of the river free of obstruction. It is obviously
less concerned with the navigability of the other state’s portion of
the river, if not actually interested in reductions in the
navigability of that portion.
Surprisingly, only South Carolina has filed a bill of complaint
alleging obstruction of navigation.104 Although the Court held
that the obstruction South Carolina complained of was authorized

102. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876).
103. When a river is specified as a boundary, rather than the geographic
middle of the river, the Court holds that the boundary is the center of the main
navigation channel or “thalweg” of the river, which is usually the deepest
portion of the river. It may be closer to one state’s bank than another, and it
may drift back and forth between the banks. The Court adopts this boundary
formula as a default principle because of the importance of controlling as much
of the prime navigable portion of the waterway as possible is important to the
states.
104. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876). Arizona’s suit against the Hoover Dam
construction did not allege obstruction probably because Congress had
authorized its construction. Arizona v. California (1930). This may have been a
mistake, as there is language in South Carolina v. Georgia leaving open the
question of whether Congress can totally disrupt the navigability of a river. The
question is an open one. The longstanding practice of damming navigable
waterways for hydroelectric power suggests Congress has authority to do so, but
this result is less constitutionally justifiable without the consent of the states
adjoining the waterway.
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by Congress, the resolution of the case on the merits indicates
that South Carolina’s bill of complaint properly stated a
controversy between states. Nearly one hundred years later
Vermont included in a bill of complaint an allegation that the
activities complained of impeded navigation on Lake Champlain
and Ticonderoga Creek.105 The Court overruled a demurrer,
presumably affirming once again its jurisdiction to resolve
controversies between states over obstruction of navigation in
interstate waters, though it was not Vermont’s primary count or
concern.106 The case was dismissed after the states settled before
final disposition. No other cases have tested the availability of
the Court for resolution of controversies over obstruction of
navigation, but perhaps this is because the rules are clear.107
Congress and Compacts can authorize a state obstructing a
portion of navigable waterway, otherwise they are probably per se
unlawful.108
b.

Protecting Land

Interstate waters gave rise to the filing of a bill of complaint
by North Dakota against Minnesota alleging an interference with
the enjoyment not of a waterway, but of land.109 North Dakota
claimed that Minnesota had constructed so many drainage
ditches leading into the Mustinka River that the resulting
increased flow volume and speed caused the level of Lake
Traverse to rise and in turn caused its outlet, the Bois de Sioux
River, to overflow and flood valuable North Dakota land used for

105. Vermont v. New York (1971).
106. Id. The navigability allegation was discussed more during New York’s
oral argument on the demurrer than Vermont’s, and in both portions the
discussions were limited. Oral Argument, Vermont v. New York (1971).
107. But see Wisconsin v. Minnesota, 382 U.S. 935 (1965) (summarily denying
leave to file a bill of complaint); McKusick, supra note 5, at 207 (noting
Wisconsin filed bill “suit to enjoin Minnesota from permitting Northern States
Power Company to build dam and coal-fired steam generating plant on St. Croix
River, allegedly creating nuisance and impeding recreational use of river”).
108. This implicit rule against interstate water obstruction without
congressional assent probably explains the significant federal involvement in
hydroelectric power.
109. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1921).
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farming.110 The Court resoundingly affirmed North Dakota’s
right to seek relief for the alleged injury in the Supreme Court by
filing a bill against the offending state, but held the state failed to
meet its high burden on the merits of showing the flooding was
caused by the ditches and not by heavy rains in another part of
the watershed and dismissed the case without prejudice.111 The
Court’s recognition of an action for interstate flooding in North
Dakota v. Wisconsin has engendered no follow up state
controversies litigated in the Supreme Court.
c.

Protecting Water

States have brought three interstate water pollution
controversies before the Court for resolution.112 In all three
controversies, the Court recognized the existence of a controversy
within its original and exclusive jurisdiction and its power to
provide relief. In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri filed a bill of
complaint against Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago
alleging that the Sanitary District was planning to reverse the
flow of the Chicago River such that it would flow into and pollute
the Mississippi River.113 And in New York v. New Jersey, New
York filed a bill of complaint against New Jersey and the Passaic
Valley Sewerage Commissioners seeking an injunction against
the discharge of sewage into the Upper Bay of the New York
Harbor.114 Finally, in Vermont v. New York, Vermont filed a bill
of complaint against New York and the International Paper
Company for a pulp mill’s pollution of Lake Champlain and

110. Id.
111. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (“[W]here one State,
by a change in its method of draining water from lands within its border,
increases the flow into an interstate stream, so that its natural capacity is
greatly exceeded and the water is thrown upon the farms of another State, the
latter State has such an interest as quasi sovereign in the comfort, health and
prosperity of its farm owners that resort may be had to this Court for relief. It
is the creation of a public nuisance of simple type for which a State may
properly ask an injunction.”).
112. Missouri v. Illinois (1901); New York v. New Jersey (1919); Vermont v.
New York (1971).
113. Missouri v. Illinois (1901).
114. New York v. New Jersey (1919).
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Ticonderoga Creek.115 In Missouri v. Illinois and New York v.
New Jersey, the Court held the complainant states failed to meet
the heavy burden on the merits and dismissed the bills without
prejudice for refiling if more could be shown in the future.116 In
Vermont v. New York, after much evidence was heard by a
master, the parties entered a joint request that the Court issue a
decree appointing a South Lake Master to act as arbitrator, and
after the Court denied the request the parties settled the case by
agreement and the court dismissed the bill.117
That these water pollution controversies did not result in the
Court finding liability and issuing injunctions does not mean that
the Court did not assist in resolving the environmental
controversies at issue between the states. In the cases resolved
on the merits, the Court’s affirmation of its jurisdiction and the
dismissal of complaints without prejudice almost certainly
limited the amount of pollution by Illinois and New Jersey into
the Mississippi River and New York Harbor, respectively. And if
Missouri and New York ever in fact obtained evidence of injury,
they could use that evidence to negotiate without having to resort
to litigation. And New York assuredly made concessions to
Vermont in the settlement of their controversy over the pollution
of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek.
On the same day that the Court granted Vermont leave to
file its bill of complaint against New York and the International
Paper Company, the Court denied Illinois leave to file a bill of
complaint against four Wisconsin cities and two local sewage
commissions alleging pollution of Lake Michigan.118 The Court
did so not on the ground that Wisconsin could not be sued for the
alleged pollution, but because Illinois simply failed to join
Wisconsin as a defendant and political subdivisions are not states
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).119 Otherwise, this would

115. Vermont v. New York (1971).
116. Missouri v. Illinois (1901); New York v. New Jersey (1919).
117. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974); Vermont v. New York,
419 U.S. 955 (1974).
118. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
119. Id. The Court did not rest its holding on an interpretation of Article III.
This may suggest that Congress has power to limit the exclusivity of the Court’s
original jurisdiction over state controversies.
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be wholly inconsistent with its grant of leave that same day in
Vermont v. New York, even more so because the International
Paper Company has less relation to the state of New York than
the four cities and two sewerage commissions have to the state of
Wisconsin.
After deciding that political subdivisions are not states for
purposes of section 1251(a)(1), the Supreme Court held that the
bill against the cities and sewerage commissions did fall under
the non-exclusive original jurisdiction provision of 28 U.S.C.
1251(b) for suits by states against citizens of other states because
political subdivisions are citizens of the state.120 The Court then
exercised discretion by denying leave to file because the cause
could be brought in a federal district court since it was not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rather than
refiling the bill in the Supreme Court with Wisconsin joined as a
defendant, Illinois filed against the political subdivisions of the
state in federal district court, presumably for strategic reasons.
Several years later on appeal, the Court held the Clean Water Act
displaced Illinois’ suit against the four cities and the two
sewerage commissions.121 This begs the question whether the
Clean Water Act also displaces suits by states against states like
Missouri v. Illinois, New York v. New Jersey, and Vermont v. New
York. No states have filed bills alleging water pollution since the
1981 state versus citizen displacement holding. Part V, infra,
argues that the displacement holding cannot apply to
controversies between states and that a broad coalition of
Justices are likely to so hold if a state were to file a bill of
complaint for water pollution today. And states are likely to
consider doing so because the absence of water pollution
controversies brought before the Court these past three decades is
no indication that interstate water pollution is no longer a
problem.122
Also, on the same day that the Court granted Vermont leave
and denied Illinois leave, the Court denied leave to file a bill in a
case that represents another environmental controversy that, if it
120. Id.
121. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981).
122. See Michael Wines, Spring Rain, Then Foul Algae in Ailing Lake Erie,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, at A1.
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were between states, could be resolved under the Court’s
exclusive original jurisdiction—air pollution, a subject discussed
in depth in Part V.123
Consideration of other potential
controversies is outside the scope of this Article, except for the
observations below the line here.124
123. See generally Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
124. Speculative discussion of other environmental controversies that fall
within these two categories that have not been litigated is limited to this
footnote.
Apportionment of Wildlife. The recognition of a cause of action for equitable
apportionment of interstate fisheries discussed above in Part III.A. suggests
states might also seek equitable apportionment of interstate terrestrial and
aerial game. Some states may desire to seek equitable apportionment not to
obtain a fair share of the consumption of a species and to prevent tragedy of the
commons diminution of populations below economically optimal levels but
instead to conserve a species. For example two states with interstate wolf
populations might have different views as to the importance of conserving
wolves. This poses a somewhat different issue than the interstate allocation of
game because applying the equal state dignity principle to perform the
allocation requires evaluative judgments of the importance of conservation of
wolves and of other affected interests. As discussed in Part III.A., Wisconsin v.
Illinois posed a similar challenge to the court. The use of the water of Lake
Michigan improved the health and welfare of the citizens of Chicago by
disposing of significant quantities of sewage. But this use lowered the level of
the Great Lakes and the connecting waterways thereby inhibiting navigation.
The Court had to weigh these against one another, and reached the result that
the injunction would be expanded to allow Chicago to construct some other
manner of disposing of the waste. But unlike a species conservation controversy,
both the sewage problem and the navigation problem could be resolved by the
expenditure of monetary resources. That the Court held in favor of the
complainant states suggests it determined that Illinois was imposing a far more
expensive remediation burden on the other states than it would cost to construct
the necessary sewage disposal facilities to obviate the need to withdraw the
water from Lake Michigan. A species could become extinct unless a remedy is
provided by the Court, for instance if a state permits destruction of the entirety
of a necessary portion of a migratory species’ habitat. In this instance the
economic benefit of the development or other activity would have to be balanced
against the non-consumptive enjoyment of the species by a neighboring state.
The required balancing is a challenging problem for the Court, but not
insurmountable. If the Court reaches the wrong balance and enjoins the
inequitable conduct even though it is worth less to the citizens of the
complainant state than the value of the enjoined conduct to the defendant state,
the states can enter into an interstate compact. By recognizing the action and
coming to some resolution, the Court incentivize states to negotiate compacts in
the first instance and the compacting process is available to correct mistakes.
Species conservation controversies pose standing issues. One question is
whether the citizen’s interest in conservation of a species is of a type that gives
rise to parens patriae standing in state controversy cases. See infra Part IV.A.d.
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Alternatively, the state might have standing because the culling of its
population of the animal is a direct injury to the state. See id. This is a
plausible argument for standing in species conservation case, as the Court has
held complete bans on the taking of species of wild animals within the borders of
a state are constitutional because wild animals are the property of the state for
purposes of a takings analysis. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208–
09 (1900) (noting wild animals “belong to the ‘negative community;’ in other
words, are public things subject to the absolute control of the State, which,
although it allows them to be reduced to possession, may at its will not only
regulate but wholly forbid their future taking.”) (quoting Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896)). As there are no similar state controversy cases in
which a non-economic interest is advanced by a state, the particular problem
addressed in this note is not elsewhere addressed in this Article.
Apportionment of Subsurface Oil and Gas. To date, the Court has settled
two interstate oil and gas extraction controversies by resolving competing claims
to territory. In Texas v. Oklahoma a discovery of oil and gas underlying a border
river led to an explosive confrontation between the states. Texas v. Oklahoma
(1920); Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 84 (1921) (“[B]ecause of the recent
discovery and development of oil and gas deposits in the bed of the river
adjacent to Wichita County, Tex., serious conflicts had arisen between parties
claiming title from the State of Texas and others claiming title from the State of
Oklahoma or under the mineral laws of the United States; and that there was . .
. danger of armed conflict between rival claimants . . . .”). And in Mississippi v.
Louisiana, Mississippi claimed an oil well drilled in Louisiana bottomed out
within Mississippi. In the former case, the Court resolved the territory dispute
in favor of Oklahoma after first appointing a receiver to take possession of the
disputed field to allow the court time to determine the territory controversy
before private parties exhausted the oil and gas. In the latter case the Court
held the well in fact bottomed out in Louisiana and therefore did not address
Mississippi’s claims of subsurface trespass. The Court has also resolved several
controversies over the interstate commerce of coal, oil, and gas. In no cases have
states asserted rights against one another in the oil and gas arising out of the
interstate nature of the pool akin to requesting the equitable apportionment of
interstate waters and fisheries. Analogous to interstate water and anadromous
fish, subsurface oil and gas migrate across state lines, and the exploitation
activities on each side of the border affect one another. The adjacent sovereigns
over an interstate oil and gas pool share a unity of interest in the manner in
which the field is developed, akin to the unity of interest shared by adjacent
owners of a subsurface resource pool. The Court has held that the unity of
interest shared by adjacent owners legitimizes regulations by states on
extraction of oil and gas.
Having recognized the importance of state
coordination of subsurface resource exploitation due to this unity of interest
between adjacent landowners, the Court may recognize the importance of
providing opportunities for coordination to states in a similar position. The
potential need for these actions might be increased by the advent of horizontal
slickwater hydrofracturing.
There are two jurisdictional issues here, one largely resolved and one less
so. The first is whether a complainant state has standing to file a bill of
complaint against a state for diminution of oil and gas resources. The Court has
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V. JUDICIAL POWER TO RESOLVE
CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES
This section examines three aspects of the Supreme Court’s
judicial power to resolve controversies between states. The first
inquiry is jurisdictional: What constitutes a controversy between
states upon which a complainant state may properly invoke the
Court’s judicial power by filing a bill of complaint against another
state? The second inquiry is remedial: What relief may the Court
grant a complainant state under its judicial power to resolve
issued several decisions on both the direct injury and parens patriae claims of
standing to complain of injuries to coal, oil, and gas supplies arising out of
restrictions on interstate commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1919)
(leave granted to seek injunction against statute requiring natural gas
producers give West Virginia cutovers preference); Maryland v. Louisiana (1979)
(leave granted to seek injunction against Louisiana tax on the first use of gas
imported from the outer continental shelf); Wyoming v. Oklahoma (1988) (leave
granted to seek injunction against Oklahoma statute requiring coal plants burn
at least ten percent Oklahoma coal); see infra Part III.B.c. The second and less
resolved issue is whether a state is responsible for diminutions caused by
activities of private operators within the pool. Unlike the water cases, the
number of citizens involved is far less than the water cases. But the issue is
implicitly decided in Idaho v. Oregon because the states were responsible for the
activities of their citizens who fished in the Columbia River. This theory of
defendant state responsibility based on the equal state dignity principle is
discussed below in depth. See infra Part III.A.. As for the common law
treatment of subsurface oil and gas, see Peter M. Gerhart & Robert D. Cheren,
Recognizing the Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1044 (2013).
Interstate Disaster Risks. These controversies are foreshadowed by North
Dakota v. Wisconsin. In some ways, the ditches in the interstate flooding cases
are creating a risk of flooding rather than causing flooding. Along this line, a
state might file a bill of complaint against another state for permitting
interstate wildfire hazards. There are no cases yet, but this is a possibility the
states annually ravaged by wild fires should consider. If the Court were to
recognize its jurisdiction over such an action, beneficial compacts would result.
That they are likely to do so is supported by the Court’s statement that its
jurisdiction extends where “there is no municipal code governing the matter.”
Virginia v. West Virginia, 202 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (citing Kansas v. Colorado II,
206 U.S. 46, 82–84 (1907)).
Invasive Species. States have already brought suits related to invasive
species, and this is another area that the Court’s resolution may be available.
However, the Court might be especially reluctant to require state regulation of
wild animals, just as the common law courts refused to hear common law
nuisance actions between neighbors when the harm flows through the activities
of wild animals. See generally Robert D. Cheren, Note, Tragic Parlor Pigs and
Comedic Rascally Rabbits, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 555 (2012).
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controversies between states? The third inquiry is justicial: What
rule of decision applies to a controversy between states?
A. Jurisdiction Over Controversies Between States
The ninety-nine proper and thirty-six improper invocations of
the Court’s jurisdiction over “controversies between two or more
states” demonstrate that a bill of complaint may be filed if (1) a
state is injured directly or through its citizenry, (2) by the acts of
another state or its citizenry, and (3) its resolution is an
appropriate use of the Court’s resources.125 The Court’s broad
interpretation of the state controversy jurisdiction is a function of
the manner in which the Court has posed and considered the
question.
The Court answered an early challenge to its jurisdiction by
holding that the states’ adoption of the Constitution “waived their
exemption from judicial power” as “they respectively made to the
United States a grant of judicial power over controversies
between two or more states” and that from this, the “Court . . .
acquired jurisdiction.”126
Under this formulation, the
jurisdictional power over the states was given by the states to the
federal government. It would seem that the determination of
what constitutes an Article III controversy between states would
be based upon what the states intended to cede to the national
government.
But the Court has instead taken the view that its jurisdiction
to decide controversies between states is what the states received
in exchange for giving up other sovereign rights to resolve
controversies with other states. Thus, the Court’s “power” over
state controversies was “conferred by the Constitution as a
substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between
sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”127
Before the
Constitution, the “independent and sovereign” states in
controversy with other states “could seek a remedy by
negotiation, and, that failing, by force,” and as “[d]iplomatic
powers and the right to make war” were “surrendered to the
125. See Appendix infra.
126. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 720 (1838).
127. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923).
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general government” in the adoption of the Constitution “it was to
be expected that upon [general government] would be devolved
the duty of providing a remedy” and that this remedy was
provided by the “constitutional provisions” for the resolution of
controversies between the states by the Supreme Court.128 And
since the purpose of the substitute is to provide a remedy in those
instances in which the strictures removed the remedy that would
otherwise be available, the absence of a remedy is a touchstone
for the presence of jurisdiction.129 The substitution conception of
the Court’s jurisdiction stems from the Court’s consideration of
the “history of the creation of the power.”130 The Court also
draws upon the specific history of the drafting of the text as is
recounted in Part II.A, supra.131 The substitution model of the
jurisdiction leads to a broad conception of what controversies may
be brought.132
There are two instances of language in the Court’s opinions
that suggest limits based on the history and function of the state
controversy provision. In one case, the Court noted that, as the
power is a substitute for the surrendered diplomatic powers,
“[t]he jurisdiction is therefore limited generally to disputes which,
between States entirely independent, might be properly the

128. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 108, 241 (1901).
129. See id. (“An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury
complained of is such that an adequate remedy can only be found in this court at
the suit of the State of Missouri.”).
130. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372 (1923).
131. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1883) (“The reference we have made to
the derivation of the words ‘controversies between two or more States’
manifestly indicates that the framers of the Constitution intended that they
should include something more than controversies over ‘territory or jurisdiction’;
for in the original draft as reported the latter controversies were to be disposed
of by the Senate, and controversies other than those by the judiciary, to which
by amendment all were finally committed.”).
132. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 108, 240-41 (1901) (“[J]urisdiction has been
exercised in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their
inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and interests of a
State. But such cases manifestly do not cover the entire field in which such
controversies may arise, and for which the Constitution has provided a remedy;
and it would be objectionable, and, indeed, impossible, for the court to anticipate
by definition what controversies can and what cannot be brought within the
original jurisdiction of this court.”).
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subject of diplomatic adjustment.”133 And the Court has reasoned
that “the jurisdiction is of so delicate and grave a character that
it” could not have been “contemplated that it would be exercised
save when the necessity was absolute and the matter in itself
properly justiciable.”134 But these limitations have no discernible
impact on the formulation of the extent of the jurisdiction, which
go to the limits of the judicial power itself.135
The substitution conception of the Court’s role in resolving
controversies between states yields a litmus test for the court’s
jurisdiction: whether the actions complained of “would be grounds
for war if the states were truly sovereign.”136 If a state has causa
belli, the Court has jurisdiction.
Thusly framed, the jurisdictional requirements of a
controversy between two or more states are not entirely in line
with other cases and controversies under Article III. Rather than
shoehorn the analysis unnecessarily, it is best to consider the

133. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923) (“The
jurisdiction and procedure of this Court in controversies between States of the
Union differ from those which it pursues in suits between private parties. This
grows out of the history of the creation of the power, in that it was conferred by
the Constitution as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies
between sovereigns and a possible resort to force. The jurisdiction is therefore
limited generally to disputes which, between States entirely independent, might
be properly the subject of diplomatic adjustment.”).
134. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900).
135. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939) (“To constitute [a
controversy between the States], it must appear that the complaining State has
suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for
judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is
susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the
common law or equity systems of jurisprudence.”); Texas v. Florida 306 U.S.
398, 405 (1939) (“[O]ur constitutional authority to hear the case and grant relief
turns on the question whether the issue framed by the pleadings constitutes a
justiciable ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ within the meaning of the constitutional
provision, and whether the facts alleged and found afford an adequate basis for
relief according to accepted doctrines of the common law or equity systems of
jurisprudence, which are guides to decision of cases within the original
jurisdiction of this Court.”) (internal citations omitted).
136. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 289 (2010) (“Our original
jurisdiction over actions between States is concerned with disputes so serious
that they would be grounds for war if the States were truly sovereign . . . . A
dispute between States over rights to water fits that bill; a squabble among
private entities within a State over how to divvy up that State’s share does
not.”) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18).
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issues from entirely within the decisions on real and purported
state controversies litigated in the Supreme Court, rather than by
reference to cases falling within different clauses of Article III,
Section 2. The Court has not yet distilled the requirements into a
set of necessary elements, so an attempt has been made here to
induce them. This Article contends three elements are present in
the court’s decisions to date. First, the complainant state must be
injured directly or through its citizenry. Second, this injury must
be caused by the acts of another state or its citizenry. Third, the
resolution of the matter must be an appropriate use of the Court’s
limited resources.
a.

Injury of Complainant State

A complainant state must have suffered or be about to suffer
a direct injury or an injury to its citizenry, and the suit may not
be prosecuted to vindicate purely private grievances or national
interests.
The injury requirement is most easily met if a state
proprietary interest is threatened or harmed. The Court has
recognized as sufficient states’ proprietary interests as consumers
in the marketplace and as revenue collectors. A state facing
higher prices is sufficiently injured. For example, in Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, the complainant states sought to protect their
interest “as the proprietor[s] of various public institutions and
schools whose supply of gas will be largely curtailed or cut off by
the threatened interference with the interstate current” by the
operation of a West Virginia statute requiring producers to give
preference to West Virginia customers.137 The Court held that
the threatened impairment of this interest was sufficient because
the state would have to make “very large public expenditures” if
the supply was reduced.138 Likewise, in Maryland v. Louisiana,
the complainant states argued that state consumers of natural
gas faced higher prices for natural gas as a result of the
137. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923).
138. Id. at 592 (“Each State uses large amounts of the gas in her several
institutions and schools — the greater part in the discharge of duties which are
relatively imperative. A break or cessation in the supply will embarrass her
greatly in the discharge of those duties and expose thousands of dependents and
school children to serious discomfort, if not more.”).
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imposition of a tax on pipeline companies. The Court held this
direct injury sufficient.139
Injuries to a state’s proprietary interest in its own property
are also sufficient. In a water apportionment case, Kansas v.
Colorado, the Court held that the “vindication of [Kansas’s]
alleged rights as an individual owner” for the deprivation of “the
waters of the river accustomed to flow through and across the
State” and the “destruction of the property of herself” was
sufficient.140
A state is also sufficiently injured if its tax receipts are
reduced. For example, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, Wyoming
severance tax receipts were reduced by an Oklahoma statute
requiring coal-fired electricity generating plants to use a mixture
of at least ten percent Oklahoma coal, and the Court held this
“loss of specific tax revenues” was sufficient.141
While direct injury to a state’s proprietaryinterest is
sufficient, it is by no means necessary because the Court
recognizes anotherstate interest that may be vindicated by suit in
the Supreme Court against other states.

139. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736–37 (1981) (“It is clear that the
plaintiff States, as major purchasers of natural gas whose cost has increased as
a direct result of Louisiana’s imposition of the First-Use Tax, are directly
affected in a ‘substantial and real’ way so as to justify their exercise of this
Court’s original jurisdiction.”); id. at 736 n.12 (“As alleged in the complaint, the
annual increase in natural gas costs directly associated with the First-Use Tax
with respect to each of the plaintiff States is as follows: Maryland ($60,000);
New York ($300,000); Massachusetts ($25,000); Rhode Island ($25,000); Illinois
($270,000); Indiana ($70,000); Michigan ($650,000); Wisconsin ($70,000); New
Jersey ($20,000). . . . Total direct injuries to the plaintiff States was estimated
to be $1.5 million . . . .”).
140. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907).
141. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 438 (1992); id. at 442 n.3 (“In 1988,
just over 163.8 million tons of Wyoming coal was mined. Only 14.6% of
Wyoming’s coal production was sold in-state. Oklahoma purchased 8% of the
coal mined, making it the third largest out-of-state consumer, behind Texas at
19.7% and Kansas at 8.3%.”); id. at 445 (“Unrebutted evidence demonstrates
that, since the effective date of the Act, Wyoming has lost severance taxes in the
amounts of $535,886 in 1987, $542,352 in 1988, and $87,130 in the first four
months of 1989.”); id. at 448-49 (agreeing with master’s finding that an
undisputed “a direct injury in the form of a loss of specific tax revenues” is
sufficient for state standing (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977)).
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The original jurisdiction may be invoked “by the State
asparens patriae,trustee, guardian or representative of all or a
considerable portion of its citizens.”142 This parens patriae
standing to vindicate injuries to the citizenry was first announced
by the Court in Kansas v. Colorado in 1902.143 There, the Court
pointed to Missouri v. Illinois as precedent, as in that case “the
threatened pollution of the waters of a river flowing between
States, under the authority of one of them, thereby putting the
health and comfort of the citizens of the other in jeopardy,
presented a cause of action justiciable under the Constitution.”144
As for the case before the Court:
Kansas files her bill as representing and on behalf of her citizens
. . . and seeks relief in respect of being deprived of the waters of
the river accustomed to flow through and across the State, and
the consequent destruction of the property . . . of her citizens and
injury to their health and comfort.145

Twenty years later, the Court explicitly held that the
pollution of a body of water to the injury of state citizens gives
rise to parens patriae standing in New York v. New Jersey.146
And in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia two years later, discussed
above, the Court held the complainant states had, in addition to
their proprietary interests in the controversy, parens patriae
standing to represent the threats to the “health, comfort, and
welfare” of its people posed by a reduction in the supply of

142. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902) (“As will be perceived, the
court there ruled that the mere fact that a State had no pecuniary interest in
the controversy, would not defeat the original jurisdiction of this court, which
might be invoked by the State as parens patriae, trustee, guardian or
representative of all or a considerable portion of its citizens.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1921) (“The health,
comfort and prosperity of the people of the State and the value of their property
being gravely menaced, as it is averred that they are by the proposed action of
the defendants, the State is the proper party to represent and defend such rights
by resort to the remedy of an original suit in this court under the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States.”).
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natural gas.147 And in Idaho v. Oregon, Idaho properly invoked
the Court’s jurisdiction to redress a depletion of salmon returning
to Idaho “to the detriment of Idaho fishermen.”148 Frequently the
existence of parens patriae standing entails the existence of direct
injury standing as well because the two are “indissolubly linked,”
such as in Wyoming v. Colorado where harm to the citizen’s
economic interests reduced the tax base of the complainant
state.149
The parens patriae standing doctrine has both an internal
Article III and an external Eleventh Amendment requirement
that a purported controversy between states not be in effect a suit
for the vindication of purely private rights. For a suit to
constitute a controversy between two or more states under Article
III, it cannot really be a controversy between the citizens of a
state and another state. This would be true whether or not the
Eleventh Amendment were adopted. In Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey, the Court denied Pennsylvania, Maine, Massachusetts,
and Vermont leave to file bills of complaint against states seeking
to recover unconstitutionally collected taxes on behalf of its
citizens because the states had neither “sovereign nor quasisovereign interests” in recovering the funds for its citizens.150
The Court did not rest this denial on the Eleventh Amendment,
rather the Court pointed to the “critical distinction, articulated in

147. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (“The private
consumers in each State not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban
communities but constitute a substantial portion of the State’s population. Their
health, comfort, and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened
withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a matter of grave
public concern in which the state, as the representative of the public, has an
interest apart from that of the individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or
ethical interest, but one which is immediate and recognized by law.”).
148. Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980) (“In the present suit, Idaho
alleges that nontreaty fishermen in Oregon and Washington take a
disproportionate share of fish destined for Idaho, thereby depleting those runs to
the detriment of Idaho fishermen. It seeks equitable apportionment of
anadromous fish destined for Idaho in the Columbia River.”).
149. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 468 (1922) (“[T]he welfare,
prosperity, and happiness of the people of the larger part of the Laramie valley,
as also a large portion of the taxable resources of two counties, are dependent on
the appropriations in that State. Thus the interests of the state are indissolubly
linked with the rights of the appropriators.”).
150. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665–66 (1976).
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Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, between suits brought by
‘Citizens’ and those brought by ‘States’” that “would evaporate” if
such suits could be filed by states on behalf of their citizens.151
On its face, the Court’s language in this case would seem to cover
many cases for which leave has been granted. This might suggest
this case was really a discretionary denial, a practice discussed
below in the section on appropriateness. The Court does refer to
this as a “salutary rule” and notes concern over the docket being
inundated, but the Court cites to a provision of the Constitution
in its holding.152 The answer to this issue is probably found in
Maryland v. Louisiana.153 In that case, the Court speaks of an
injury that “affects the general population of a State in a
substantial way” and notes the state’s citizens are suffering
“substantial economic injury” as a result of increased costs.154
Thus, perhaps the problem is one of substantiality. Alternatively,
the Court noted the absence of an option for individual redress in
Maryland v. Louisiana, whereas in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
the taxpayers each had a right to sue for a refund themselves.
The internal Article III limits on parens patriae are often
eclipsed by the more stringent external limit of the Eleventh
Amendment. The internal limit is only implicated if enough
citizens of a state are affected so as to eliminate Eleventh
Amendment problems. When enough citizens’ interests are
implicated, the difficult question of distinguishing between the
impermissible elements of Pennsylvania v. New Jersey and the
permissible elements of Maryland v. Louisiana is implicated.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibition on suits “commenced
or prosecuted against the United States by Citizens of another
State”155 limits the institution of parens patriae suits that are
essentially litigated on behalf of private citizens.
The
constitutional standard seems to be the same as the standard for
the establishment of agency—assent, benefit, and control. An
early case suggested that the Eleventh Amendment would not be
violated so long as the state was at least the nominal party in the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
Id. at 737-39.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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suit because the Amendment “left its exercise over [controversies]
between states as free as it had been before.”156 This statement
omits the caveat that a suit filed by a state against another state
is impermissible under the Eleventh Amendment if it is “a
controversy in vindication of the grievances of particular
individuals.”157
In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, the Court held New
Hampshire could not maintain a suit against Louisiana for the
recovery of repudiated bonds because “[n]o one can look at the
pleadings and testimony in these cases without being satisfied,
beyond all doubt, that they were in legal effect commenced, and
are now prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and
coupons.”158 Thus, the suit was impermissibly controlled by the
bondholders. In South Dakota v. North Carolina, South Dakota
was permitted to bring an action because the bonds “were given
outright and absolutely to the state,” thus, even though much of
the suit was instigated by the previous holder of the bonds, the
prosecution of the suit only benefited the State as owner of the
bonds.159 In North Dakota v. Minnesota, the complainant state

156. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 731 (1838) (“[W]hile [the
Eleventh Amendment] took from this Court all jurisdiction, past, present, and
future . . . of all controversies between states and individuals; it left its exercise
over those between states as free as it had been before.”).
157. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900) (“In order, then, to maintain
jurisdiction of this bill of complaint as against the state of Texas, it must appear
that the controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly between
the state of Louisiana and the state of Texas, and not a controversy in
vindication of the grievances of particular individuals.”); Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) (“[O]ur original jurisdiction is not affected by the
provisions of the Eleventh Amendment which only withholds federal judicial
power in suits against a State ‘by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.’ Thus, an original action between two States only
violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to
recover for injuries to specific individuals.” (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U. S. 251, 258–59 n.12 (1972)).
158. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–91 (1883).
159. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310 (1904) (“Neither can
there be any question respecting the title of South Dakota to these bonds. They
are not held by the state as representative of individual owners, as in the case of
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, for they were given outright and
absolutely to the state.”). But South Dakota could not join the previous owner of
the bonds who still held additional bonds and other citizen bondholders as
defendants in the suit with the hope that the Court would order a proportional
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improperly sought money damages relief on behalf of farm
owners injured by flooding that would be paid to them in
proportion of their losses because the “power as a sovereign to
present and enforce individual claims of its citizens as their
trustee against a sister state” was lost by the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment and that the injured farm owners had
“contributed to a fund which has been used to aid in the
preparation and prosecution” of the suit.160 The Court’s most
recent discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue indicates that
the recovery of funds proportionate to the aggregate of individual
losses that ultimately will be paid out to citizens is permissible so
long as the suit is really controlled by the state.161 The Court will
deny leave to file bills of complaint where the motion for leave to
file indicates that the vindication of a private right is the
dominant purpose and stimulus for the suit.162
In a recent dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the
presence of citizens joined as party plaintiffs might pose Eleventh
Amendment issues.163
Though the majority of the Court
distribution of recovered funds to all bondholders, the state as well as the citizen
defendants. For this reason the court dismissed the citizen bondholders with
costs to South Dakota. As the point of the suit was not to recover on South
Dakota’s bonds but to recover on the citizen bonds, the victory for South Dakota
was a hollow one. Id. at 313-14.
160. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1923).
161. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2001).
162. Illinois v. Michigan, 409 U.S. 36, 37 (1972) (“[I]t seems apparent from the
moving papers and the response that Illinois, though nominally a party, is here
‘in the vindication of the grievances of particular individuals.” (quoting
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16)).
163. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2317-19 (2010) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from deferral of
motion of summary judgment motion that suit by Commission is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment on the grounds that Arizona v. California wrongly decided
and “[t]he Commission is not a sovereign State”). The dissent begins with three
forceful sentences:
The parties to this case are Alabama, Florida, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and the Southeast Interstate Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Management Commission. One of these things is
not like the others: The Commission is not a sovereign State. The
Court entertains its suit — despite North Carolina’s sovereign
immunity — because the Commission “asserts the same claims and
seeks the same relief as the other plaintiffs.” . . . Our Constitution
does not countenance such “no harm, no foul” jurisdiction, and I
respectfully dissent.
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disagreed, it is inadvisable to join citizens as party plaintiffs in
light of the Chief Justice’s concerns when the benefits of party
plaintiffs’ status are limited to what can be had by amicus curiae.
b.

Responsibility of Defendant State

Controversies between sovereigns do not require state action.
Ordinarily, Article III requires a plaintiff’s injury be fairly
traceable to a defendant’s conduct. But the Court has not
adopted this formula for its state controversy jurisdiction.
Rather, a state must answer for injuries to a complainant state or
its citizenry that are fairly traceable to either (1) the sovereign
actions of the state, or (2) the actions of the state’s citizenry in
which the state has a sufficient interest that it could bring a suit
to protect the citizenry as parens patriae.
The states are subject to suit under Article III because, by
adopting the Constitution, the states each consented to be sued
by other states in the Supreme Court and waived sovereign
immunity.164 The Eleventh Amendment did not revoke this
consent and waiver.
States are directly responsible for injuries fairly traceable to
the laws of the state and the authorized actions of its agents.
State responsibility for legislative enactments is borne out by the
numerous challenges to laws restricting interstate commerce.165
And states appear to be responsible for the official acts of

Id. at 2317; compare id., with SESAME STREET, ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE
OTHERS (Columbia Records 1970) (“One of these things is not like the
others.”).
164. Virginia v. West Virginia 206 U.S. 290, 319 (1907) (“Consent to be sued
was given when West Virginia was admitted into the Union . . . .”); Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934) (“The establishment of a permanent
tribunal with adequate authority to determine controversies between the States,
in place of an inadequate scheme of arbitration, was essential to the peace of the
Union. The Federalist, No. 80; Story on the Constitution, s 1679. With respect
to such controversies, the States by the adoption of the Constitution, acting ‘in
their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people,’ waived their
exemption from judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court over the parties in
such cases was thus established ‘by their own consent and delegated authority’
as a necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union.”).
165. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1919); Maryland v. Louisiana (1979).
THE
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governors.166 States are also responsible for the determinations
of state tax assessors.167 And states are responsible for the
actions of corporate agents directed by the state, such as a state
sewerage commission.168 Conversely, states are not responsible
directly for the unauthorized actions of state agents.169 And
states are not directly responsible for the undirected actions of
political subdivisions.170 The contours of direct responsibility are
not well defined because there is a far broader theory of state
responsibility that covers what would otherwise be questionable
cases.171
In 1900, the Court appeared to suggest that states could only
be sued for injuries that states are directly responsible for, that
is, that there would be a “state action” requirement.172 But the
166. State governors can sue in their official capacity on a state’s behalf and
may be sued in their official capacity on a state’s behalf. See, e.g., Idaho v.
Oregon (1975); Kentucky v. Dennison (1861).
167. Texas v. Florida (1937).
168. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921) (“[F]or the purpose of
showing the responsibility of . . . New Jersey for the proposed action of the
defendant, the Passaic Valley sewerage commissioners, the bill sets out, with
much detail, the acts of the Legislature of that state authorizing and directing
such action on their part. Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments of the
bill, quite undenied, show that the defendant sewerage commissioners
constitute such a statutory, corporate agency of the state that their action,
actual or intended, must be treated as that of the state itself, and we shall so
regard it.”).
169. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1900).
170. Thus, New Jersey was not directly responsible for the acts of the Passaic
Valley Sewerage Commission merely because the sewerage commission was
incorporated by the state legislature, but rather it mattered that its activities
were directed by the state. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921).
171. Chief among the questionable cases are the activities of municipal
corporations who are chartered by state legislatures and have powers both
delegated by the state legislation and in many states powers of home rule
delegated by state constitutions. Were it not for the theory of liability to be
discussed below, there would be difficult questions as to how much state
involvement in a particular project constitutes direction and authorization of the
specific acts. But this question is avoided by the theory of liability first
suggested in Missouri v. Illinois, as discussed infra.
172. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1900) (“[I]n order that a
controversy between States, justiciable in this court, can be held to exist,
something more must be put forward than that the citizens of one State are
injured by the maladministration of the laws of another. . . . [A] controversy
between States does not arise unless the action complained of is state action,
and acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers cannot be laid hold of
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following term the Court announced a new theory of
responsibility—state interest. In Missouri v. Illinois, though the
Court found state action, the Court also suggested Illinois could
be held accountable for the actions of the Chicago Sanitary
District because “Illinois would have a right to appear and
traverse the allegations” levied in a suit against the Chicago
Sanitary District.173 Illinois would have this right to intervene
because an injunction against the Sanitary District would injure
a proprietary interest of the State. Under this view, a state may
be sued if the state has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the
decision such that it would be able itself to file a complaint. This
early hint of an important and broad conception of indirect state
responsibility stemmed, as had parens patriae, from the Court’s
analysis of the history of the provision.174 The state interest
theory justifies the scope of the injuries for which states have
been held responsible, but the Court’s decisions along the way
focused on a principle that itself is unacceptably broad—indirect
liability for permitted activities.
Permitting first appeared one year after Missouri v. Illinois,
in Kansas v. Colorado.175 The Court held Colorado responsible
for diversions of the waters of the Arkansas River for irrigation.
Some of these diversions were directed by the state, but a great
number of the diversions Kansas complained of were made by
Colorado citizens who had obtained permits from the state.176

as in themselves committing one State to a distinct collision with a sister
state.”).
173. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 242 (1901) (“The object of the bill is to
subject this public work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the
method of its construction and maintenance will create a continuing nuisance,
dangerous to the health of a neighboring state and its inhabitants. Surely, in
such a case, . . . Illinois would have a right to appear and traverse the
allegations of the bill, and, having such a right, might properly be made a party
defendant.”).
174. Id. at 219 (“But in this, as in other instances, when called upon to
construe and apply a provision of the Constitution of the United States, we must
look not merely to its language but to its historical origin . . . .”). This decision
includes one of the most detailed reviews of the history of the “between two or
more states” provision.
175. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
176. Id. at 137.
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The Court referenced these diversions in its holding summarizing
the allegations of the bill:
The gravamen of the bill is that . . . Colorado, acting directly
herself, as well as through private persons thereto licensed, is
depriving and threatening to deprive the State of Kansas and its
inhabitants of all the water heretofore accustomed to flow in the
Arkansas River through its channel on the surface, and through
a subterranean course, across the state of Kansas . . . . 177

Like Missouri v. Illinois, this was not the only ground the
complaint stood on, and the Court explicitly found state action.178
But the cases that followed bore out the sufficiency of allegations
of a state acting indirectly through private persons licensed by
the state to engage in an activity.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Court had two possible
theories upon which to base an expansion of state responsibility
in state controversy cases beyond state action. On the one hand,
the Court hints in Missouri v. Illinois that state interest
sufficient for state standing is also sufficient for state
responsibility. And on the other hand, the Court hints in Kansas
v. Colorado that permitting regimes are sufficient to impute
responsibility for the permitted activity to the state. The firmer
foundation is the former. If permitting is sufficient for indirect
responsibility, a state could be sued whenever a driver licensed by
a state damages the property of another state. The better view is
that permitting is not relevant, and its frequent presence is only
because state controversies are often over scarce resources that
the states are likely to apportion amongst their citizens.
Furthermore, permitting is beneficial to the conservation of
interstate resources and the avoidance of state controversies, so
holding states subject to responsibility for permitted activities
that they would otherwise not be responsible for is inappropriate.
The purpose of the state controversy provision is to resolve
interstate conflict, not to impose disincentives for conservation.
Though this Article takes the position in favor of the state

177. Id. at 145–46 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 142 (“The action complained of is state action and not the action of
state officers in abuse or excess of their powers.”).
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interest theory, both permitting and state interest are present in
the resolved controversies complaining of citizenry activities.
In Wyoming v. Colorado, the Court held Colorado responsible
for substantial diversions of the Laramie River and its tributaries
by two private corporations with the knowledge, consent, and
cooperation of the state.179 In Washington v. Oregon the Court
evaluated claims by Washington against Oregon for the uses of
water by private irrigators and farmers sinking wells.180 In
Vermont v. New York, one the most striking examples, the Court
granted leave to file a bill of complaint against New York for the
pollution of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek by the
International Paper Co. and other private parties.181 And in
Idaho v. Oregon, the Court granted Idaho leave to file a bill of
complaint against Washington and Oregon for permitting their
fishermen to take an inequitable portion of the anadromous fish

179. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 456 (1922) (“[T]wo corporate
defendants, acting under the authority and permission of Colorado, were
proceeding to divert in that State a considerable portion of the waters of the
river and to conduct the same into another watershed . . . .”); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509–10 (1932) (“The contention that the present bill
shows that the acts complained of are not acts done by Colorado, or under her
authority, but acts done by private corporations and individuals not parties to
the present suit, is shown by the bill to be untenable. It is there alleged
that Colorado in 1926 permitted a diversion from the Laramie through the
Laramie-Poudre tunnel appropriation materially in excess of the 15,500 acrefeet specified in the decree; that in 1926, 1927 and 1928, with the knowledge,
permission and co-operation of Colorado, diversions were made from the
Laramie and its tributaries through the Skyline ditch appropriation in stated
amounts materially in excess of the 18,000 acre-feet specified in the decree; that
in 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929, with the knowledge, consent and cooperation of
Colorado, diversions were made from the Laramie and its tributaries through
the meadow-land appropriations in various amounts pronouncedly in excess of
the 4,250 acre-feet specified in the decree; and that Colorado has permitted
other diversions from the Laramie and its tributaries in violation of the decree
through the Bob Creek and other designated ditches, none of which were
recognized or named in the findings or decree.”).
180. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523–25 (1936).
181. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 270 (1974) (“[W]e granted Vermont’s
motion to file a bill complaint against New York and the International Paper Co.
which alleged that as a result of discharge of wastes, largely from
International’s mills, that company and New York are responsible for a sludge
bed in Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek that has polluted the water,
impeded navigation, and constituted a public nuisance.”).
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in the Columbia River en route to spawning grounds in Idaho.182
These four cases are not justiciable under a state action rubric,
but whether they are justiciable because the defendant states had
a sufficient interest in the activities of the citizenry or because
the state had enacted permitting regimes is an open question.183
The theory upon which it is based aside, the provision for
controversies between states on account of state injuries that are
caused by the citizenry of other states plays an important role in
the federal scheme of enumerated congressional powers, limits on
state self-help, and mechanisms for coordination of states
through compacts and submission of controversies to the
Supreme Court.
Congress’s adoption of the cooperative
federalism model for national regulation of the environment
represents its considered judgment that state governments
utilizing the police power and representing local constituencies
are best fit to implement environmental regulations.184 The
alternative to cooperative federalism is regional environmental
compacts under which state governments regulate utilizing the
police power. These compacts, consented to by the states and
Congress, are enforceable in the Supreme Court and by Congress.
A compact is therefore a method of achieving directly what
Congress achieves indirectly through cooperative federalism:
state implementation of regulations set in consideration of the
national interest. But compacting is probably among the most
expensive and difficult legislative processes in the world. The
existence of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to resolve the most

182. Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980) (“In the present suit, Idaho
alleges that nontreaty fishermen in Oregon and Washington take a
disproportionate share of fish destined for Idaho, thereby depleting those runs to
the detriment of Idaho fishermen. It seeks equitable apportionment of
anadromous fish destined for Idaho in the Columbia River.”).
183. It is possible that the Court is imposing both requirements, that is, the
state must impose a permitting regime and have a parens patriae interest in the
permitted activities.
This is better than a permitting-only theory of
responsibility, but still poses the problem of imposing greater liability on states
that have taken the first step in resolving interstate resource scarcity or
pollution problems by instituting permitting regimes, often at the behest of
Congress.
184. Jason Scott Johnston offers a different view. Jason Scott Johnston, A
Positive Political Economic Theory of Environmental Federalization, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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egregious instances of inequitable interstate pollution gives
downwind states leverage to negotiate compacts with upwind
states. And the existence of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to
apportion scarce interstate resources gives the incentives to
negotiate an apportionment by compact rather than leave the
matter for the Court’s resolution.
Under the substitution theory, the Court’s jurisdiction over
state controversies is an entitlement of the states in light of the
loss of sovereign powers of self-help. Limiting constructions
therefore do not benefit defendant states who themselves will
have occasion to redress conflicts with other states. Indeed, this
is probably why the requirements for defendant states are so
unclear—states are rationally choosing not to advance limiting
constructions on the requirements for state responsibility because
those same states might soon be complainants. This is a
symmetry not found in many private party cases litigating the
extent of the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts.
For these reasons, the only limit the Court has consistently
imposed on the responsibility of defendant states is that the
complainant state’s injury must not be more fairly traceable to
the activities of the complainant state than those of the defendant
or its citizenry.185
Even the statutory limit, for purposes of exclusivity of the
Court’s jurisdiction on attribution of political subdivision actions
to states, is not a limit on state responsibility because all it
requires is that the complainant name a state as a defendant in
the bill rather than only its political subdivisions.186

185. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976) (“In neither of the
suits at bar has the defendant State inflicted any injury upon the plaintiff
States through the imposition of the taxes held . . . and alleged . . . to be
unconstitutional. The injuries to the plaintiffs’ fiscs were self-inflicted, resulting
from decisions by their respective state legislatures. Nothing required Maine,
Massachusetts, and Vermont to extend a tax credit to their residents for income
taxes paid to New Hampshire, and nothing prevents Pennsylvania from
withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New Jersey. No State can be heard to
complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.”).
186. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972) (holding “the term
‘States’” in 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) does not “include their political subdivisions”
and granting leave to states to file bills against political subdivisions of other
states is therefore discretionary under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)).
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So long as a defendant state has a sufficient interest in the
actions of its citizenry that are injuring the complainant state,
the matter is justiciable under Article III as a controversy
“between two or more states.”
c.

Appropriateness of Controversy

Despite Chief Justice Marshall’s remonstration that the
Supreme Court has “no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given,”187 the Court in the latter half of the twentieth century
asserted its right to exercise discretion not only in granting leave
to file bills of complaint under the Court’s non-exclusive original
jurisdiction,188 but in granting leave to file under the Court’s
exclusive original jurisdiction over state controversies as well.189
Therefore, complainant states must show that the determination
of the controversy is an appropriate use of the Court’s resources.
The doctrine of discretion over non-exclusive original jurisdiction
was first announced by Justice Harlan in Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., though, as Justice Harlan noted, Justice
Hughes had discussed the need for the exercise of discretion in
non-exclusive original jurisdiction cases three decades earlier.190
The following term the Court again exercised its discretion in
denying leave of Illinois to file against political subdivisions of
Wisconsin.191
Unlike these non-exclusive original jurisdiction cases, the
exercise of discretion in an exclusive original jurisdiction case
would leave the complainant state without recourse in any court.
Justice Frankfurter in 1939 had indicated concerns over the
consequence of overly broad interpretations of the Court’s
jurisdiction over state controversies, but he did not advocate
discretionary denial of leave to file bills of complaint.192 The
Court first extended the exercise of discretion in an exclusive

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.).
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797-98 (1976).
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496–99 (1971).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972).
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction case in Arizona v. New Mexico by denying Arizona
leave to file a bill challenging the assessment of a tax on Arizona
electricity generating utilities located in New Mexico.193 Justice
Stevens concurred on the ground that Arizona did not have
standing, but noted his disagreement with the extension of
discretionary denials to exclusive jurisdiction cases.194 When the
Court summarily denied California leave to file a bill of complaint
against West Virginia for breach of a contract between state
universities to play a football game, Justice Stevens, in dissent,
reiterated his view that Justice Harlan’s reasoning in Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. is inapplicable to exclusive original
jurisdiction cases.195 Soon after he joined the Court, Justice
Thomas indicated Justice Stevens may have had the better
view.196
In exercising its discretion, the Court examines a motion for
leave to file to determine whether the controversy is appropriate
for the Court’s original jurisdiction.197 Thus, in Maryland v.
Louisiana the Court held that a challenge by nineteen states
against the imposition of a first-use tax on natural gas imported
into Louisiana from the outer continental shelf was
appropriate.198 And eleven years later in Wyoming v. Oklahoma,

193. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797-98 (1976) (per curiam) (“We . . .
are not unmindful of Mr. Justice Harlan’s cautionary advice in Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. . . .”).
194. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
195. California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027-28 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
196. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 474 n.* (1992).
197. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76–77 (1992) (“Determining
whether a case is ‘appropriate’ for our original jurisdiction involves an
examination of two factors. First, we look to ‘the nature of the interest of the
complaining State,’ focusing on the ‘seriousness and dignity of the claim[.]’ ‘The
model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is a dispute
between States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the
States were fully sovereign.’ Second, we explore the availability of an
alternative forum in which the issue tendered can be resolved.”) (citations
omitted).
198. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739–44 (1981). Justice Rehnquist
dissented and argued that the case was inappropriate due to the nature of the
interest involved and the availability of other forums. Id. at 760–71 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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the Court held the exercise of its original jurisdiction appropriate
to hear a challenge to an Oklahoma statute requiring coal-fired
electricity generating plants use a mixture of ten percent
Oklahoma coal that Wyoming alleged reduced its severance tax
receipts by lessening demand for Wyoming coal.199
d.

Congressional Control of State Controversy
Jurisdiction

Does Congress have the power to limit the Court’s
jurisdiction over state controversies? Probably not. There is a
significant distinction between the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and other federal courts.200 And the Court has forcefully
suggested, but not yet held, that Congress may not limit the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.201

199. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 450–54 (1992). While Justice
Thomas noted that perhaps discretion should not be exercised at all, assuming
the existence of discretion he urged the Court to deny leave to file in cases in
which the complainant state’s injury is based on its status as tax collector and is
wholly derivative of the injuries of private parties. Id. at 475–77 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas indicated a concern that the result of the Court’s
grant of leave would be a flood of litigation. But the feared flood of tax-collector
status challenges under the Commerce Clause have not materialized. See
generally, McKusick, supra note 5, at 199. This suggests that the states are not
so easily moved to litigation as the private bar. It supports the view that the
limited number of potential plaintiffs and defendants, constraints on state
resources, and perhaps some reluctance by states to willingly subject themselves
even as plaintiffs to the Court’s jurisdiction and remedial powers ensures that
what might otherwise be a flood is in practice only a trickle. This evident reality
suggests the Court may not need to exercise discretion over its exclusive original
jurisdiction because the states already exercise significant discretion in deciding
which controversies are worth submitting to the Court. For more on discretion
and concerns over floodgates. See McKusick, supra note 5.
200. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (“Only the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution.
Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction
wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict
such jurisdiction at its discretion . . . .”).
201. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 64–66 (1979).
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B. Remedial Power to Resolve Controversies Between
States
The Court has extensive remedial powers to resolve
controversies between states. These powers are proportional to
the significant strictures the Constitution places on the states
limiting their ability to treat with other states in order to resolve
disputes:
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must
admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war
having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of
providing a remedy, and that remedy, we think, is found in the
constitutional provisions we are considering.202

The Court resolutely confirmed the existence of its remedial
powers in 1918 in Virginia v. West Virginia.203 And the Court
202. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); see also Virginia v. West
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 599–600 (1918) (“Throwing this light upon the
constitutional provisions, the conferring on this court of original jurisdiction
over controversies between states, the taking away of all authority as to war and
armies from the states and granting it to Congress, the prohibiting the states
also from making agreements or compacts with each other without the consent
of Congress, at once makes clear how completely the past infirmities of power
were in mind and were provided against. This result stands out in the boldest
possible relief when it is borne in mind that not a want of authority in Congress
to decide controversies between states, but the absence of power in Congress to
enforce as against the governments of the states its decisions on such subjects,
was the evil that cried aloud for cure, since it must be patent that the provisions
written into the Constitution, the power which was conferred upon Congress
and the judicial power as to states created, joined with the prohibitions placed
upon the states, all combined to unite the authority to decide with the power to
enforce—a unison which could only have arisen from contemplating the dangers
of the past and the unalterable purpose to prevent their recurrence in the future
. . . . The state, then, as a governmental entity, having been subjected by the
Constitution to the judicial power under the conditions stated, and the duty to
enforce the judgment by resort to appropriate remedies being certain even
although their exertion may operate upon the governmental powers of the state .
. .”).
203. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 591 (1918) (“That judicial power
essentially involves the right to enforce the results of its exertion is elementary .
. . . And that this applies to the exertion of such power in controversies between
states as the result of the exercise of original jurisdiction conferred upon this
court by the Constitution is therefore certain.”).
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reaffirmed the broad scope of these powers in 1987 in Texas v.
New Mexico.204 Aside from these cases, the Court has said little
regarding the scope of its remedial powers, but its orders speak
volumes. This section gleans the constitutional scope of the
Court’s remedial powers to resolve state controversies by
examining the history of their exercise.
a.

Relief Afforded

To date, the Court has exercised its remedial power to issue
injunctions, issue money judgments, award costs to prevailing
states, award prejudgment interest, order state action, appoint
enforcement officers, and even order foreclosure on state
property. The Court has also held it has authority to issue writs
of execution and hold states in contempt.
The court frequently issues injunctions binding upon
states.205 These injunctions typically also bind the officers,
agents, and citizens of the state from engaging in the proscribed
conduct, and at least once to its attorneys.206 The Court has
204. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128, 130–31 (1987) (“By ratifying the
Constitution, the States gave this Court complete judicial power to adjudicate
disputes among them, . . . and this power includes the capacity to provide one
State a remedy for the breach of another . . . . The Court has recognized the
propriety of money judgments against a State in an original action, South
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904); United States v. Michigan, 190
U. S. 379 (1903); and specifically in a case involving a compact, Virginia v. West
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918). In proper original actions, the Eleventh
Amendment is no barrier, for by its terms, it applies only to suits by citizens
against a State. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981); United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); South Dakota v. North Carolina,
[192 U.S. 286]. That there may be difficulties in enforcing judgments against
States counsels caution but does not undermine our authority to enter
judgments against defendant States in cases over which the Court has
undoubted jurisdiction, authority that is attested to by the fact that almost
invariably the ‘States against which judgments were rendered, conformably to
their duty under the Constitution, voluntarily respected and gave effect to the
same.’ Virginia v. West Virginia, [246 U.S.] at 592.”).
205. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906); Wyoming v. Colorado (1917);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1919); Oklahoma v. Texas (1920); Texas v. New
Mexico (1923); Wisconsin v. Illinois (1926); Maryland v. Louisiana (1979); New
Jersey v. New York (1997); Virginia v. Maryland (2003).
206. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1906) (“Mississippi, its
officers, agents and citizens”); Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372, 375 (1920)
(“Texas, and . . . Oklahoma, and their respective officers, agents and employees,
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enjoined states from disputing or asserting sovereignty over
territory,207 and has done the same with respect to ownership of
land.208 In one territory dispute, the Court enjoined a state from
any purported disposition of oil rights or authorization of
exploitation in an area the Court adjudged to lie within New
Mexico.209 In another case, the Court enjoined the enforcement of
the conditions on construction and water appropriation
permits.210 The Court has enjoined enforcement of state laws and
the collection of state taxes.211 After interpreting a compact, the

and all persons now in possession of any of the said lands or claiming any right,
title or interest therein”); Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372 (1920) (“Texas, her
officers and agents”); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 624 (1923)
(“the defendant State, and her several officers, agents and servants”); Maryland
v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 456, 457 (1981) (“Louisiana, its officers, agents, and
employees”); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 135 (1987) (“New Mexico, its
officers, attorneys, agents, and employees”). But see New Jersey v. New York,
526 U.S. 589 (1999) (“New York”); Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 79–80
(2003) (“Maryland”).
207. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 58 (1906) (“It is further
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that . . . Mississippi, its officers, agents, and
citizens, be and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from disputing the
sovereignty . . . of . . . Louisiana in the land and water territory south and west
of said boundary line as laid down on the foregoing map.”); New Jersey v. New
York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999) (“New York is enjoined from enforcing her laws or
asserting sovereignty over the portions of Ellis Island that lie within . . . . New
Jersey’s sovereign boundary . . . .”).
208. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 58 (1906) (“It is further
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that . . . Mississippi, its officers, agents and
citizens, be and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from disputing the . . .
ownership of . . . Louisiana in the land and water territory south and west of
said boundary line as laid down on the foregoing map.”).
209. Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372 (1920) (“Texas, her officers and agents,
are hereby enjoined from selling any purported rights or making or issuing any
grants, licenses or permits to any person, corporation or association covering or
affecting any lands, or any part of the bed of Red river, lying north of the line of
the south bank of such river as said south bank existed at the date of the
ratification of the Treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain, that is to
say, on the twenty-second day of February, 1821, and between the One
Hundredth degree of West Longitude and the southeastern corner of the state of
Oklahoma.”).
210. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 79–80 (2003) (“Any conditions
attached to the construction/water appropriation permit granted by Maryland to
the Fairfax County Water Authority . . . are null and void and . . . Maryland is
enjoined from enforcing them.”).
211. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 624 (1923) (“[T]he
defendant state, and her several officers, agents and servants, are hereby
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Court has issued an injunction ordering compliance with the
compact according to specific performance standards determined
and set by the Court.212
The Court has issued complex
injunctions in water appropriation cases that require significant
state regulation of water consumption.213 When the Court issues
injunctions against states apportioning resources or setting other
limits, these injunctions bind the political subdivisions of the
state and the state citizenry.214
severally enjoined from enforcing, or attempting to enforce, that act . . . .”);
Maryland v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 456, 457 (1981) (“Louisiana, its officers, agents,
and employees are permanently enjoined and prohibited from collecting the
Louisiana First Use Tax.”).
212. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 135 (1987) (“It is Ordered, Adjudged,
and Decreed that the State of New Mexico, its officers, attorneys, agents, and
employees are hereby enjoined . . . [t]o comply with the Article III(a) obligation
of the Pecos River Compact by delivering to Texas at state line each year an
amount of water calculated in accordance with the inflow-outflow equation . . .
[and t]o calculate the Index Inflow component of the inflow-outflow and channelloss equations . . . .”).
213. Wyoming v. Colorado, 260 U.S. 1 (1922) (“It is considered, ordered and
decreed that the defendants, their officers, agents and servants, be, and they are
hereby, severally enjoined from diverting or taking from the Laramie River and
its tributaries in the state of Colorado more than fifteen thousand five hundred
(15,500) acre-feet of water per annum in virtue of or through what is designated
in the pleadings and evidence as the Laramie-Poudre Tunnel appropriation in
that state . . . .”); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 586 (1936); Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665, 665-66 (1945) (“Colorado, its officers, attorneys, agents
and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or
permitting the diversion of water from the North Platte River and its tributaries
for the irrigation of more than a total of 135,000 acres of land . . . ; [f]rom storing
or permitting the storage of more than a total amount of 17,000 acre feet of
water for irrigation purposes . . . ; [f]rom exporting . . . to any other stream basin
or basins more than 60,000 acre feet of water in any period of ten consecutive
years . . . Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents and employees, be and they
are hereby severally enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or permitting the diversion of
water . . . for the irrigation of more than a total of 168,000 acres of land in
Wyoming during any one irrigation season [;] . . . [f]rom storing or permitting
the storage of more than a total amount of 18,000 acre feet of water for
irrigation purposes. . . .”); Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 99 (2009).
214. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 506-07 (1932); see Oklahoma v.
Texas, 252 U.S. 372, 375 (1920) (“The defendant, . . . Texas, and the
complainant, . . . Oklahoma, and their respective officers, agents and employees,
and all persons now in possession of any of the said lands or claiming any right,
title or interest therein, are . . . enjoined until the further order of this court
from removing any of the property hereinbefore described from said lands and
from conducting any oil or gas mining operations thereon save under the
direction and supervision of the receiver and from interfering with the
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The Court frequently orders states to pay the costs of
prevailing states.215 And the Court has issued money judgments
in four controversies.216 The Court ordered North Carolina to pay
South Dakota $27,400 due on repudiated bonds owned by South
Dakota.217 The Court ordered West Virginia to pay Virginia
“$12,393,929.50, with interest” from the date of judgment as owed
under a compact settling West Virginia’s portion of Virginia’s
debt at the time of secession.218 The Court ordered New Mexico
to pay Texas $14,000,000 as damages for breach of the Pecos
River Compact.219 And the Court ordered Colorado to pay
possession, control or operations of the receiver.”); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S.
696 (1930) (injunction against Illinois and Chicago withdrawing water from
Lake Michigan beyond gradually decreasing limits).
215. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496, 497 (1922) (“And it is also
considered, ordered and decreed that the state of Wyoming do have and recover
from the defendants her lawful costs herein.”), modified by Wyoming v.
Colorado, 260 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1922) (“the costs of this suit be apportioned among
and paid by the parties thereto as follows: The State of Wyoming one-third, the
State of Colorado one-third, and the two corporate defendants jointly onethird.”); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 583, 586 (1924) (awarding costs to
Minnesota); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 96 (1926) (“[S]ince no
public boundary or public ownership was involved, costs are awarded against
the complainant.”); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 200 (1930) (“We see no
reason why costs should not be paid by the defendants, who have made this suit
necessary by persisting in unjustifiable acts.”); Michigan v. Ohio, 410 U.S. 420,
421 (1973) (“The costs of this suit, including the expenses of the Special Master,
shall be borne by . . . Michigan.”); Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 103–04
(2009) (“Costs through January 31, 2006, including reallocation of Kansas’ share
of the Special Master’s fees and expenses, are awarded to Kansas in the amount
of $1,109,946.73. These costs were paid in full on June 29, 2006.”).
216. South Dakota v. North Carolina (1904); Virginia v. West Virginia (1907);
Texas v. New Mexico (1975); Kansas v. Colorado (1986).
217. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (“A decree will,
therefore, be entered, which, after finding the amount due on the bonds and
coupons in suit to be twenty-seven thousand four hundred dollars ($27,400) . . .
no interest being recoverable . . . , shall order that the said State of North
Carolina pay said amount with costs of suit to . . . South Dakota . . . .”).
218. Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U.S. 202, 242 (1915) (“It is therefore now
here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this Court that the complainant,
Commonwealth of Virginia, recover of and from the defendant, State of West
Virginia, the sum of $12,393,929.50, with interest thereon from July 1, 1915,
until paid, at the rate of five per cent per annum.”);
219. Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111, 111 (1990) (“New Mexico shall pay
Texas $14 million . . . . by delivering a check or draft in that amount made
payable to . . . Texas or transferring that amount to . . . Texas by electronic wire
transfer.”).
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Kansas “$34,615,146.00 for damages and prejudgment interest”
for violating the Arkansas River Compact.220
The Court frequently issues orders under its remedial power
that require states to take action. The Court ordered states and
citizens to surrender possession of property to a receiver pending
determination of a territorial controversy.221 The Court ordered
states to keep records and permit other states to inspect those
records.222 The Court ordered specific performance of a contract
between states to build an interstate bridge.223 And the Court
ordered a state to provide an accounting of taxes
unconstitutionally collected to complainant states and to refund
the taxes.224
The Court has also required extensive state actions to
effectuate the Court’s apportionments of interstate resources.225
In one typical case, the Court not only enjoined the state from
withdrawing water but enjoined the state from permitting
appropriations for irrigation beyond set thresholds, thereby
requiring that the state implement a permitting regime to limit
private appropriation.226 Further, the Court ordered the states to
220. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 103 (2009) (“Judgment is awarded in the
amount of $34,615,146.00 for damages and prejudgment interest, including the
required adjustment for inflation, arising from depletions of usable streamflow
of the Arkansas River at the Colorado-Kansas Stateline in the amount of
428,005 acre-feet of water during the period 1950-1996. The damages were paid
in full on April 29, 2005.”).
221. Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372, 375 (1920).
222. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 656 (1945); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 665, 670 (1945) (“Wyoming and . . . Colorado be and they hereby are
each required to prepare and maintain complete and accurate records of the
total area of land irrigated and the storage and exportation of the water of the
North Platte River and its tributaries within those portions of their respective
jurisdictions . . . and such records shall be available for inspection at all
reasonable times . . . .”).
223. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 700, 701-02 (1930).
224. Maryland v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 456 (1981).
225. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (“We have invoked
equitable apportionment not only to require the reasonably efficient use of
water, but also to impose on States an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps
to conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate stream.”) (relying on
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)).
226. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665, 665–66 (1945) (“Colorado, its
officers, attorneys, agents and employees, be and they are hereby severally
enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or permitting the diversion of water from the North
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construct, at their mutual convenience, “gauging stations and
measuring devices” near the state line as necessary to effectuate
an apportionment decree.227 The Court has the authority to
appoint masters to supervise states, and also to independently
make the calculations required under its complex apportionment
decrees.228 And in another instance, significantly touching on
state sovereignty, Wyoming requested that the Court order
Colorado to permit Wyoming to “install measuring devices at the
places of diversion” of a river in Colorado.229 The Court indicated
it had power to issue such an order but exercised its discretion
not to issue the order unless it proved necessary to do so.230
The Court has similarly extensive power to require states to
take specific steps to reduce activities interfering with the
enjoyment of environmental resources by other states, though the
Court prefers to issue orders setting required levels and leaving
the details to the diligence of the states.231 Dilly-dallying by a
Platte River and its tributaries for the irrigation of more than a total of 135,000
acres of land . . . ; [f]rom storing or permitting the storage of more than a total
amount of 17,000 acre feet of water for irrigation purposes . . . ; [f]rom exporting
. . . to any other stream basin or basins more than 60,000 acre feet of water in
any period of ten consecutive years . . . Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents
and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or
permitting the diversion of water . . . for the irrigation of more than a total of
168,000 acres of land in Wyoming during any one irrigation season [;] . . . [f]rom
storing or permitting the storage of more than a total amount of 18,000 acre feet
of water for irrigation purposes . . . .”).
227. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665, 669 (1945) (“Such additional
gauging stations and measuring devices at or near the Wyoming-Nebraska state
line, if any, as may be necessary for making any apportionment herein decreed,
shall be constructed and maintained at the joint and equal expense of Wyoming
and Nebraska to the extent that the costs thereof are not paid by others . . . .”).
228. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987).
229. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 585 (1936).
230. Id. at 585–86.
231. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 406 (1933) (“The Court did not
exhaust its power by the provisions enjoining the diversion according to the
times and amounts prescribed. The Court omitted further specific requirements,
not because of want of power, but in the expectation that the diligence of
defendants in carrying out the program they had submitted to the Court would
give no occasion for such specifications. In deciding this controversy between
States, the authority of the Court to enjoin the continued perpetration of the
wrong inflicted upon complainants, necessarily embraces the authority to
require measures to be taken to end conditions, within the control of defendant
State, which may stand in the way of the execution of the decree.”).
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state in meeting its remedial obligations has led to stern
injunctive rebuke by the Court leaving no doubt of the Court’s
extensive authority under its remedial powers to order states to
raise, appropriate, and spend funds to construct the required
facilities.232
The Court has indicated it has the authority to find states in
contempt, but has never done so, in part because no state has
ever persisted in failing to comply with the Court’s orders.233
Neither has the Court had to issue writs of execution. But in one
case, this seems to have been avoided by deft work on the part of
the Court.
To avoid the prospect of issuing a writ of execution against
North Carolina to compel it to pay South Dakota amounts owed
on repudiated civil war bonds, the Court issued a money
judgment and directed the Marshal of the Court to foreclose on
intangible property owned by the state that secured the bond
obligation if the judgment was not paid by a specified date.234 As
232. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 411 (1933) (“[T]he State of Illinois is
hereby required to take all necessary steps, including whatever authorizations
or requirements, or provisions for the raising, appropriation and application of
moneys, may be needed in order to cause and secure the completion of adequate
sewage treatment or sewage disposal plants and sewers, together with
controlling works to prevent reversals of the Chicago River, if such works are
necessary, and all other incidental facilities, for the disposition of the sewage of
the area embraced within the Sanitary District of Chicago so as to preclude any
ground of objection on the part of the State or of any of its municipalities to the
reduction of the diversion of the waters of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system
or watershed to the extent, and at the times and in the manner, provided in this
decree.”).
233. Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572, 581-82 (1940) (considering but
denying petition to find Colorado in contempt of Court’s decree on the merits
because of potential for misunderstanding and uncertainty but noting there
would be “no ground for any possible misapprehension” going forward).
234. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (“A decree will,
therefore, be entered, which, after finding the amount due on the bonds and
coupons in suit to be twenty-seven thousand four hundred dollars ($27,400), (no
interest being recoverable . . . ), and that the same are secured by one hundred
shares of the stock of the North Carolina Railroad Company, belonging to the
State of North Carolina, shall order that the said State of North Carolina pay
said amount with costs of suit to the State of South Dakota on or before the 1st
Monday of January, 1905, and that in default of such payment an order of sale
be issued to the marshal of this court, directing him to sell at public auction all
the interest of the State of North Carolina in and to one hundred shares of the
capital stock of the North Carolina Railroad Company, such sale to be made at
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North Carolina had never actually reduced the intangible
property to paper certificates, no physical force or possession was
required. The Marshal would simply auction the stock and the
winner of the auction could then print certificates. Two points
are worth noting about this incident. First, this indicates that
the Marshal of the Supreme Court is the Sheriff of the United
States. Second, the order unintentionally set up a humorous
clash between the Court and the other branches. A federal law
prohibited peddling from the steps of the Capitol and thus the
Court issued an order that would require the Marshal to violate a
federal law. Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately depending on
one’s perspective, the issue never came to a head as North
Carolina simply paid the amount owed to South Dakota.235
b.

The Remedial Power to Commandeer

The foregoing demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s
remedial power to resolve “controversies between two or more
states” is not circumscribed by the Tenth Amendment and is
therefore distinct from Congress’s enumerated powers that are
circumscribed by the Tenth Amendment unless the controversy
arises out of a compact.
The Court held in New York v. United States and in Printz v.
United States that the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of power to
the states (or alternatively, limits on the Necessary and Proper
Clause) prohibits Congress from issuing commands to state
legislatures and executives.236 The second clause of the Tenth

the east front door of the Capitol building in this city, public notice to be given of
such sale by advertisements once a week for six weeks in some daily paper
published in the city of Raleigh, North Carolina, and also in some daily paper
published in the city of Washington.”); Repudiated Bonds Made Good, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1904.
235. Robert G. Caldwell, The Settlement of Inter-State Disputes, 14 AM. J. INT’L
L. 38, 62 (1920).
236. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 176-77, 180 (1992) (“We
conclude that while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to
encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste
generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress
the ability to simply compel the States to do so. . . . While the Framers no doubt
endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to
avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes that were common under
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Amendment provides support for the view that this reservation
does not apply to the Supreme Court: “[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”237
The Constitution specifically makes states subject to the Court’s
power to resolve “controversies between two or more states.”
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York v. United States notes that
the Supremacy Clause limits the applicability of the Tenth
Amendment reservation to federal statutes enforceable in state
courts and that the provisions of Article III enable the federal
courts to order state officials to comply with federal law.238 The
Court’s decision did not explicitly address the remedial power of
the Court to resolve controversies between states as distinct from
the other provisions of Article III, but it is a subset of the judicial
power granted by Article III that is discussed. Moreover, the
United States specifically argued that Congress had power to
resolve controversies between states by issuing commands to
state legislatures and pointed to the Court’s remedial power to
issue commands to states in resolving controversies between
states, an argument Justice O’Connor sets out in the opinion and
rejects without explicitly drawing the crucial distinction between
the Court’s remedial power and Congress’s power.239 Justice
the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not intend that Congress should
exercise that power through the mechanism of mandating state regulation.”).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
238. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178–79 (“Federal statutes
enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but
this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the
Supremacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress
to command state legislatures to legislate. Additional cases . . . discuss the
power of federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal law. See . . .
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 407 U.S. 91, 106–108 (1972) . . . . Again, however,
the text of the Constitution plainly confers this authority on the federal courts,
the ‘judicial Power’ of which ‘shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . ; [and]
to Controversies between two or more States; [and] between a State and
Citizens of another State.’ U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2. The Constitution contains
no analogous grant of authority to Congress. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause
makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions of state officials; the
power of federal courts to enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority
to order state officials to comply.”).
239. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 179-80 (“[T]he United States . . .
argues that the Constitution envisions a role for Congress as an arbiter of
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Stevens in dissent however does note that the decision creates a
distinction between the Court’s undoubted remedial power and
Congress’s power, though he argues that because the Court has
the power so too must Congress.240 No Justice in New York v.
United States or Printz v. United States ever even intimates that
the Court’s remedial powers are limited by the Tenth
Amendment, for to do so would be to discount numerous remedial

interstate disputes. The United States observes that federal courts, and this
Court in particular, have frequently resolved conflicts among States. See, e.g.,
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437
(1992). Many of these disputes have involved the allocation of shared resources
among the States, a category perhaps broad enough to encompass the allocation
of scarce disposal space for radioactive waste. See, e. g., Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The
United States suggests that if the Court may resolve such interstate disputes,
Congress can surely do the same under the Commerce Clause. . . . While the
Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate
commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes
that were common under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not
intend that Congress should exercise that power through the mechanism of
mandating state regulation.”).
240. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 211 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The notion that Congress does not
have the power to issue ‘a simple command to state governments to implement
legislation enacted by Congress’, ante, at 2428, is incorrect and unsound. There
is no such limitation in the Constitution. . . . The Constitution gives this Court
the power to resolve controversies between the States. Long before Congress
enacted pollution control legislation, this Court crafted a body of ‘interstate
common law,’ Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972), to govern
disputes
between
States
involving
interstate
waters.
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1992). In such contexts, we
have not hesitated to direct States to undertake specific actions. For example,
we have ‘impose[d] on States an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to
conserve
and
augment
the
water
supply
of
an
interstate
stream.”
Colorado v. New
Mexico,
459
U.S.
176,
185
(1982)
(citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922)). Thus, we unquestionably
have the power to command an upstream state that is polluting the waters of a
downstream State to adopt appropriate regulations to implement a federal
statutory command. With respect to the problem presented by the case at hand,
if litigation should develop between States that have joined a compact, we would
surely have the power to grant relief in the form of specific enforcement of the
take title provision. Indeed, even if the statute had never been passed, if one
State’s radioactive waste created a nuisance that harmed its neighbors, it seems
clear that we would have had the power to command the offending State to take
remedial action. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. . . . If this Court has such
authority, surely Congress has similar authority.”).
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precedents set out above in which the Court issued commands to
states.
However, New York v. United States and Printz v. United
States do omit one important exception to the Tenth Amendment’s
prohibition on issuing commands to state legislatures and
executives. As discussed in Part I, the Court in Virginia v. West
Virginia held in no uncertain terms that Congress’s power to issue
commands to states to enforce compacts is plenary.241 Thus, the
effect of the Tenth Amendment is to limit congressional power to
issue commands to state legislatures and executives only in the
absence of a compact and does not in any way circumscribe the
Court’s authority to do so under its remedial powers over
controversies between two or more states.
c.

Congressional Control of the Court’s Remediation
Power

Judge Iredell, dissenting in Chisholm v. Georgia, suggests
Congress controls the remedial power of the Court.242 But there
does not seem to be an instance of Congress doing so. When
confronted with the suggestion that the Tax Injunction Act did so,
the Court “note[d] in passing” that the argument was “lacking in
merit” because “the Tax Injunction Act, which by its terms only
applies to injunctions issued by federal district courts . . . is
inapplicable in original actions.”243 When confronted with the
suggestion that 28 U.S.C. § 1821 statutorily set the witness fees
that could be awarded as costs in original jurisdiction cases, the
Court avoided the issue.244 Chief Justice Roberts however, joined
by Justice Souter, squarely and succinctly reached the issue in a
concurring opinion:
I join the opinion of the Court in full. I do so only, however,
because the opinion expressly and carefully makes clear that it in
no way infringes this Court’s authority to decide on its own, in
original cases, whether there should be witness fees and what
they should be.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601-02 (1918).
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793) (Iredell, J.).
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981).
Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 102 (2009).
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Our appellate jurisdiction is, under the Constitution, subject to
“such Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.” Art. III, § 2. Our original jurisdiction is not. The Framers
presumably “act[ed] intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion” of these terms. INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is accordingly our responsibility to determine matters related
to our original jurisdiction, including the availability and amount
of witness fees. For the reasons given by the Court, I agree that
$40 is a reasonable choice for the fees at issue here. But the
choice is ours.245

As the Court’s interpretation of the state controversy
provision, in light of its history and the Court’s obligation to
provide remedies to states wronged by other states in light of
their surrender of sovereign powers, supports Chief Justice
Roberts’ position, this Article agrees.246
C. Rules of Decision in Controversies Between States
Rules of decision in controversies between states may stem
from compacts, federal statutes, and federal common law, but not
all sources of law are equal, and the source of law that controls
depends on the matter to be decided. The priority of sources of
law as rules of decision on a given matter in state controversies is
a question of federal constitutional law. There must always be a
rule of decision in a controversy between states properly brought
before the Supreme Court for resolution. The Court “may be
called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by
Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State alone”

245. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 109-10 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
246. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (“If Missouri were an
independent and sovereign State all must admit that she could seek a remedy
by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to
make war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy,
and that remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are
considering . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 940–41 (1997) (excerpting same language).
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and in those instances must craft a rule of decision.247 But there
is no matter that may be brought before the Court that cannot be
dealt with by Congress and the governments of both states acting
together to form a compact because no principle of federalism
restrains the operation of laws formed by the sovereign states
acting in concert with Congress. The priority of sources of rules
of decision on a given matter in state controversies is:
(1) a compact between the contravening states on any matter;
(2) a federal statute on a congressionally regulable matter; and
(3) a federal common law rule in the absence of all of the above.

Compacts preempt all other rules of decision. Federal
statutes on congressionally regulable matters displace federal
common law. Federal common law controls unless preempted by
compact or displaced by a federal statute on a congressionally
regulable matter. Below, the terms of the Rule of Decision Act
are adapted to show this constitutional rule of decision
framework.
a.

Compacts as Rules of Decision

Compacts between the several states assented to by Congress,
except where the Constitution otherwise requires or provides, are
the rule of decision in controversies between two or more states
before the Supreme Court, in cases where they apply.

This principle of constitutional law has never been
questioned and has always been followed by the Supreme Court,
and Congress has at no time ever attempted to abrogate its
application in any case. The assent of all relevant legislatures
leaves no room, absent countervailing constitutional provisions,
for independent judicial determination of the rule of decision
where the matter is set forth in a compact between the state
parties to the controversy.
The agreement of states without the assent of Congress does
not supply the rule of decision in the Supreme Court in the
247. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (citing Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-20 (1906); Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 82–84
(1907)).

69

CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED

174

3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

resolution of controversies between states. Thus, states that
enact reciprocal legislation gain no enforcement rights against
one another before the Court, and their continued compliance is
purely voluntary.
State agreements do, however, bind
individuals subject to the powers of the agreeing states without
congressional assent because the Compact Clause limits only
agreements enforceable on states in the Supreme Court, not
concerted action. The key distinction for constitutional purposes
is that the states can cease complying with an agreement that
does not meet the requirements of the Compact Clause at any
time.
b.

Federal Statutes as Rule of Decision

The Acts of Congress, except where the Constitution or compacts
otherwise require or provide, are the rule of decision in
controversies between two or more states before the Supreme
Court, in cases where they apply.

The Acts of Congress alone, without the assent of states, are
sufficient to displace federal common law in controversies
between states only as to matters within congressional power as
circumscribed by the Tenth Amendment, the Revenue Clauses,
and other provisions of the Constitution.248 That is to say, the
Acts of Congress displace federal common law as far as they go.
But the Acts of Congress may only go so far. And the matters
involved in state controversies, more than in any other class of
cases, are frequently outside of the constitutional competence of
Congress to provide rules of decision without the concurrent
assent of the states.
The sole Acts of Congress do have a significant role in
providing rules of decision for the resolution of state controversies
in theory. For example, were states ever to litigate a controversy
that required a decision as to weights and measures, the Acts of
Congress would provide a rule of decision. And likewise, Acts of
Congress under other constitutional provisions would also
provide a rule of decision. The dominant such provision is the

248. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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Commerce Clause.249 Thus, the Acts of Congress are the rule of
decision in controversies over the apportionment of any navigable
waterway of the United States—resources wholly within the
congressional regulatory ambit since Gibbons v. Ogden.250
Conversely the sole Acts of Congress are not rules of decision in
controversies over territory because Congress may not adjust the
boundaries between the several states without their consent.251
And so along the Mississippi River there is a curious distinction
between the applicability of the Acts of Congress as rules of
decision in controversies between states, depending upon the
Congress may not alone determine the
question posed.252
location of the river’s boundary between two states, but may
decide to dam the river, construct a bridge, or otherwise impact or
adjust the waterway such that the federal common law
determination of the border between the states will change
according to the principles of thalweg, accretion, and avulsion.253
Another class of controversy to which the sole Acts of
Congress may supply the rule of decision is commercial activities
that fall within the domain of the Commerce Clause, as
augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.254 Curiously,
although the Supreme Court has frequently intimated that
249. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
250. 22 U.S. 1, 22 (1824); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564–65
(1963) (“We have concluded . . . that Congress in passing the Project Act
intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme for the apportionment
among California, Arizona, and Nevada of the Lower Basin’s share of the
mainstream waters of the Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries . . . .
[A]pportionment of the Lower Basin waters of the Colorado River is not
controlled by the doctrine of equitable apportionment . . . . It is true that the
Court has used the doctrine of equitable apportionment to decide river
controversies between States. But in those cases Congress had not made any
statutory apportionment. In this case, we have decided that Congress has
provided its own method for allocating among the Lower Basin States the
mainstream water to which they are entitled under the Compact. Where
Congress has so exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no
power to substitute their own notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ for the
apportionment chosen by Congress.”).
251. See generally, Poole v. Fleeger’s Lessee, 36 U.S. 185, 191 (1837).
252. See e.g., Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 (1893), Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901); Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39 (1919); Lousiana v. Mississippi,
384 U.S. 24. (1966).
253. See e.g., Arizona v. California, 282 U.S. 795 (1930).
254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Congress should supply the rule of decision in certain such
controversies between states, in no commercial state controversy
resolved by the Court has it found a ready-made rule of decision
supplied by a sole Act of Congress. The exemplar of this
circumstance is the Court’s determination of escheat rights
amongst the states in unconsummated interstate transactions.255
There are undoubtedly some areas of decision that
themselves fall outside of the enumerated powers of Congress. To
date, the Court has consistently assumed, without deciding, that
Congress cannot regulate the nonnavigable waterways of the
United States under its enumerated powers. And in the last two
decades the Court has held that the sole Acts of Congress may not
regulate the possession of guns in schools, violence against
women, or inaction. There have been six state controversies over
nonnavigable waterways.256 But Congress has never attempted
to provide a rule of decision through a sole Act of Congress in any
of these cases, and so the Court has not yet had occasion to
declare the non-displacement of federal common law of
apportionment of interstate waterways that are nonnavigable.
But the Court’s consistent designation in every waterway case as
either navigable or nonnavigable, and the Court’s holding of
displacement in Arizona v. California, strongly suggest that the
over 100 years of apportionment precedent indicate the Court’s
view of the significance of the regulability of the subject matter by
sole Acts of Congress in determining whether or not federal
common law is displaced.257

255. See Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993) (“If the States are
dissatisfied with the outcome of a particular case, they may air their grievances
before Congress. That body may reallocate abandoned property among the
States without regard to this Court’s interstate escheat rules. Congress overrode
Pennsylvania by passing a specific statute concerning abandoned money orders
and traveler’s checks . . . and it may ultimately settle this dispute through
similar legislation.”); see generally Texas v. New Jersey (1965); Pennsylvania v.
New York (1972).
256. See appendix infra.
257. Arizona v. California, 282 U.S. 795 (1930).
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The federal common law, except where the Constitution, compacts,
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, is the rule of
decision in controversies between two or more states before the
Supreme Court.

Federal common law provides the rule of decision in
controversies between states as to those matters in which it is not
preempted by compact or displaced by Acts of Congress. That is,
when all else fails, the Court determines the appropriate rule.
The Court has never doubted its residual power to determine
rules of decision in state controversies.258
When the Court is called upon to determine a rule of decision
in a controversy between states, it applies an equal dignity
principle, and over time, the Court’s application to specific cases
has generated a body of federal common law for state
controversies. The Court succinctly explained this principle and
this process of common law adjudication in Kansas v. Colorado:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to
each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the
same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on
no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none.
Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,
the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural
laws into the territory of another State, the question of the extent
and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a
matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is
called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice
between them. In other words, through these successive disputes

258. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (“Nor is our jurisdiction
ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are States sovereign and
independent in local matters, the relations between them depend in any respect
upon principles of international law. International law is no alien in this
tribunal.”). Warren reports that Daniel Webster argued in Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts that the Rules of Decision Act applied to state controversies, but
the court evidently disagreed. WARREN, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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and decisions this court is practically building up what may not
improperly be called interstate common law. 259

While this process is not wholly unlike ordinary common law,
there are differences stemming from the nature both of the
controversies and the parties.260 Federal common law in state
controversies is not limited to the consideration of evaluating
quasi-tortious state action. For example, the federal common law
frequently provides rules of decision in territorial controversies.
And the Court also has been forced by congressional inaction to
fashion rules for the priority of escheat claims by the states to
abandoned property.261
In fashioning federal common law rules of decision in state
controversies, the Court looks to many sources of law for
inspiration. The Court has repeatedly looked to principles of
international law in the determination of state boundaries.262
259. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
260. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (“We are met at the
outset by the question what rule is to be applied. It is established that a more
liberal answer may be given than in a controversy between neighbors members
of a single State . . . . Different considerations come in when we are dealing with
independent sovereigns having to regard the welfare of the whole population
and when the alternative to settlement is war. In a less degree, perhaps, the
same is true of the quasi-sovereignties bound together in the Union.”).
261. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 675, 677 (1965) (“With respect to tangible
property, real or personal, it has always been the unquestioned rule in all
jurisdictions that only the State in which the property is located may escheat.
But intangible property, such as a debt which a person is entitled to collect, is
not physical matter which can be located on a map. The creditor may live in one
State, the debtor in another, and matters may be further complicated if, as in
the case before us, the debtor is a corporation which has connections with many
States and each creditor is a person who may have had connections with several
others and whose present address is unknown. Since the States separately are
without constitutional power to provide a rule to settle this interstate
controversy and since there is no applicable federal statute, it becomes our
responsibility in the exercise of our original jurisdiction to adopt a rule which
will settle the question of which State will be allowed to escheat this intangible
property.”).
262. See, e.g., Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 511 (1890) (citing EMMERICH
DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, Book 2, c. 11, §149); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 8
(1893) (applying international law principle of thalweg with general citation to
“recognized treatises on international law, of modern times”); Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 524 (1893) (citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW part II, c. 4, §164 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., Little
Brown & Co. 8th ed. 1866)); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 49–53 (1906)
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(reviewing international law principle of thalweg and applying the rule to
determine the boundary); Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (“The
case is to be considered in the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a quasiinternational controversy . . . .”); Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1, 44
(1910) (citing 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 243 for prescriptive
acquisition of territory); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 170 (1918)
(reaffirming thalweg principle); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295, 308 (1926)
(citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1916); 1
JOHN MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, 294 et seq.) (“That rights of the
character here claimed may be acquired on the one hand and lost on the other
by open, long-continued and uninterrupted possession of territory, is a doctrine
not confined to individuals but applicable to sovereign nations as well . . . and, a
fortiori to the quasi-sovereign states of the Union.”); New Jersey v. Delaware,
291 U.S. 361, 379 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (“International law today divides the river
boundaries between states by the middle of the main channel, when there is
one, and not by the geographical centre, half way between the banks . . . . The
Thalweg, or downway, is the track taken by boats in their course down the
stream, which is that of the strongest current.”) (citing (1 HALLECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (4th ed. 1878); 1 MOORE, DIGEST INTERNATIONAL LAW
617 (1906); 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (1910); ORBAN, ETUDE DE
DROIT FLUVIAL INTERNATIONAL 343 (1896); KAECKENBECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS
176 (1918); HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (1922); FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CODIFIED § 1051 (1918); CALVO, DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1885));
id. at 381 (tracing development of Thalweg) (citing 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 137 (1922); 1 NYS, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 425–26; GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIS (1631); VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1797); ENGELHARDT, DU REGIME
CONVENTIONNEL DES FLEUVES INTERNATIONAUX 72 (1879); 5 KOCH, HISTOIRE DES
TRAITES DE PAIX 156 (1838); KAECKENBECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 176 (1918);
ADAMI, NATIONAL FRONTIERS 17 (Behrens trans. 1927)); id. at 383 (discussing
adjudicatory determination of rules of decision in the absence of treaties and
conventions) (citing LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 52, 60, 70, 85, 100, 110–11, 255, 404, 432 (1933)); id. at 383–84
(discussing affect of international law principles that have “only a germinal
existence”) (citing HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 12, 15–16 (8th ed. 1880);
LAUTERPACHT at 110, 255; JENKS, THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE 11–12 (1916);
VINOGRADOFF, CUSTOM AND RIGHT 21 (1925)). Justice Cardozo in New Jersey v.
Delaware provides the following excerpt from an international law case in a
footnote:
International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and
generally does not contain, express rules decisive of particular cases;
but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing
rights and interests by applying, in default of any specific provision
of law, the corollaries of general principles . . . . This is the method of
jurisprudence; it is the method by which law has been gradually
evolved in every country resulting in the definition and settlement of
legal relations as well between States as between private
individuals.
Id. at 416 n.7 (quoting Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph
Company, Ltd. (Gr. Br.) v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 17, 114 (1923)).
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Recently the Court has extensively consulted state common law
in applying federal common law to the interpretation of a
compact.263 In another recent instance, the Court fashioned its
determination of witness fees in a costs judgment in the same
manner as Congress provided for in a statute that the Court
noted did not control.264 And state law is “an important
consideration” in fashioning federal common law rules of decision
in equitable apportionment of water between states.265
As noted above, federal common law is the applicable rule of
decision unless preempted or displaced. But as to some matters,
the sole Acts of Congress are insufficient to supply a rule of
decision because the matter is beyond congressional powers. This
may be because the matter is not within the enumerated powers
of Congress, as the Court has assumed but not held in
nonnavigable waters cases, or because the Tenth Amendment, or
another constitutional limitation on the exercise of its
enumerated powers, prohibits congressional regulation of the
matter. This results in a sort of pre-eminence of federal common
law as to certain matters over the Acts of Congress, though not
over compacts, as these always preempt federal common law
rules of decision. And this constitutional pre-eminence in certain
matters has not gone unrecognized by the Court:
As Congress cannot make compacts between the States, as it
cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel their
separate action, disputes between them must be settled either by
force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to determine the
right and wrong thereof. Force under our system of Government
is eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution vests in this
court the power to settle those disputes. We have exercised that

263. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2309 (2010) (consulting
Restatement of Contracts in interpretation of compact).
264. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 102-03 (2009).
265. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable
apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes
between States concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream.
. . . The laws of the contending States concerning intrastate water disputes are
an important consideration governing equitable apportionment.”).
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power in a variety of instances, determining in the several
instances the justice of the dispute. 266

And in another case, the Court reiterated that the Court “may be
called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by
Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State
alone.”267
In these matters, the Court supplies the rule of decision
unless there is a compact. There are several areas in which this
is so. First, matters must be decided by the court or compacts if
the subject matter is outside of the enumerated powers of
Congress, such as nonnavigable rivers.268 Second, matters must
be decided by the Court or compacts if the resolution of the
controversy requires the issuance of commands to state
governments, as commandeering state legislatures and
executives is beyond the power of Congress.269 Third, matters
must be decided by the Court or compacts if the adequate
resolution of the controversy by Congress would require an
unapportioned requisition from a state’s treasury in violation of
the Revenue Clauses, though no such case has been brought to
date.
In light of this pre-eminence of federal common law over Acts
of Congress as to certain matters, the Court has adopted and
266. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
267. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (citing Kansas v. Colorado
II, 206 U.S. 46, 82–84 (1907)).
268. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 95-96 (1907) (“Now the question
arises between two States, one recognizing generally the common law rule of
riparian rights and the other prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of
flowing water. Neither State can legislate for or impose its own policy upon the
other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the
flow of that stream. It does not follow, however, that because Congress cannot
determine the rule which shall control between the two States or because
neither State can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy
ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power which can take
cognizance of the controversy and determine the relative rights of the two
States. Indeed, the disagreement, coupled with its effect upon a stream passing
through the two States, makes a matter for investigation and determination by
this court.”).
269. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240-241 (1901) (“An inspection of
the bill discloses that the nature of the injury complained of is such that an
adequate remedy can only be found in this court at the suit of the State of
Missouri.”).
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applies a precautionary principle to all state controversy cases.
This doctrine was first announced by Justice Holmes in Missouri
v. Illinois.270 Justice Holmes noted concern over the class of cases
that,
[do] not fall within the power of Congress to regulate, the result
of a declaration of rights by this court would be the establishment
of a rule which would be irrevocable by any power except that of
this court to reverse its own decision, an amendment of the
Constitution, or possibly an agreement between the States
sanctioned by the legislature of the United States. 271

Such cases pose “difficulties in the way of establishing such a
system of law” that, while they would “not be insuperable, . . .
would be great and new.”272 Accordingly, the Court adopted the
requirement that in all state controversy cases “[b]efore this court
. . . intervene[s] the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly
and fully proved, and the principle to be applied should be one
which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain against all
considerations on the other side.”273

270. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-522 (1906).
271. Id. at 520; see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 941 (1997) (“Essentially, Holmes concluded that the
only possible source of law was the provision of the Constitution granting
jurisdiction to the Court over such disputes, and the necessity of applying legal
rules which would not be subject to revision by the legislatures of either state.”).
272. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 520.
273. Id. at 521; see, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921)
(“[W]e come to consider the evidence introduced, but subject to the rule that the
burden upon the State of New York of sustaining the allegations of its bill is
much greater than that imposed upon a complainant in an ordinary suit
between private parties. Before this court can be moved to exercise its
extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State
at the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of serious
magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” (citing
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496)); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 31213 (1921) (“Considering all of this evidence, and much more which we cannot
detail, we must conclude that the complainants have failed to show by the
convincing evidence which the law requires that the sewage which the
defendants intend to discharge into Upper New York Bay, even if treated only in
the manner specifically described in the stipulation with the United States
Government, would so corrupt the water of the Bay as to create a public
nuisance by causing offensive odors or unsightly deposits on the surface or that
it would seriously add to the pollution of it.”).
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Rather than attempting to apply Justice Holmes’s
precautionary principle to only those classes of cases in which the
rule announced could not be displaced by the sole Act of Congress,
the Court seems to apply the principle unless it is absolutely clear
that the only issue to be decided is one for which Congress can
displace the Court’s decision. Thus, in the nonnavigable water
appropriation cases, the Court has not determined whether
Congress does or does not have the power to apportion
nonnavigable waters. Rather, the Court proceeds as if the Court
is fashioning law that may only be preempted by compact. In
contrast, the Court resolved the three escheat property cases
without any special precaution because Congress could obviously
supplant the Court’s decisions (and indeed in one instance did
so).274
The Court also adopts another measure of precaution aside
from that suggested by Justice Holmes. The Court consistently
urges states to form compacts to resolve disputes.275 Indeed, one
gets the sense from the cases that once states began to heed this
advice the Court has relaxed its application of the precautionary
principle in reliance on the availability of compact. This is
sensible because the Court was uncertain at the time of Missouri

274. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993); Texas v. New Jersey,
379 U.S. 674 (1965); Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972) (decision
overruled by 12 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2503 as discussed in Delaware v. New York, 507
U.S. 490, at 510).
275. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (“The reason for
judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such cases is that,
while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasisovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the
possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the
compact clause of the federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the court has
said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accommodation
and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of
invocation of our adjudicatory power.”); Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205,
218 (1909) (“We submit to the States of Washington and Oregon whether it will
not be wise for them to pursue the same course, and, with the consent of
Congress, through the aid of commissioners, adjust, as far as possible, the
present appropriate boundaries between the two States and their respective
jurisdiction.”).
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v. Illinois whether compacts preempt federal common law, as
Justice Holmes noted, and this is now well established.
VI. AIR POLLUTION CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN
STATES
This final Section addresses the prospects of filing an
interstate air pollution complaint in the Supreme Court for
resolution under the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve “controversies between two or more states” similar to a
case unsuccessfully brought against individual sources by North
Carolina in North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority.276 No
controversy between states over air pollution has ever been
litigated. Nevertheless, application of the forgoing analysis of the
Court’s plenary jurisdiction over state controversies demonstrates
that states may bring air pollution suits against other states and
that only compacts can displace these interstate actions.
A. Downwind States May Bring Air Pollution
Controversy Suits
Air pollution travels across state boundaries. Emissions of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere in one
state can lead to acid rain in other states. Emissions of mercury
and particulate matter in one state can lead to negative health
consequences and environmental impacts in other states. And
the prevailing winds leave some states more subject to interstate
air pollution than others, the so-called downwind states, and
others less subject to interstate air pollution, the so-called upwind
states.277 The Court has consistently recognized state actions
seeking protection of environmental resources.278 To date, the
Court has recognized its jurisdiction over suits seeking judicial
protection of navigation, land, and water—the protection of air is
no great leap; however, no state has ever filed a bill of complaint
against another state for air pollution. Rather, states have so far
276. 615 F.3d 291 (2010).
277. Robert De C. Ward, The Prevailing Winds of the United States, 6 ANNALS
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 99, 103, 106 (1916) (showing several states are
generally downwind in both summer and winter).
278. See supra Part III.B.
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filed two suits under the Court’s non-exclusive original
jurisdiction against individual emitters.279
In the first state suit against individuals under the Court’s
original jurisdiction, Georgia filed a bill of complaint against the
Tennessee Copper Company and the Ducktown Sulphur, Copper,
& Iron Company seeking “to enjoin the defendant copper
companies from discharging noxious gas from their works in
Tennessee over the plaintiff’s territory.”280 The Court, per
Justice Holmes, held Georgia properly stated a claim under
federal common law because,
[i]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a
sovereign that the air over its territory should not be
polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the
forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and
whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should
not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills
should not be endangered from the same source.281
On the merits the Court held against the copper companies and
awarded Georgia injunctive relief.282 In the second suit against

279. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (holding copper
companies liable for sulphur dioxide emissions); see also Georgia v. Tenn Copper
Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 678 (1915);
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
304 U.S. 546 (1938); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 305 U.S. 565 (1938);
Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 116 (1972) (discretionary denial
of leave to file).
280. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
281. Id. at 238.
282. Id. at 238–39 (“[T]he defendants generate in their works near the Georgia
line large quantities of sulphur dioxide which becomes sulphurous acid by its
mixture with the air. It hardly is denied, and cannot be denied with success,
that this gas often is carried by the wind great distances and over great tracts of
Georgia land. On the evidence the pollution of the air and the magnitude of that
pollution are not open to dispute . . . [W]e are satisfied, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the sulphurous fumes cause and threaten damage on so
considerable a scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within
[Georgia], as to make out a case within the requirements of Missouri v. Illinois .
. . .”).
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individuals, the Court exercised its discretion to deny leave to file
a bill under the Court’s nonexclusive jurisdiction.283
The state air pollution plaintiff record is one win on the
merits and one discretionary denial of leave to file a bill. The
outcome in the first suit strongly indicates that a federal common
law air quality protection suit may be brought under the Court’s
plenary state controversy jurisdiction. And as lower courts do not
have jurisdiction over controversies between states, discretionary
denial is far less likely in a suit brought by states against states
than in a suit brought by states against individuals. The Court
recently held that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common
law air quality protection suits brought by states against
individuals.284 This Article argues below in Part V.B. that this
holding does not apply to controversies between states and for
now proceeds on this assumption.
A recent unsuccessful state law nuisance suit filed by North
Carolina against the Tennessee Valley Authority in a federal
district court demonstrates the demand for, and amplifies the
importance of, the Supreme Court as a forum for the resolution of
interstate air pollution controversies.285 North Carolina’s suit
alleged the Tennessee Valley Authority’s emissions of sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and particulate matter from its
coal plants constituted a public nuisance under state law and
sought an injunction requiring emissions reductions.286 The
district court granted an injunction, but the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal in 2010. The Fourth
Circuit held that the Clean Air Act preempts downwind state
nuisance law and that a defendant’s compliance with permits
issued under state implementations of the Clean Air Act is a bar
to claims under source state nuisance law absent a showing of
negligence.287 The merits of the decision of the Fourth Circuit in

283. Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. at 116.
284. See North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir.
2010).
285. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
286. Complaint at 1, 4, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d
486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20). The bill of complaint in Wisconsin v.
Illinois served as a model for the last two sentences.
287. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d at 308-10.
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this case are beyond the scope of this Article, but its decision—
when combined with the Supreme Court’s holdings that the Clean
Air Act displaces federal common law suits against individual
sources—leaves the downwind states in the Fourth Circuit
without recourse against individual sources of air pollution in
upwind states apart from federal statutory remedies under the
Clean Air Act.288 Those remedies are of little use to North
Carolina and other downwind states that seek greater protection
from air pollution than the Clean Air Act offers.289
This Section will briefly outline how to refashion North
Carolina’s complaint in North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley
Authority into a viable bill of complaint against other states
seeking protection of a downwind state’s air quality from
interstate pollution. For North Carolina and other downwind
states to obtain judicial protection of its air quality from
interstate pollution under federal common law in the Supreme
Court, the states must (1) allege great loss or serious injury;290 (2)
file a bill alleging facts clearly sufficient to call for relief;291 (3)
demonstrate an Article III, Section 2 controversy between
states;292 (4) seek relief against and for states, not just
individuals;293 and (5) prove the claim clearly and fully.294

288. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. at 497.
289. See North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,, 615 F.3d at 307 (“‘North
Carolina is seeking a Court order requiring TVA to control its emissions to
levels similar to those required for coal-fired power plants in North Carolina by
the North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act on a similar timetable.’” (quoting a
press release from 2006)).
290. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906) (“Before this court ought to
intervene the case should be of serious magnitude . . . .”); Alabama v. Arizona,
291 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1934) (“Leave will not be granted unless the threatened
injury is clearly shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent . . . . The facts
alleged are not sufficient to warrant a finding that the enforcement of the
statutes of any defendant would cause Alabama to suffer great loss or any
serious injury.”).
291. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. at 291-292 (1934) (“A State asking leave to
sue another to prevent the enforcement of laws must allege, in the complaint
offered for filing, facts that are clearly sufficient to call for a decree in its
favor.”).
292. See supra Part IV.A.a–b.
293. Id.
294. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 521. (1906) (“Before this court ought to
intervene the case should be . . . clearly and fully proved . . . .”).
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Using the bill of complaint filed in Wisconsin v. Illinois and
the complaint in North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
and in light of the nature of a downwind state’s suit against
upwind states,an appropriately modest prayer for relief at the
outset of a bill of complaint would be as follows:
Plaintiff, the State of _____ (“the State”), respectfully requests
leave to file this bill of complaint in equity against defendant
_____ (“the Defendant”) to address emissions of air pollution from
coal-fired electric generating units (“EGUs”) installed in electric
generating stations (“power plants”) located in the Defendant’s
territory that have in the past significantly contributed, and
continue to significantly contribute, to substantial adverse effects
on the health and welfare of citizens of the State, damage to the
State’s natural resources and economy, and harm to the State’s
finances. The Defendant is inequitably permitting the emission
of excessive quantities of air pollution into the atmosphere
thereby threatening great losses upon the State and violating the
State’s sovereign rights. The State prays that this Court issue
necessary and appropriate orders to gradually restore the just
rights of the State in order to avoid so far as might be the
possible the economic consequences which the Defendant has
subjected itself and its citizens by permitting the expenditures of
great sums on the construction of power plants within its
territory.295

States can file bills of complaint on their own behalf as well
as on behalf of the citizenry of the states as parens patriae.296 In
its complaint against the Tennessee Valley Authority, North
Carolina filed its claim in just these terms:
North Carolina is a sovereign State of the United States of
America. It brings this cause of action on its own behalf to protect
State property, resources, and revenue, asparens patriaeon
behalf of its citizens and residents to protect their health and

295. See Complaint at 1, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp.
2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20).
296. See supra Part IV.A.a. The requirements for state and citizenry injury in
an air pollution suit are discussed infra Part V.A.d.
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well-being, and to protect those natural resources held in trust by
the State.297

In filing against upwind states, this portion can be used
nearly verbatim, substituting only the name of the downwind
state, though additional pleading will be necessary as discussed
below.
States can file bills of complaint against other states for the
other states’ own actions, as well as the actions of the other
states’ citizenry.298 For displacement reasons, downwind states
should not bring suit against upwind states in their capacities as
owners and commercial operators of any of the listed facilities,
but downwind states should still assert both state action and
citizenry action to properly affect the substitution of states for
individual sources. For both assertions, the bill must identify the
upwind states and the sources of air pollution in their respective
territories.299 A downwind state should then assert its claims
against the upwind states as (1) issuers of permits to the listed
facilities; and (2) parens patriae of the listed facilities.300 The
requirements to plead state responsibility are addressed below,
but this will suffice for the description of the state defendants in
the bill of complaint. Downwind states should consider filing

297. Complaint at 2, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d
486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20). The bill of complaint in Wisconsin v.
Illinois served as a model for the last two sentences.
298. See supra Part IV.A.b. The requirements for state responsibility in an air
pollution suit are discussed infra Part V.A.d.
299. In its complaint against the Tennessee Valley Authority, North Carolina
lists only the entity’s facilities located in the three states. Complaint at 3, North
Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No.
1:06CV20). To this, North Carolina should add additional private and state
owned facilities.
300. As discussed supra in Part IV.A.b. and infra in Part V.A.d., it is unclear
whether the Court recognizes jurisdiction in cases like Idaho v. Oregon and
Vermont v. New York on account of state permitting or on a theory of parens
patriae state responsibility. This Article argues the latter is the better theory,
but the matter should be pressed in the alternative until explicitly decided. On
the permitting score, see North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291,
309-10 (4th Cir. 2010) (“TVA’s electricity-generating operations are expressly
permitted by the states in which they are located. . . . An activity that is
explicitly licensed and allowed by Tennessee law cannot be a public nuisance.”).
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separate suits against each upwind state rather than joining the
suits together to avoid multifariousness problems.301
As for the Court’s jurisdiction, a downwind state’s bill of
complaint should state that the Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over this “controversy between two or more states”
under Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 and 28 U.S.C. 1251(a). The
North Carolina complaint against the Tennessee Valley Authority
included pleadings on venue, but this is superfluous in the
Supreme Court, as would be any allegations of personal
jurisdiction such as those included in the American Electric Power
Co. v. Connecticut complaint.302 But, in order to make out a claim
of the existence of a controversy “between two or more states”
within the meaning of the Constitution, a downwind state’s bill of
complaint must allege that the downwind state is injured directly
or through its citizenry by the acts of the upwind defendant states
or through their respective citizenry.303
In its litigation against the Tennessee Valley Authority,
North Carolina pled injury both directly and through its
citizenry, and a downwind state can make the same allegations of
injury in a bill of complaint against states filed in the Supreme
Court. North Carolina generally alleged that the emissions of
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and particulate matter
“harm human health, safety, comfort, the environment, and the
economy . . . in North Carolina” and resulted in “increased
financial burdens to the State.”304 The state specifically alleged
the following:
(1) the emissions are “prejudicial to the health, comfort, safety,
and property of North Carolina’s citizens at large and to the
economy, finances, and natural resources of the State of North
Carolina;”

301. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1934) (holding bill against
states with differing statutes on Commerce Clause grounds for restricting the
sale of convict labor multifarious).
302. Complaint, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486
(W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20).
303. See supra Part IV.A.a–b; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
304. Complaint at 4, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d
486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20).
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(2) the fine particulate matter emissions cause “citizens of North
Carolina” to suffer from “premature death, cardiovascular
disease (including heart attacks and cardiac arrhythmia),
aggravation of respiratory disease (including asthma), decreased
lung function, changes to lung tissue and structure, and other
respiratory effects;”
(3) the emissions of nitrogen oxides contribute “to the formation
of ground-level ozone, which causes North Carolina citizens to
experience adverse health effects, including chest pains,
aggravated asthma, shortness of breath, reduced lung function,
coughing, and throat irritation;”
(4) emissions of mercury eventually contaminate “lakes, rivers,
and estuaries in North Carolina” where they “chemically
transform into methylmercury” that “becomes increasingly
concentrated as it travels up the food chain, reaching
concentrations in fish tissue that can be toxic to those who
consume affected fish” because they may cause “a variety of
developmental neurological abnormalities;”
(5) the negative health consequences of the emissions lead to
“increased costs to the citizens of the State from increased
hospital visits and other medical costs and from absence from
work.”
(6) the emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
particulate matter “contribute to haze that markedly decreases
visibility in North Carolina, including in the State’s treasured
State parks” and “degrades the quality of the environment for the
citizens of North Carolina and visitors to the State;”
(7) the emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides “contribute
to the deposition of acid compounds in North Carolina” that
“causes the acidification of surface waters, including lakes,
streams and ponds, and damages forests in North Carolina;”
(8) these emissions “contribute to loss of revenue for the State
and a substantial increase in expenditures for the State to
combat and remedy the effects” of the emissions. 305

The sufficiency of these harms for a controversy between
states is evidenced by the Court’s recognition of jurisdiction over
the controversies in Idaho v. Oregon, the suit on behalf of Idaho
salmon fisherman, and Vermont v. New York, the suit alleging

305. Id. at 4-6.
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pollution of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek.306 As for
the sufficiency of air pollution injuries to states, the bill of
complaint in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. included a subset of
these alleged injuries and the Court recognized its jurisdiction to
resolve the controversy between the state and the source of the
emissions on the ground that “the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain” and “has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”307 And the harms alleged by
North Carolina are more immediate than the threatened loss of
sovereign territory caused by global warming that five Justices
recognized as sufficient in Massachusetts v. EPA.308
The substantive sufficiency of these alleged injuries to a
downwind state and its citizenry is, however, a different matter
than the way in which they must be pled. The Court has long
required that bills of complaint in state controversies allege facts
that “are clearly sufficient,” akin to the Twombly-Iqbal
heightened pleading standard.309 This presumably applies to all
necessary components of a state controversy complaint, including
injury.
Therefore, downwind states should offer greater
specificity and detail of its injury, perhaps by offering
quantitative measures of the harms as previous successful state
complaints have.310

306. Idaho v. Oregon (1975); Vermont v. New York (1971).
307. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
308. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2007).
309. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1934) (“A State asking leave
to sue another to prevent the enforcement of laws must allege, in the complaint
offered for filing, facts that are clearly sufficient to call for a decree in its
favor.”).
310. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736 n.12 (1981) (“As
alleged in the complaint, the annual increase in natural gas costs directly
associated with the First-Use Tax with respect to each of the plaintiff States is
as follows: Maryland ($60,000); New York ($300,000); Massachusetts ($25,000);
Rhode Island ($25,000); Illinois ($270,000); Indiana ($70,000); Michigan
($650,000); Wisconsin ($70,000); New Jersey ($20,000) . . . . Total direct injuries
to the plaintiff States was estimated to be $1.5 million, and injury to the citizen
consumers was estimated at $120 million.”); see also Brief for Fourteen States as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615
F.3d 291 (2010) (No. 10-997) (noting “that emissions from the plants at issue
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As demonstrated in Part IV.A.b, states must answer for
injuries to a complainant state or its citizenry that are fairly
traceable to either the sovereign actions of the state, or the
actions of the state’s citizenry in which the state has a sufficient
interest that it could bring a suit to protect the citizenry as
parens patriae. As discussed below, downwind state suits against
upwind states in their capacity as owners and operators of
sources of emissions are probably preempted by the Clean Air
Act. But this still leaves open suits against upwind states as (1)
issuers of permits; and (2) parens patriae of the emissions of the
citizenry.
This Article takes a dim view of the permitting theory of
liability, but downwind states cannot afford to omit this theory in
a bill of complaint unless it is explicitly rejected by the Court.
Accordingly, downwind states should include allegations of state
permitting of the emissions. Taking the statement discussed
above in the Court’s summary of the bill of complaint in Colorado
v. Kansas as a model, downwind state complaints should allege
that upwind states are “acting . . . through private persons
thereto licensed” to emit air pollutants that have caused the
downwind state’s injuries.311
The better argument for upwind state responsibility for
downwind state injuries is that the upwind states have
significant parens patriae interests in the emissions activity of
their respective citizenry. As discussed in Part IV.A.b, this
theory of defendant state responsibility was first suggested in
Missouri v. Illinois and seems to underlie the Court’s recognition
of the state responsibility for private appropriation of water in
Wyoming v. Colorado, private well boring and irrigation in
Washington v. Oregon, private water pollution in Vermont v. New
York, and private fishing in Idaho v. Oregon.312 Of these, the
annually result in the premature deaths of 99 North Carolinians, 49 New
Yorkers, and 27 Marylanders”).
311. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1902). As there are significant
arguments against this theory of defendant state responsibility, it should be
clearly set apart from other theories of defendant state responsibility.
312. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 242 (1901); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S 419, 456 (1922); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523–25 (1936);
Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385
(1980).
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facts of Vermont v. New York are especially compelling — the
Court recognized its jurisdiction to resolve a controversy between
the states primarily over emissions from just one private entity,
the International Paper Company. According to the theory of
these cases, upwind states may be sued so long as they have a
sufficient interest in the activities of their respective citizenry
that result in emission that cause injury to states downwind.
It would be difficult to conceive of how an upwind state could
disclaim its significant interests in the activities that result in
interstate air pollution. Emission controls are costly, and these
costs are passed on to consumers, including the state itself. If the
market will not bear these cost increases, production may be
reduced.
For these reasons, Alabama, an upwind state,
successfully intervened on appeal in North Carolina v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, and its arguments in favor of intervention are
equally valid in favor of holding states responsible for the
emissions of their citizenry.313
B. Only Individual Source Suits Are Displaced by the
Clean Air Act
As there are no air pollution compacts in force between the
states, federal common law air pollution controversy suits are not
displaced and may be filed in the Supreme Court by downwind
states against upwind states, notwithstanding the Clean Air Act
and the Court’s 2011 holding in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut that suits by states against individual sources are
displaced by the Clean Air Act.
Suits that might otherwise be maintained under federal
common law may be displaced by compacts and Acts of Congress
that supply the rule of decision in the underlying controversy
between the states. As discussed in Part IV.C, compacts entered
into by states with the assent of Congress always provide the rule
of decision in controversies between compacting states in those
matters to which they pertain but the unilateral Acts of Congress

313. State of Alabama’s Motion to Intervene, North Carolina v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1623) (“Alabama has
important sovereign interests at stake”); North Carolina v. Tennessee, No. 091623 (4th Cir. July 20, 2009) (granting Alabama’s motion to intervene).
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only sometimes provide the rule of decision in controversies
between states. Thus, for Acts of Congress to displace suits
between states, there is a threshold inquiry regarding the
constitutional power of Congress to supply the rule of decision.314
Congress may constitutionally regulate the emissions of
individual sources of interstate air pollution under the Commerce
Clause and does so by way of the provisions of the Clean Air Act.
After Garcia reversed National League of Cities, Congress may
even regulate the proprietary emissions of individual state
sources. But under the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution
in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States,
Congress may not commandeer the states by directly compelling
the states to regulate air pollution. Thus, the rule of decision in a
suit between a downwind state and an upwind state for the
latter’s proprietary emissions may be supplied by the unilateral
Acts of Congress. For this reason, federal common law of
nuisance suits even between states are vulnerable to
displacement, and the Court’s recent decision in a federal
common law of nuisance suit between states and private sources
of emissions suggests they have indeed been displaced by the
Clean Air Act.315
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, California,
Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin joined with New York City,316 together

314. As for air pollution compacts, there are none. See CAROLINE N. BROUN, ET.
THE EVOLVING USE AND CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 311, §
9.4.5 (2006) (noting failed attempts to enact interstate air pollution compacts).
This is so despite great scholarly interest in the potential of compacts to resolve
air pollution controversies in the late 1960s.
See generally, Interstate
Agreements for Air Pollution Control, 1968 WASH. U. L. REV. 260 (1968); A Model
Interstate Compact for the Control of Air Pollution, 4 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369 (1966–
1967); Lewis C. Green, State Control of Interstate Air Pollution, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (1968); Leonard A. Weakley, Interstate Compacts in the
Law of Air and Water Pollution, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 81 (1970).
315. However, as will be seen in a moment, this does not apply when the suit
seeks relief from the aggregate emissions of the respective upwind states, not
individual sources, because Congress cannot supply the rule of decision, and in
the alternative, because Congress cannot afford the “same relief” as the Court
and compacts can.
316. New Jersey and Wisconsin stopped participating before the case reached
the Court presumably because new governors were elected.
AL.,
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with three land trusts who had filed a separate complaint,317 filed
a complaint against American Electric Power Company, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary, Southern Company, Xcel Energy Inc.,
Cinergy Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.318 The
plaintiffs alleged the defendants “are the five largest emitters of
carbon dioxide in the United States” and that “[t]heir collective
annual emissions of 650 million tons constitute 25 percent of
emissions from the domestic electric power sector, 10 percent of
emissions from all domestic human activities, . . . and 2.5 percent
of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide.”319 The plaintiffs
claimed that “[b]y contributing to global warming, the plaintiffs
asserted, the defendants’ carbon-dioxide emissions created a
‘substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights,’ in
violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or, in
the alternative, of state tort law.”320 The plaintiffs requested
“injunctive relief requiring each defendant ‘to cap its carbon
dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage
each year for at least a decade.’”321
On appeal of the Second Circuit’s holding that the claims
could proceed, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed and held
the federal common law nuisance claim by the states, a city, and
three land trusts against the four private parties and the
Tennessee Valley Authority was displaced by the provisions of the
Clean Air Act because “[t]he Act itself . . . provides a means to
seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power
plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal
common law,” and “[t]here is no room for a parallel track.”322
This displacement holding would extend to a suit by a state
against another state for the upwind state’s proprietary
emissions from individual sources.

317. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 n.3 (2011)
(“Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and Audubon
Society of New Hampshire.”).
318. Id. at 2534 n.5.
319. Id. at 2534.
320. Id. at 2534.
321. Id. at 2534.
322. American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. at 2530–31.
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But the Court’s holding of displacement does not limit the
right of states to bring suits against one another under federal
common law so long as the suit is not seeking injunctions against
individual sources and instead seeks protection from the
excessive aggregate emissions of the defendant upwind state.
The Clean Air Act displaces federal common law resolution of
controversies between states challenging emissions of individual
sources, but not entire states because there are constitutional
limits on congressional power recognized in New York v. United
States and Printz v. United States.323 As “the Framers explicitly
chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to
regulate individuals, not States,” Congress may not supply the
rule of decision in a controversy between states unless the
Congress has plenary power over the subject matter, whether
that be navigable waters or proprietary emissions.324
Accordingly, the effect of the Clean Air Act is limited to
displacement of suits for individual emissions, not state-wide
emissions.
Air pollution controversy suits are not displaced by the Clean
Air Act even if the Court were to hold that Congress could supply
the rule of decision. The displacement doctrine articulated by
Justice Ginsburg in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut in
an opinion joined by every participating justice would not reach a
suit between states over aggregate upwind state emissions
because the Court can provide remedies that Congress may not
under New York v. United States.325 As Justice Stevens noted in
dissent in New York v. United States, that decision holds
Congress may not provide—in the words of Justice Ginsburg in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut—”the same relief”
that state plaintiffs may seek from the Supreme Court.326 Thus,
the New York v. United States limit on the power of Congress to
regulate states also limits the displacement of federal common
law in cases “between two or more states” in which states seek

323. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
324. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
325. Id. at 145.
326. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 212 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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relief that Congress may not constitutionally provide.327 But the
simpler route to the same conclusion is discussed above: namely
that Congress does not have the constitutional power to supply
the rule of decision, so displacement is not possible as a threshold
matter.
VII. CONCLUSION
Suits between states in the Supreme Court seeking
resolution of environmental controversies have already played a
significant role in the apportionment and protection of this
nation’s natural resources. For the Court to play a greater role in
the future, the states for whom this forum was provided in
exchange for surrender of important sovereign powers must
invoke the jurisdiction in novel controversies. If past cases are
any indication, the Court will heed the call.

327. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 ,179 (1992).
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APPENDIX OF SUITS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE
STATES
This appendix attempts, as others have before, to document
in one place the reported history of controversies between states
litigated in the Supreme Court.328 It follows the practice of
previous compilations of omitting “[m]inor procedural orders such
as allowance of additional time in which to plead,” assignment of
masters, receipt of records from masters, and “receipt of postdecree progress reports.”329 The cases are separated between
those properly brought and those in which the court denied leave
to file a bill or dismissed the bill on demurrer. The cases are
dated and ordered according to first reported entry in the United
States Reports except that cases after October of 1961 are ordered
by docket number.330 Supplemental and contextual information
not contained within the decisions and notable commentary is
provided in footnotes when appropriate. It is worth recompiling
these cases as there is no widely available comprehensive
328. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 537–41 (controversies between states organized
by state through 1918); CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN
STATES, at 113–15 (controversies between states through 1923); Vincent L.
McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s Management of Its
Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 MAIN L. REV. 185, 216–42 (1992) (all
original jurisdiction litigation between 1961 and 1992); Note, The Original
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665, 701-19 (1959) (all
original jurisdiction litigation through 1958). There have been two compilations
of opinions. SCOTT, ANALYSIS (select opinions through 1918); JAMES BROWN
SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION: CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1918) (all cases through 1918). Several authors have summarized many of the
cases. SCOTT, ANALYSIS; WARREN; JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE DISPUTES:
THE SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION (2006). Zimmerman, a Professor
of Political Science, erroneously asserts at the outset of his contribution that “no
book and relatively few articles have been published on the subject of the court’s
original jurisdiction.” ZIMMERMAN at x. Another author has attempted to
compile a win-loss record for each state. JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES:
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST CURIOUS
PROVISIONS (2012).
329. The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, supra note 328, at 701.
330. When the first reported entry is a procedural matter that would
otherwise be excised, it has been included.
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appendix of the cases. Further, this appendix uses a tabular
display to allow more in depth summaries than are provided
when the information is provided in citation parentheticals.
Interested parties and future compilers may contact the author to
obtain the data contained herein in an easily accessible format.
A. Controversies Between States Properly Brought
Before the Court
1

New York v.

4 U.S. 1 (1799)

New York filed a bill of complaint against Connecticut and private

Connecticut

4 U.S. 3 (1799)

landowners seeking an injunction against Connecticut ejectment

4 U.S. 6 (1799)

proceedings on the ground that the land belonged to New York in
consequence of a 1683 agreement between the two states.

The

Court denied the injunction because “New York was not a party to
the [ejectment] suits below nor interested in the decision of those
suits.”331
2

3

New Jersey v.

28 U.S. 461 (1830)

New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against New York disputing the

New York

30 U.S. 284 (1831)

“title to and sovereignty over the waters of New York Harbor and

31 U.S. 323 (1832)

Hudson River.”332 After a heated jurisdictional dispute, the states
“settled their dispute by a compact assented to by Congress.”333

Rhode Island v.

32 U.S. 651 (1833)

Rhode Island filed a bill of complaint against Massachusetts

Massachusetts

36 U.S. 226 (1837)

seeking settlement of its northern boundary. The Court decided in

37 U.S 657 (1838)

favor of Massachusetts on the merits of the boundary dispute after

37 U.S. 755 (1838)

an extensive resolution of the Court’s power to decide the boundary.

38 U.S. 23 (1839)
39 U.S. 210 (1840)
40 U.S. 233 (1841)
45 U.S. 591 (1846)

331. New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 3, 4 (1799). Connecticut did not appear
because the legislature had not met, rather the attorney for the individual
plaintiffs in the ejectment case appeared and defended Connecticut court
proceedings.
332. WARREN, supra note 328, at 39 (“This dispute had given rise to much
bitterness of feeling and retaliatory legislation between the States; and there
had been forcible seizures and practically armed conflict over the rights of
various steamboat owners to run their boats upon these waters—so that
William Wirt, in arguing the great Steamboat Monopoly Case in 1824, said:
‘Here are three States almost on the eve of war,’ and that if the Court did not
interpose its friendly hand, ‘there would be civil war.’”).
333. WARREN, supra note 328, at 40.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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Missouri v.

48 U.S. 660 (1849)

Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Iowa seeking settlement of

Iowa

51 U.S. 1 (1850)

its northern boundary. The Court decided in favor of Iowa on the

160 U.S. 688 (1896)

merits of the dispute.

165 U.S. 118 (1897)

restrained each state from exercising jurisdiction beyond the

The Court perpetually enjoined and

boundary the Court established and appointed commissioners to
mark the line the court established and to plant cast iron pillars
every ten miles along the borders.334
5

Florida v.

52 U.S. 293 (1850)

Florida filed a bill of complaint against Georgia seeking settlement

Georgia

58 U.S. 478 (1854)

of a portion of its northern boundary. The United States sided with
Florida as to the location of the boundary and the attorney general
moved “for leave to be heard on behalf of the United States.” This
led to a heated split decision granting the motion to be heard. No
further proceedings in this controversy are evident in the reports.

6

Alabama v.

64 U.S. 505 (1859)

Georgia

Alabama filed a bill of complaint against Georgia seeking
settlement of its Chattahoochee River border with Georgia. The
dispute turned on the interpretation of words of a contract of
cession to the United States.

The Court decided in Georgia’s

favor.335
7

Kentucky v.

65 U.S. 66 (1860)

Dennison

Kentucky filed a bill of complaint against the governor of Ohio in
his official capacity seeking a writ of mandamus commanding him
to deliver a Cincinnati man indicted for assisting in the escape of a
Kentucky slave. The Court held that the governor of Ohio could not
be compelled to do so.

8

Virginia v.
West Virginia

78 U.S. 39 (1870)

Virginia filed a bill of complaint against West Virginia seeking to
settle its boundary by attacking the validity of its purported cession
of Berkeley and Jefferson counties to West Virginia on the grounds
that Congress never expressly assented. The Court found Congress
impliedly assented and held in favor of West Virginia.

334. WARREN, supra note 328, at 41 (“Missouri at one time had called out 1500
troops and Iowa 1100, to defend their respective alleged rights. The conflict of
claims was more serious, by reason of the fact that if Missouri prevailed, these
2000 square miles would become additional slave territory; if Iowa won, they
would be free.”).
335. WARREN, supra note 328, at 42–43 (“[T]he Southern States, though
having little confidence at that time in the political branches of the Government,
were entirely content to leave the decision of some of their sovereign rights as
States to the Supreme Judiciary. Hence, we have the remarkable spectacle of
two states who, less than one year from the date of the decision, were to secede
from the Union, accepting the decision of a Court under a Constitution which
they were so soon to repudiate.”).
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Missouri v.

78 U.S. 395 (1870)

Kentucky

[Vol. 31

Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky seeking to settle
its Mississippi River boundary at Wolf Island. The Court held in
favor of Kentucky.

10 South Carolina v. 93 U.S. 4 (1876)

Georgia

South Carolina filed a bill of complaint against Georgia, Secretary
of War Alonzo Taft, and the chief and a lieutenant-colonel of the
Army Corps of Engineers seeking an injunction against the
obstruction of a channel of the Savannah River. The Court held the
obstruction authorized by Congress under its commerce power
notwithstanding pre-Constitution compact between the states
prohibiting obstructions of the river.

11 Indiana v.

136 U.S. 479 (1890)

Indiana filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky seeking

Kentucky

159 U.S. 275 (1895)

settlement of a portion of its southern border with Kentucky.

167 U.S. 270 (1897)

Indiana and Kentucky each claimed jurisdiction over a two
thousand acre tract north of the Ohio River. Kentucky claimed the
tract was at one time an island in the Ohio River and Indiana
claimed only a bayou had separated the tract from the mainland to
the north. The Court held in favor of Kentucky.

12 Nebraska v.

Iowa

143 U.S. 359 (1892)

Nebraska filed a bill of complaint against Iowa seeking to settle its

145 U.S. 519 (1892)

Missouri River boundary near Omaha where there were marked
changes in the course of the main channel. The Court held that
principles of accretion and avulsion apply and found on the merits
that the sudden shift of the Missouri River was avulsion and the
boundary did not change as a result.

13 Iowa v.

Illinois

147 U.S. 1 (1893)

Iowa filed a bill of complaint against Illinois seeking settlement of

151 U.S. 238 (1894)

its Mississippi River boundary. Iowa argued the boundary to be the

202 U.S. 58 (1906)

geometric middle and Illinois argued it to be the middle of the main
channel. The Court held in favor of Illinois.

14 Virginia v.

148 U.S. 503 (1893)

Virginia filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee seeking to settle

Tennessee

158 U.S. 267 (1895)

its southern boundary. Virginia claimed the boundary to be “on the

177 U.S. 501 (1900)

parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north” and

190 U.S. 64 (1903)

Tennessee claimed the states had agreed to a different boundary
without express congressional consent. The Court held in favor of
Tennessee that Congress impliedly assented and the Court
appointed commissioners to mark the boundary. The states then
entered into a compact adjusting the line.

15 Missouri v.

180 U.S. 208 (1901)

Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Illinois and the Sanitary

Illinois

200 U.S. 496 (1906)

District of Chicago complaining of the construction of an artificial

202 U.S. 598 (1906)

channel from the Chicago River to the Des Plaines River such that
sewage and waste from the Chicago River would ultimately

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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discharge into the Mississippi River to the injury of Missouri. The
Court overruled a demurrer but dismissed the bill without
prejudice after taking evidence and awarded costs to Illinois.
16 Kansas v.

Colorado

185 U.S. 125 (1902)

Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Colorado claiming its rights

206 U.S. 46 (1907)

by prior appropriation to the use and enjoyment of Arkansas River
water.

The Court recognized the action in two opinions, but

ultimately dismissed the petition without prejudice and invited
Kansas to institute new proceedings

“whenever it shall appear

that, through a material increase in the depletion of the Arkansas
by Colorado, its corporations or citizens, the substantial interests of
Kansas are being injured to the extent of destroying the equitable
apportionment of benefits between the two States resulting from
the flow of the river.”336
17 South Dakota v.

192 U.S. 286 (1904)

North Carolina

South Dakota filed a bill of complaint against North Carolina,
Simon Rothschilds, and Charles Salter seeking payment on ten
repudiated state bonds issued by North Carolina secured by the
stock of the North Carolina Railroad Company or in lieu of
payment foreclosure on the stock. Private parties had donated the
ten bonds to South Dakota with the hopes that a successful original
suit would convince North Carolina to pay its obligations to private
bond holders. The private defendants represented private owners
of the bonds. North Carolina alleged they were included in the
complaint as defendants as a means of evading the Eleventh
Amendment.

The Court held the private defendants were not

necessary parties and were entitled to no relief. The Court held in
favor of South Dakota and ordered North Carolina to pay the
amount owed on the ten bonds, $27,400, by the end of the year or
the Marshall of the Supreme Court would foreclose the North
Carolina Railroad Company Stock by sale from the United States
Capitol steps.
18 Missouri v.

Nebraska

196 U.S. 23 (1904)

Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska seeking

197 U.S. 577 (1905)

settlement of its Missouri River boundary. The dispute arose out of
shift in the Missouri River over a twenty-four hour period. The
Court held the shift was an avulsion and did not change the

336. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907). WARREN supra note 28,
at 47–48 (“[A] momentous question as to how far a State by instituting extensive
irrigation works within its boundary could deprive another State of the water of
a non-navigable river flowing from one State into the other, and could thus
reduce much arable land in a neighboring State to a desert condition”).
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boundary between the states.
19 Louisiana v.

Mississippi

202 U.S. 1 (1906)

Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi seeking

202 U.S. 58 (1906)

settlement of its coastal boundary.

The dispute arose out of

conflicting congressional grants first giving Louisiana all islands
within nine miles of its coast and then giving Mississippi all islands
within eighteen miles of its shore.
Louisiana.337
20 Virginia v.

West Virginia

21 Washington v.

Oregon

The Court held in favor of

206 U.S. 290 (1907)

Virginia filed a bill of complaint against West Virginia seeking a

220 U.S. 1 (1911)

decree for an equitable proportion of the public debt of Virginia

231 U.S. 89 (1913)

owed by West Virginia. The Court held that the Court had power

234 U.S. 117 (1914)

to issue a remedy equivalent to execution of judgment but as

238 U.S. 202 (1915)

Congress also has this power under the Compact Clause when the

241 U.S. 531 (1916)

execution is in accord with a compact that it is the better course to

246 U.S. 565 (1918)

give Congress the opportunity to exercise its power.

211 U.S. 127 (1908)

Washington filed a bill of complaint against Oregon seeking

214 U.S. 205 (1909)

settlement of its Columbia River boundary. The Court held in favor
of Oregon that the center of the north channel continued to serve as
the boundary.338

22 Missouri v.

213 U.S. 78 (1908)

Kansas

Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Kansas seeking settlement
of a portion of its western boundary. Missouri claimed sovereignty
over a four hundred acre island in the Missouri River west of its
main channel on the ground that it lay east of the meridian
boundary that existed before Congress extended Missouri’s
jurisdiction to the river.

The court held that the intent of the

adjustment was to make the river the boundary and so the
accretion resulted in the cession of the territory to Kansas.
23 Maryland v.

West Virginia

217 U.S. 1 (1910)

Maryland filed a bill of complaint against West Virginia seeking

217 U.S. 577 (1910)

settlement of its meridian boundary. The Court determined the
boundary is the historically recognized albeit inaccurate line.

337. WARREN supra note 328, at 43–44 (“By far the most important boundary
case . . . involved great Financial interests—the oyster fisheries in the waters
between the two States. The controversy had been pending for ten years; each
State had appointed armed patrols, and by law and force sought to exclude
fishermen of the other States . . . The situation was precisely that of an
economic conflict in mutually claimed territory, which, if occurring between
nations of Europe or elsewhere, would be very probable cause of war.”)
338. WARREN supra note 328, at 44 (“[A] suit . . . involving the channel of the
Columbia River presented [an] inflamed boundary question, the decision of
which might leave one or the other State in control of the very valuable salmon
fisheries.”). The controversy was ultimately settled by compact.
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32 S.Ct. 836 (1912)

Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee seeking

246 U.S. 158 (1918)

settlement of its Mississippi River boundary. The Court held in

247 U.S. 461 (1918)

favor of Arkansas that the recognition of the principle of thalweg
does not limit the application of the principle of avulsion.

25 North Carolina v. 235 U.S. 1 (1914)

Tennessee

240 U.S. 652 (1916)

North Carolina filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee Seeking
a settlement of its eastern boundary. The Court determined and
recognized the boundary established by the commissioners that
were appointed by the states in 1821.

26 Wyoming v.

243 U.S. 622 (1917)

Wyoming filed a bill of complaint against Colorado asserting

Colorado

259 U.S. 419 (1922)

appropriation rights against a diversion of the nonnavigable

259 U.S. 496 (1922)

Laramie River and sought an injunction against Colorado and two

42 S. Ct. 587 (1922)

corporate defendants.

260 U.S 1 (1922)

applies and entered an injunction against Colorado limiting the

286 U.S. 494 (1932)

diversion of water to 15,500 acre-feet of water per year. Wyoming

287 U.S. 579 (1932)

subsequently asserted Colorado was not complying with the Court’s

298 U.S. 573 (1936)

decree and successfully obtained an injunction ordering adherence

309 U.S. 627 (1940)

The Court held the rule of appropriation

to the decree.

309 U.S. 572 (1940)
353 U.S. 953 (1957)
27 New York v.

New Jersey

249 U.S. 202 (1919)

New York filed a bill of complaint against New Jersey and the

256 U.S. 296 (1921)

Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners seeking an order enjoining
the discharge of sewage into the Upper Bay of New York Harbor.
The Court dismissed the bill without prejudice on the merits for
failure to prove threat of injury by clear and convincing evidence.

28 Arkansas v.

Mississippi

29 Georgia v.

South Carolina

250 U.S. 39 (1919)

Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi seeking

252 U.S. 344 (1920)

settlement of its Mississippi River boundary. The Court determined

40 S. Ct. 585 (1920)

the boundary between the states to be the center of the main

256 U.S. 28 (1921)

channel of the Mississippi River as it was prior to 1848 avulsion.

39 S. Ct. 258 (1919)

Georgia filed a bill of complaint against South Carolina seeking

253 U.S. 477 (1920)

settlement of its Savannah River, Tugaloo River, and Chatooga

257 U.S. 516 (1922)

River boundary. The Court interpreted Article II of the Beaufort

259 U.S. 572 (1922)

Convention to define the boundary between the states not
according to the principle of thalweg but rather as the geometric
middle of the stream where there are no islands and the geometric
midway between islands and the South Carolina shore where there
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are islands.

The Court also determined that the islands of the
Chattooga River are within Georgia’s jurisdiction.339
30 Pennsylvania v.

West Virginia

31 Minnesota v.

Wisconsin

39 S. Ct. 490 (1919)

Pennsylvania and Ohio each filed a bill of complaint against West

252 U.S. 563 (1920)

Virginia seeking an injunction against enforcement of a West

257 U.S. 620 (1922)

Virginia statute requiring producers of natural gas to give

262 U.S. 553 (1923)

preference to West Virginia customers as a violation of the

262 U.S. 623 (1923)

Commerce Clause.

263 U.S. 350 (1923)

over the objections of Holmes and Brandeis on the merits and

263 U.S. 671 (1923)

McReynolds and Brandeis on jurisdiction.

252 U.S. 273 (1920)

Minnesota filed a bill of complaint against Wisconsin seeking

254 U.S. 14 (1920)

settlement of its Upper St. Louis Bay and Lower St. Louis Bay

258 U.S. 149 (1922)

boundary. The Court held in favor of Minnesota that the principal

The Court entered the requested injunction

and not the deepest channel is the main channel under the
principle of thalweg.
32 Oklahoma v.

Texas

252 U.S. 372 (1920)

Oklahoma filed a bill of complaint against Texas contending the

40 S. Ct. 394 (1920)

southern bank of the Red River constituted the boundary between

40 S. Ct. 580 (1920)

the two states as determined by the court in United States v. Texas,

40 S. Ct. 582 (1920)

162 U.S. 1. The Court first granted the motion of the United States

253 US 465 (1920)

to intervene, issued an injunction, and appointed a receiver over

254 U.S. 609 (1920)

disputed property between the main channel of the Red River and

254 U.S. 280 (1920)

its southern bank in light of potential armed conflict between

254 U.S. 603 (1920)

Oklahoma and Texas after the discovery of oil and gas deposits in

256 U.S. 70 (1921)
261 U.S. 340 (1923)
262 U.S. 505 (1923)

the bed of the river.

The Court then held the boundary res

judicata.

Texas counterclaimed as to another portion of the

boundary.

The Court held this portion of the boundary not res

339. Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516, 174 (1922) (“The taxation of
dams and hydro-electric plants, already constructed and hereafter to be
constructed, in the boundary rivers, renders the decision of the questions
involved of importance to the two States.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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judicata and resolved the claim on the merits.340

265 U.S. 500 (1924)
265 U.S. 505 (1924)
265 U.S. 513 (1924)
267 U.S. 452 (1925)
269 U.S. 314 (1926)
269 U.S. 539 (1926)
272 U.S. 21 (1926)
273 U.S. 93 (1927)
274 U.S. 714 (1927)
276 U.S. 596 (1928)
281 U.S. 109 (1930)
33 North Dakota v.

Minnesota

256 U.S. 220 (1921)

North Dakota filed a bill of complaint against Minnesota for the

263 U.S. 365 (1923)

construction of drainage ditches that allegedly increased the flow of

263 U.S. 583 (1924)

the Mustinka River such that it raised the level of Lake Traverse
and caused its outlet, the Bois de Sioux River, to overflow in North
Dakota and flood adjacent properties and sought money damages
on behalf of North Dakota property owners and an injunction. The
Court held it had jurisdiction over the claim for an injunction, but
not over the claim for damages on behalf of North Dakota property
owners because of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court found for
Minnesota on the merits and dismissed the bill without prejudice
with costs taxed against North Dakota.

34 New Mexico v.

Texas

264 U.S. 574 (1923)

New Mexico filed a bill of complaint against Texas seeking

45 S. Ct. 127 (1924)

settlement of a portion of its boundary. The Court determined the

266 U.S. 586 (1924)

boundary by finding the location of the middle channel of the Rio

267 U.S. 583 (1925)

Grande River in 1850.

271 U.S. 650 (1926)

340. After resolving the boundary dispute, the court had to resolve the
proprietary claims over the land in question between the United States,
Oklahoma, and individual claimants and also to resolve the receivership. Those
decisions and orders are at 256 U.S. 602 (1921); 257 U.S. 609 (1921); 257 U.S.
611 (1921); 257 U.S. 616 (1921); 257 U.S. 308 (1921); 42 S. Ct. 96 (1921); 257
U.S. 621 (1922); 258 U.S. 606 (1922); 258 U.S. 574 (1922); 259 U.S. 565 (1922);
42 S. Ct. 587 (1922); 260 U.S. 705 (1922); 260 U.S. 711 (1923); 261 U.S. 606
(1923); 261 U.S. 345 (1923); 262 U.S. 724 (1923); 263 U.S. 681 (1923); 265 U.S.
76 (1924); 265 U.S. 573 (1924); 265 U.S. 490 (1924); 266 U.S. 583 (1924); 267
U.S. 7 (1925); 268 U.S. 252 (1925); 268 U.S. 676 (1925); 268 U.S. 678 (1925); 268
U.S. 680 (1925). Texas also claimed the receiver was obligated to pay certain
taxes to Texas. 266 U.S. 298 (1924); 266 U.S. 303 (1924); 268 U.S. 472 (1925).
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274 U.S. 716 (1927)
275 U.S. 279 (1927)
276 U.S. 557 (1928)
276 U.S. 558 (1928)
283 U.S. 788 (1931)
51 S. Ct. 357 (1931)
51 S. Ct. 363 (1931)
35 New Mexico v.

Colorado

36 Vermont v.

New Hampshire

267 U.S. 30 (1925)

New Mexico filed a bill of complaint against Colorado seeking

267 U.S. 582 (1925)

settlement of its thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude boundary.

268 U.S. 108 (1925)

The Court held that regardless of its accuracy, the historically

357 U.S. 934 (1958)

recognized survey of the thirty-seventh parallel governed.

46 S. Ct. 16 (1925)

Vermont filed a bill of complaint against New Hampshire seeking

282 U.S. 796 (1930)

settlement of its Connecticut River boundary. The Court held in

50 S. Ct. 462 (1930)

favor of Vermont.

51 S. Ct. 18 (1930)
52 S. Ct. 124 (1931)
289 U.S. 593 (1933)
53 S. Ct. 788 (1933)
290 U.S. 589 (1933)
290 U.S. 602 (1933)
290 U.S. 579 (1934)
298 U.S. 642 (1936)
57 S. Ct. 192 (1936)
299 U.S. 519 (1936)
57 S. Ct. 428 (1937)
300 U.S. 636 (1937)
57 S. Ct. 491 (1937)
37 Michigan v.

Wisconsin

270 U.S. 295 (1926)

Michigan filed a bill of complaint against Wisconsin seeking

272 U.S. 398 (1926)

settlement of its complex boundary.

The Court held that the

boundaries were settled by adverse possession of sovereignty.
38 Wisconsin v.

Illinois

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2

270 U.S. 631 (1926)

Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New

270 U.S. 634 (1926)

York filed a bill of complaint against Illinois and the Sanitary

273 U.S. 637 (1926)

District of Chicago seeking an injunction against the withdrawal of

273 U.S. 642 (1926)

8,500 cubic feet of water per second from Lake Michigan by pump

273 U.S. 644 (1926)

into a canal on the grounds that it lowered the levels of other Great

274 U.S. 488 (1927)

Lakes and connecting waterways to their injury. The Court first

278 U.S. 367 (1929)

held Illinois and “its creature the Sanitary District were reducing

279 U.S. 821 (1929)

the level of the Great Lakes, were inflicting great losses upon the
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281 U.S. 179 (1930)

complainants and were violating their rights” but “the restoration

281 U.S. 696 (1930)

of the just rights of the complainants was made gradual rather

287 U.S. 578 (1932)

than immediate” and the Court referred the case for consideration

289 U.S. 395 (1933)

of the proper remedy to the master. The Court then entered an

289 U.S. 710 (1933)

injunction against Chicago and its Sanitary District setting

309 U.S. 569 (1940)

gradually decreasing limits to withdrawals.

309 U.S. 636 (1940)

regarding the pace of work to enable the Sanitary District to meet

311 U.S. 107 (1940)

the requirements of the injunction the Court strengthened decree to

340 U.S. 858 (1950)
352 U.S. 945 (1956)
352 U.S. 947 (1957)
352 U.S. 983 (1957)
352 U.S. 984 (1957)

After concerns

require Illinois “to take all necessary steps” in order to secure
adequate sewage facilities so as to reduce the need to withdrawal
water from Lake Michigan. The Court’s supervision of withdrawal
of water from Lake Michigan continued by Illinois continued for
decades.341

361 U.S. 956 (1960)
388 U.S. 426 (1967)
449 U.S. 48 (1980)
39 Massachusetts v.

New York

271 U.S. 65 (1926)

Massachusetts filed bill of complaint against New York, the city of

271 U.S. 636 (1926)

Rochester, and several corporations and individuals asserting
private title over a twenty-five acre strip of property fronting Lake
Ontario within the city limits of Rochester and sought to enjoin
Rochester from taking it by eminent domain.

Massachusetts

claimed to own the land by virtue of the 1786 Treaty of Hartford
under which Massachusetts had given up its sovereignty claims
over land which is now part of western New York in exchange for
pre-emptive rights of private ownership over land then in
possession of Native Americans.

Massachusetts conveyed its

interest in the Territory in 1788. Thereafter the shoreline receded
and brought the land now in dispute above water. The Court held
Massachusetts did not obtain title to the land through the treaty
and even if it did it had conveyed that interest.

341. Interestingly, then former Associate Justice and former Secretary of
State Charles Evans Hughes was appointed Special Master on June 7, 1926 and
delivered the first report in the case to the Supreme Court on November 23,
1927. He had resigned from the court to run for president in 1916. By the time
the Court heard arguments on his second report, Hughes had been appointed
Chief Justice. Naturally, he “took no part in the consideration or decision” of
the Court’s consideration of his second report. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S.
179, 202 (1930). But by 1932 whatever concerns the Court may have had about
his prior service appear to have faded, as he delivered an opinion of the court in
the case. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933).
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40 Kentucky v.

278 U.S. 571 (1928)

Kentucky filed a bill of complaint against Indiana seeking an order

Indiana

49 S. Ct. 478 (1929)

of specific performance of a contract between Kentucky and Indiana

50 S. Ct. 68 (1929)

for the construction of an interstate bridge after Indiana refused to

281 U.S. 163 (1930)

proceed when citizens filed a suit in Indiana state court challenging

281 U.S. 700 (1930)

the project.

The Court held for Kentucky and ordered specific

performance of the contract because Indiana conceded its
obligations.
41 New Jersey v.

279 U.S. 823 (1929)

New York filed a bill of complaint seeking to enjoin New York and

New York

280 U.S. 528 (1930)

New York City from diverting water from the Delaware River and

283 U.S. 336 (1931)

its tributaries to the Hudson River watershed for the purpose of

283 U.S. 805 (1931)

increasing New York City’s water supply.

345 U.S. 369 (1953)

decree permitting New York to divert up to 440 million gallons of

346 U.S. 853 (1953)

water daily without restriction. The Court enjoined diversions in

347 U.S. 941 (1954)

excess of that amount unless (a) New York provided for treatment

347 U.S. 995 (1954)

of sewage and industrial waste entering the rivers according to

The Court entered a

minimum standards set by the Court in the decree; (b) New York
ensured the stage of the Delaware River would not fall below 0.50 c.
s. m. at Port Jervis, New York, and Trenton; and (c) New York
afforded New Jersey and Pennsylvania specified rights of
inspection.

The Court adjusted the terms of its decree upon

petition of New York City in 1954.
42 New Jersey v.

279 U.S. 825 (1929)

New Jersey filed a bill of complaint seeking a determination of its

Delaware

280 U.S. 529 (1930)

Delaware Bay and River boundary with Delaware.

291 U.S. 361 (1934)

claimed the boundary to be the center of the main channel

295 U.S. 694 (1935)

according to thalweg. Delaware claimed sovereignty to the midway

304 U.S. 590 (1937)

between the banks and shores except over one segment in which it

305 U.S. 576 (1938)

claimed sovereignty over the entire riverbed. The Court upheld

New Jersey

Delaware’s claim of title to the entire riverbed of the segment and
applied thalweg to the remainder.
43 Arizona v.

282 U.S. 795 (1930)

Arizona filed a bill of complaint against the Secretary of the

California

283 U.S. 423 (1931)

Interior and signatories to the Colorado River Compact—
California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming—
challenging construction of Hoover Dam as an unconstitutional
attempt to enforce a compact as against Arizona that it refused to
ratify. The Court held the construction of the dam was a valid
exercise of congressional power because the Colorado River is
navigable (the Court took judicial notice of navigability though it
was denied by Arizona).

44 Arizona v.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2

344 U.S. 919 (1953)

Arizona filed a bill of complaint against California and seven
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345 U.S. 914 (1953)

California agencies over the apportionment of the water of the

347 U.S. 985 (1954)

Colorado River and its tributaries. Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and

350 U.S. 880 (1955)

the United States joined. The Court determined that the Boulder

350 U.S. 114 (1955)

Canyon Project Act controlled and determined the rights of the

368 U.S. 917 (1961)

parties to water accordingly.

373 U.S. 546 (1963)
376 U.S. 340 (1964)
383 U.S. 268 (1966)
439 U.S. 419 (1979)
460 U.S. 605 (1983)
466 U.S. 144 (1984)
493 U.S. 886 (1989)
530 U.S. 392 (2000)
531 U.S. 1 (2000)
547 U.S. 150 (2006)
45 Connecticut v.

282 U.S. 660 (1931)

Connecticut filed a bill of complaint against Massachusetts seeking

Massachusetts

283 U.S. 789 (1931)

to enjoin the diversion of waters from the Connecticut River
watershed.

The Court held Connecticut failed to show it was

entitled to relief.
46 Washington v.

Oregon

283 U.S. 801 (1931)

Washington filed a bill of complaint against Oregon seeking judicial

297 U.S. 517 (1936)

apportionment of the waters of the nonnavigable Walla Walla
River. The Court held Washington failed to show it was entitled to
relief.

47 Wisconsin v.

287 U.S. 571 (1932)

Wisconsin filed a bill of complaint against Michigan alleging

Michigan

295 U.S. 455 (1935)

mistakes in the Court’s decree issued in its determination of the

297 U.S. 547 (1936)

border between the states. The Court issued a corrected decree.

293 U.S. 523 (1934)

Nebraska filed a bill of complaint against Wyoming seeking

295 U.S. 40 (1935)

equitable apportionment of the waters of the nonnavigable North

296 U.S. 553 (1935)

Platte River.

304 U.S. 545 (1938)

apportioned the water used for irrigation purposes amongst the

325 U.S. 589 (1945)

three states and issued an extensive decree that required the states

345 U.S. 981 (1953)

to limit the quantities of water used for irrigation within their

507 U.S. 584 (1993)

respective jurisdictions and required the states to keep records of

515 U.S. 1 (1995)

water used in irrigation.

48 Nebraska v.

Wyoming

The Court established interstate priorities and

534 U.S. 40 (2001)
49 Arkansas v.

Tennessee

296 U.S. 545 (1935)

Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee seeking

310 U.S. 563 (1940)

determination of a portion of their boundary along a portion of the

311 U.S. 1 (1940)

Mississippi River shifted by avulsion in 1821. The Court held that
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the avulsion did not change the boundary, but that Tennessee’s
undisputed possession over the territory ripened into sovereignty.

50 Texas v.

Florida

300 U.S. 642 (1937)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against Florida, New York,

300 U.S. 643 (1937)

Massachusetts, and the wife and sister of a decedent alleging that

302 U.S. 662 (1938)

his domicile at the time of his death was Texas.

306 U.S. 398 (1939)

determined that the

domicile

at the

time

The Court

of death was

Massachusetts.
51 Kansas v.

Missouri

310 U.S. 614 (1940)

Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Missouri seeking

322 U.S. 213 (1944)

determination of the boundary along the Missouri River claiming

322 U.S. 654 (1944)

sovereignty over about 2,000 acres of land resulting from an alleged

340 U.S. 859 (1950)

combination of accretions and avulsions of the Missouri River. The
Court held Kansas failed to prove its case.

52 Colorado v.

316 U.S. 645 (1942)

Colorado filed a bill of complaint against Kansas and the Finney

Kansas

320 U.S. 383 (1943)

County Water Users’ Association seeking an injunction against

322 U.S. 708 (1944)

private litigation brought by Kanas appropriators of the waters of
the Arkansas basin private against Colorado appropriators to
establish

interstate
injunction.342
53 Texas v.

New Mexico

priorities.

The

Court

granted

the

343 U.S. 932 (1952)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico. Five years later

352 U.S. 991 (1957)

the Court denied leave to amend the bill of complaint and granted a
motion to dismiss the bill of complaint for the absence of the United
States as an indispensable party.

54 Mississippi v.

Louisiana
55 Virginia v.

Maryland

346 U.S. 862 (1953)

Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana disputing the

350 U.S. 5 (1955)

river boundary. The court adopted the master’s report and decree.

355 U.S. 3 (1957)

Virginia filed a bill of complaint against Maryland seeking an order

355 U.S. 269 (1957)

enjoining “enforcement of [a] Maryland statute regulating fishin,

371 U.S. 943 (1963)

oystering, and crabbing on and in the Potomac River.”343

The

Court dismissed the bill after the parties reached a settlement.
56 Texas v.

New Jersey

369 U.S. 869 (1962)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

370 U.S. 929 (1962)

and the Sun Oil Company seeking an injunction and declaration of

371 U.S. 873 (1962)

jurisdiction to escheat the debts owed by the Sun Oil Company.

372 U.S. 926 (1963)

The Court established a federal common law rule to resolve escheat

372 U.S. 973 (1963)

of debt controversies. The Court held the state of the creditor’s last

379 U.S. 674 (1965)

known address as shown by the debtor’s books may escheat the

342. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 389 (1943) (“The evidence consists of
some seven thousand typewritten pages of testimony and 368 exhibits covering
thousands of pages.”).
343. McKusick, supra note 328, at 218.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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380 U.S. 518 (1965)

debt.

375 U.S. 803 (1963)

Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi disputing the

375 U.S. 950 (1963)

boundary at Deadman’s Bend on the Mississippi River. The Court

384 U.S. 24 (1966)

held the border to be the thalweg.

379 U.S. 876 (1964)

Nebraska filed a bill of complaint against Iowa seeking to resolve a

379 U.S. 911 (1964)

controversy over the ownership of thirty separate areas of land

379 U.S. 996 (1965)

according to the terms of the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of

406 U.S. 117 (1972)

1943.

409 U.S. 285 (1973)

declaring the ownership of the disputed areas.

379 U.S. 952 (1965)

Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana disputing the

380 U.S. 901 (1965)

boundary. The Court adopted upon the agreement of the parties

380 U.S. 969 (1965)

the master’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and proposed

382 U.S. 803 (1965)

decree.

The Court interpreted the compact and issued a decree

382 U.S. 1022 (1966)
399 U.S. 146 (1970)
60 Ohio v.

Kentucky

384 U.S. 982 (1966)

Ohio filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky seeking a

410 U.S. 641 (1973)

declaration of the boundary line and concurrent jurisdiction over

440 U.S. 902 (1979)

the Ohio River. The Court determined that the boundary is the

444 U.S. 335 (1980)

1792 lower water mark of the northern side of the Ohio River.

445 U.S. 941 (1980)
456 U.S. 958 (1982)
471 U.S. 153 (1985)
474 U.S. 1 (1985)
61 Texas v.

Colorado

62 Michigan v.

Ohio

386 U.S. 901 (1967)

Texas and New Mexico filed a bill of complaint against Colorado

389 U.S. 1000 (1967)

seeking enforcement of the Rio Grande Compact provision

390 U.S. 933 (1968)
391 U.S. 901 (1968)

requiring Colorado “to deliver water in the Rio Grande at the
Colorado-New Mexico state line.”344
The Court granted a

474 U.S. 1017 (1985)

stipulated motion to dismiss the bill with prejudice.

386 U.S. 1001 (1967)

Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana disputing the

410 U.S. 420 (1973)

boundary in Lake Erie. The Court entered a decree establishing
the boundary and charging costs to Michigan.

63 Missouri v.

Nebraska

64 Arkansas v.

417 U.S. 904 (1974)

Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska seeking
settlement of its Missouri River boundary.345 The Court dismissed

417 U.S. 959 (1974)

the bill upon motion of the parties.

389 U.S. 1026 (1968)

Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee to settle a

389 U.S. 1001 (1967)

344. McKusick, supra note 328, at 220.
345. McKusick, supra note 328, at 221.
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397 U.S. 88 (1970)

boundary dispute over five thousand acres along the west bank of

397 U.S. 91 (1970)

the Mississippi River. The Court determined the boundary to be

399 U.S. 219 (1970)

the main channel as it existed prior to an avulsion.

397 U.S. 931 (1970)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana seeking a

410 U.S. 702 (1973)

declaration that the boundary at the Sabine Pass, Lake, and River

414 U.S. 1107 (1973)

is the geographic middle and not the main channel. The Court held

416 U.S. 965 (1974)

the boundary to be the geographic middle of the Sabine.

426 U.S. 465 (1976)
431 U.S. 161 (1977)
66 Pennsylvania v.

New York

398 U.S. 956 (1970)

Pennsylvania filed a bill of complaint against New York seeking a

400 U.S. 811 (1970)

determination of the jurisdiction to escheat unclaimed funds paid to

400 U.S. 924 (1970)

Western Union. Connecticut, California, and Indiana intervened as

400 U.S. 1019 (1971)

plaintiffs and Florida and Arizona intervened as defendants. The

401 U.S. 931 (1971)

Court held the rule of Texas v. New Jersey controlled.

407 U.S. 206 (1972)
407 U.S. 223 (1972)
67 Mississippi v.

400 U.S. 1019 (1971)

Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Arkansas seeking a

Arkansas

415 U.S. 289 (1974)

determination of the boundary line to determine the sovereignty

415 U.S. 302 (1974)

over an island formed by changes in the location of the Mississippi

419 U.S. 375 (1974)

River. The Court held the changes were the result of accretion and
not avulsion and accordingly the island belonged to Mississippi.

68 Vermont v.

New York

402 U.S. 940 (1971)

Vermont filed a bill of complaint against New York and

405 U.S. 983 (1972)

International Paper Co. alleging discharges of waste into Lake

406 U.S. 186 (1972)

Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek created a sludge bed that

417 U.S. 270 (1974)

polluted the water and impeded navigation.

419 U.S. 955 (1974)

granted leave and some but not all the evidence was taken by a

After the Court

master the parties requested the court issue a consent decree
appointing a river lake master. The Court rejected this application
and subsequently dismissed the bill under Rule 60.
69 New Hampshire

v. Maine

413 U.S. 918 (1973)

New Hampshire filed a bill of complaint against Maine seeking

414 U.S. 810 (1973)

determination of the lateral marine boundary between the states.

426 U.S. 363 (1976)

The parties applied before trial by a master for entry of a consent

434 U.S. 1 (1977)

decree defining the terms necessary to resolve the dispute. The
Court held the entry of the proposed decree consonant with the
Court’s Article III powers and granted the request.346

346. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 364, 372 n. 1 (1976) (“The controversy
arose out of a dispute over lobster fishing in the seabed. Maine’s regulatory
laws, if applicable, are more restrictive than those of New Hampshire. For

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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421 U.S. 927 (1975)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico alleging breach

423 U.S. 1085 (1976)

of the Pecos River Compact by permitting excessive depletion of

446 U.S. 540 (1980)

water in the Pecos River and seeking an order of compliance with

462 U.S. 554 (1983)

the Compact. The Court held it had jurisdiction to determine and

467 U.S. 1238 (1984)

remedy noncompliance with the Compact. The Court determined

482 U.S. 124 (1987)

New Mexico breached the compact and was therefore required to

494 U.S. 111 (1990)

compensate Texas. The Court also issued an injunction requiring
future compliance with the Compact.

71 Idaho v.

Oregon

423 U.S. 813 (1975)

Idaho filed a bill of complaint against Oregon and Washington

429 U.S. 163 (1976)

claiming fishermen in those states were taking disproportionate

444 U.S. 380 (1980)

shares of anadromous fish destined for Idaho in the Columbia River

462 U.S. 1017 (1983)

and seeking an equitable apportionment of this resource.

The

Court held Idaho stated a claim for relief but failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence real and substantial injury and
dismissed the bill without prejudice.
72 South Dakota v.

Nebraska

429 U.S. 810 (1976)

South Dakota filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska disputing

434 U.S. 948 (1977)

the boundary between them regarding Rush Island after the

458 U.S. 276 (1982)

initiation of conflicting quiet title proceedings in each state. The
Court entered a consent decree settling the dispute and appointing
a Joint State Boundary Commission to settle any further disputes.

73 California v.

433 U.S. 918 (1977)

California filed a bill of complaint against Nevada in the nature of

Nevada

438 U.S. 913 (1978)

a quiet title action “precipitated by growing doubts about the

447 U.S. 125 (1980)

geographic accuracy of the existing line” as determined by surveys

456 U.S. 867 (1982)

in the nineteenth century.

The Court held that Nevada had

acquiesced to the recognized boundary.347
74 Georgia v.

South Carolina

434 U.S. 917 (1977)

Georgia filed a bill of complaint against South Carolina disputing

497 U.S. 376 (1990)

the boundary “along the lower beaches of the Savannah River . . .
and at the river’s mouth” as it affected emerging islands.

The

Court held that the Barnwell Islands belonged to South Carolina by
prescription. The Court also held that new islands did not affect
the boundary line between states as set by the Treaty of Beaufort.
The Court determined other aspects of the boundary as well.
75 Tennessee v.

439 U.S. 812 (1978)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against Arkansas disputing the

example, Maine requires a license, available only to Maine residents, for the
taking of lobsters in Maine waters. . . . Maine also imposes stricter minimumand maximum-size requirements. . . . Before the original action was filed, efforts
to settle the dispute failed, and violence over lobster fishing rights in the area
was threatened.”).
347. Apparently this suit establishes the angle of the border over Lake Tahoe.

111

CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED

216

3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

Arkansas

[Vol. 31

454 U.S. 809 (1981)

boundary line. The Court summarily adopted a master’s report and

454 U.S. 351 (1981)

entered a decree settling the boundary line.

76 California v.

439 U.S. 812 (1978)

California filed a bill of complaint against Arizona and the United

Arizona

440 U.S. 59 (1979)

States claiming to own lands outside of its jurisdiction as

452 U.S. 431 (1981)

determined by the Interstate Compact Defining the Boundary
Between the States of Arizona and California. The Court entered a
decree awarding some of the land underlying the Colorado River.

77 Oklahoma v.

439 U.S. 812 (1978)

Oklahoma filed a bill of complaint against Arkansas seeking a

Arkansas

469 U.S. 1083 (1984)

determination of the boundary. The Court summarily adopted the

469 U.S. 1101 (1985)

report of a master and entered a decree in favor of Arkansas.

473 U.S. 610 (1985)
78 Colorado v.

New Mexico

439 U.S. 975 (1978)

Colorado filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico seeking an

459 U.S. 176 (1982)

equitable apportionment of the non-navigable Vermejo River, the

467 U.S. 310 (1984)

waters of which had to date been fully appropriated by New Mexico
users.

The Court held Colorado failed to meet its burden and

dismissed the bill.
79 Maryland v.

Louisiana

442 U.S. 937 (1979)

Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and

451 U.S. 725 (1981)

Wisconsin filed a bill of complaint challenging the constitutionality

452 U.S. 456 (1981)

of a Louisiana tax on the first use of natural gas imported into

454 U.S. 809 (1981)

Louisiana that was not subject to taxation by another state or the
United States. The United States and several pipeline companies
intervened. New Jersey, the United States, the Federal Energy
Regulatory

Commission,

and

seventeen

pipeline

companies

intervened as plaintiffs. The Court held the tax unconstitutional.
80 Texas v.

Oklahoma
81 Louisiana v.

Mississippi

444 U.S. 1065 (1980)

Texas filed a bill of complaint against Oklahoma disputing the

450 U.S. 1038 (1981)

boundary along the Red River. The Court ordered a consent decree

457 U.S. 172 (1982)

resolving the boundary.

445 U.S. 957 (1980)

Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi and Avery B.

466 U.S. 96 (1984)

Dille, Jr. disputing the boundary along a portion of the Mississippi

466 U.S. 921 (1984)

River.

After Mississippi claimed the main channel migrated

westerly so that the bottom hole of an oil well drilled under the
terms of a lease granted by the state of Louisiana was now in
Mississippi. The Court held the bottom hole of the well was in
Louisiana.
82 California v.

Texas

457 U.S. 164 (1982)

California filed a bill of complaint against Texas seeking a

458 U.S. 1119 (1982)

determination of the domicile of Howard Hughes at the time of his

459 U.S. 1067 (1982)

death. The case was dismissed on stipulation pursuant to Rule

459 U.S. 1083 (1982)

53.1.

459 U.S. 1096 (1983)

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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471 U.S. 1050 (1985)
471 U.S. 1051 (1985)
83 Arkansas v.

Mississippi

456 U.S. 912 (1982)

Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi disputing the

471 U.S. 377 (1985)

boundary along a portion of the Mississippi River. The Court adopted
the report of a master and entered a decree resolving the dispute.

84 New Jersey v.

Nevada

474 U.S. 917 (1985)

New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against Nevada and others

487 U.S. 1211 (1988)

seeking an order enjoining “interference with New Jersey’s contract
with [a] private firm for disposal of New Jersey waste in Nevada.”348
The Court dismissed the bill of complaint under Rule 53.

85 Kansas v.

Colorado

475 U.S. 1079 (1986)

Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Colorado alleging violations

514 U.S. 673 (1995)

of the Arkansas River Compact. The Court held Colorado violated

533 U.S. 1 (2001)

the Compact, issued a judgment for money damages and enjoined

543 U.S. 86 (2004)

Colorado to comply with the Compact.

556 U.S. 98 (2009)
86 Illinois v.

479 U.S. 879 (1986)

Illinois filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky disputing the

Kentucky

500 U.S. 380 (1991)

boundary along the Ohio River.

87 Oklahoma v.

484 U.S. 808 (1987)

Oklahoma and Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico

501 U.S. 221 (1991)

over a dispute regarding the interpretation of the Canadian River

New Mexico

Compact. The Court interpreted the Compact.
88 Delaware v.

New York

486 U.S. 1030 (1988)

Delaware filed a bill of complaint against New York to resolve the

489 U.S. 1005 (1989)

rights to escheat unclaimed distributions made by issuers of

507 U.S. 490 (1993)

securities.

The Court held the state in which the debtor is

incorporated is entitled to escheat when the creditor’s address is
unknown.
89 Wyoming v.

Oklahoma

487 U.S. 1231 (1988)

Wyoming filed a bill of complaint against Oklahoma challenging

488 U.S. 921 (1988)

the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute requiring coal-fired

502 U.S. 437 (1992)

electric generating plants burn a mixture of coal containing at least
ten percent coal mined from Oklahoma and seeking an injunction
against enforcement.

The Court held the Oklahoma statute

unconstitutional.
90 Connecticut v.

New Hampshire

91 Louisiana v.

502 U.S. 1069 (1992)

Connecticut filed a bill of complaint against New Hampshire. The

504 U.S. 983 (1992)

Court dismissed the bill under Rule 46.1 after the states reached a

507 U.S. 1026 (1993)

settlement prior to oral argument on exceptions to a master’s
report.349

510 U.S. 941 (1993)

Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi disputing the

348. McKusick, supra note 328, at 230.
349. McKusick, supra note 328, at 185.
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Mississippi

510 U.S. 1036 (1994)
516 U.S. 22 (1995)

Mississippi River boundary.
favor.350

[Vol. 31

The Court held in Mississippi’s

516 U.S. 122 (1995)
92 New Jersey v.

523 U.S. 767 (1998)

New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against New York asserting

New York

526 U.S. 589 (1999)

sovereignty over 24.5 acres added to Ellis Island by the United
States subsequent to the 1834 compact granting sovereignty over
Ellis Island to New York despite its location on the New Jersey side
of the boundary settled by the compact. The Court held New Jersey
sovereign over the additional land.

93 Kansas v.

Nebraska

525 U.S. 805 (1998)

Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska.

The Court

525 U.S. 1101 (1999)

summarily approved a final settlement stipulation accompanying a

527 U.S. 1020 (1999)

master’s report and dismissed the bill.

530 U.S. 1272 (2000)
538 U.S. 720 (2003)
94 Virginia v.

Maryland

530 U.S. 1201 (2000)

Virginia filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaration of its rights

531 U.S. 1140 (2001)

to withdraw water from the Potomac River and to construct

540 U.S. 56 (2003)

improvements on the Virginia shore without obtaining permits
from Maryland despite the terms of an arbitration award which
was made binding as a compact. The Court interpreted the award
as affording Virginia these rights and issued a declaratory
judgment to that effect and enjoined enforcement of any condition
of a permit issued to a Virginia Municipality.

95 New Hampshire

v. Maine

530 U.S. 1272 (2000)

New Hampshire filed a bill of complaint against Maine claiming

532 U.S. 742 (2001)

sovereignty over the entirety of the Piscataqua River and
Portsmouth Harbor.

The Court held New Hampshire judicially

estopped from disputing the boundary by New Hampshire’s
position in the litigation leading to the 1977 entry of a consent
judgment settling the boundary.
96 Alabama v.

North Carolina

537 U.S. 806 (2002)

Alabama,

539 U.S. 925 (2003)

Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission

130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010)

filed a bill of complaint alleging breach of an interstate compact for
radioactive

Florida,

waste

Tennessee,

management,

Virginia,

breach

and

of

the

Southeast

contract,

unjust

enrichment, promissory estoppel, and money had and received and
seeking declaratory judgment of the validity and enforceability of

350. On the thicket of litigation in this controversy, Justice Kennedy quipped:
“Like the shifting river channel near the property in dispute, this litigation has
traversed from one side of our docket to the other.” Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516
U.S. 22, 23 (1995). McKusick again served as master. Id. at 24.
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the Commission’s sanctions resolution against North Carolina,
damages, costs, and other relief. The Court has so far held North
Carolina did not breach the compact.
97 New Jersey v.

546 U.S. 1147 (2006)

New Jersey filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaration that a

Delaware

552 U.S. 597 (2008)

1905 compact established New Jersey’s exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate construction of improvements on the New Jersey shore.
The Court held that under the compact Delaware could not impede
New Jersey riparian owners from ordinary and usual exercises of
the right to wharf out from the shore, but that the planned
construction was neither ordinary nor usual and was therefore
subject to regulation by Delaware.351

98 Montana v.

Wyoming

550 U.S. 932 (2007)

Montana filed a bill of complaint against Wyoming alleging breach

552 U.S. 1175 (2008)

of the Yellowstone River Compact by permitting pre-1950

131 S. Ct. 442 (2010)

appropriators to increase consumption by improving the efficiency

131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011)

of their irrigation systems which reduces the amount of wastewater
return to the river. The Court has so far held the permits do not
violate the compact because the conserved water is used to irrigate
the same acreage.

99 South Carolina v. 552 U.S. 804 (2007)

North Carolina

South Carolina filed a bill of complaint against North Carolina

558 U.S. 256 (2010)

seeking equitable apportionment of the waters of the Catawba

131 S. Ct. 855 (2010)

River basin. The Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 46.1.

351. New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 602 (2008) (“The controversy . . .
was sparked by Delaware’s refusal to grant permission for construction of a
liquefied natural gas . . . unloading terminal that would extend some 2,000 feet
from New Jersey’s shore into territory New Jersey v. Delaware II adjudged to
belong to Delaware.”).
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B. Denials of Leave to File and Dismissals on Demurrer
1

New Hampshire v. 108 U.S. 76 (1883)

New Hampshire and New York each filed a bill of complaint

Louisiana

against Louisiana and officers of Louisiana’s board of liquidation
seeking a decree enforcement of the terms of repudiated state
bonds that were assigned to New Hampshire and New York for the
purpose of seeking enforcement of the bonds in the Supreme Court.
The Court held the litigation was really brought by the private
parties and was therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.

2

Louisiana v.

176 U.S. 1 (1900)

Texas

Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Texas, the governor of
Texas, and a Texas health officer for embargoing interstate
commerce between New Orleans.352 The Court sustained a
demurrer

on

the

ground

that

the

bill

only

alleged

the

maladministration of Texas laws and failed to set up facts to show
the alleged actions of the health officer were attributable to the
state of Texas.
3

Alabama v.

291 U.S. 286 (1934)

Arizona

Alabama moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against nineteen
states (reduced by amendment to Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New
York, and Pennsylvania) seeking an injunction against state laws
prohibiting the sale of articles produced by convict labor on the
grounds that they violated the Commerce Clause.

The Court

denied leave to file because (1) the bill was multifarious for naming
states with differing schemes without valid justification; and (2)
the bill wanted equity for failing to sufficiently make out that
Alabama would suffer great loss or serious injury.
4

Arizona v.

298 U.S. 558 (1936)

California

Arizona moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada
seeking a judicial apportionment of the waters of the Colorado
River Basin.

The Court denied leave because, if filed, the bill

would have to be dismissed for failure to join the United States.
5

Texas v.

300 U.S. 642 (1937)

Motion for leave summarily dismissed but granted on refiling.353

308 U.S. 1 (1939)

Massachusetts moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against

New York
6

Massachusetts v.

352. WARREN, supra note 328, at 45 (Texas “by statute had given to her
officials wide powers to enforce very drastic quarantine regulations and to
detain vessels, persons and property coming into Texas. In 1899, a health officer
of Texas took advantage of a single case of yellow fever in New Orleans to lay an
embargo on all commerce between that city and the State of Texas, and the
embargo was enforced by armed guards posted at the frontier.”).
353. Texas v. Floida (1937).
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Missouri for Missouri’s assessment of an inheritance tax on a
citizen of Massachusetts despite reciprocal legislation enacted by
both designed to avoid multiple taxation. The Court denied leave
to file the bill because Missouri’s imposition of the tax did not
impair Massachusetts ability to levy a separate tax and reciprocal
legislation does not give rise to contractual rights to sue amongst
states because it does not comply with the Compact Clause.

7

Alabama v.

347 U.S. 272 (1954)

Texas

Alabama and Rhode Island moved for leave file a bill of complaint
against the United States and several states challenging the
constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act. The Court denied
leave because challenges to the congressional disposition of the
property of the United States are foreclosed by Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2.

8

Arizona v.

377 U.S. 926 (1964)

California

Arizona moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “against
California

and

[a]

California

citizen

to

recover

workers’

compensation benefits paid by Arizona state fund to Arizona
citizen injured in auto accident allegedly caused by defect on San
Francisco-Oakland Bridge and to assert tort claims assigned to
Arizona by injured Arizonan and his employer.”354

The Court

summarily denied leave with a citation to Massachusetts v.
Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939).
9

Kansas v.

382 U.S. 801 (1965)

Colorado
10 Wisconsin v.

Kansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Colorado.
The motion was dismissed under Rule 60.

382 U.S. 935 (1965)

Minnesota

Wisconsin moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Minnesota seeking an order enjoining “Minnesota from permitting
Northern States Power Company to build dam and coal-fired steam
generating plant on St. Croix River, allegedly creating nuisance
and impeding recreational use of river.”355 Motion for leave to file
summarily denied.

11 Delaware v.

385 U.S. 895 (1966)

New York

The Court summarily denied a motion for leave to file a bill of
complaint “against all 50 States and the District of Columbia to enjoin
use of the ‘state-unit’ (winner-take-all) system to cast electoral votes for
presidential and vice presidential candidates.”356

12 New Jersey v.
New York

390 U.S. 1000 (1968)

New Jersey moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “against New
York and private company, Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., to enforce
agreement between New Jersey and New York as to [the]

354. McKusick, supra note 328, at 210.
355. Id. at 207.
356. Id. at 210.
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condemnation value of [a] railway allegedly violated by decision of
New York’s highest court.”357 The Court summarily denied leave.
13 Illinois v.

406 U.S. 91 (1972)

City of Milwaukee

Illinois moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against four
Wisconsin cities and two Wisconsin sewerage commissions alleging
pollution of Lake Michigan by the discharge of over 200 million
gallons of sewage and waste daily.

The Court held “the term

‘States’ as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) [does not] include their
political subdivisions” and exercised its discretion to deny leave to
file a bill under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3).
14 Illinois v.

409 U.S. 36 (1972)

Michigan

Illinois moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Michigan
for violation of a reciprocal treaty by allowing recovery against an
Illinois re-insurance company in a case brought by two injured
workmen. The Court denied leave because (1) Illinois as a party to
the decision complained of failed to file a timely petition for writ of
certiorari; and (2) Illinois was only a nominal plaintiff because it
filed the complaint to vindicate the grievances of particular
individuals.

15 Pennsylvania v.

410 U.S. 977 (1973)

New York

The Court summarily denied a motion for leave to file a “against 25
states to challenge constitutionality of states’ liquor ‘price
affirmation’ policy, requiring liquor vendors to give states lowest
available price”.358

16 Nevada v.

414 U.S. 810 (1973)

California

Nevada moved for leave to file a bill of complaint seeking a
“declaration that Nevada state employee’s operation of state-owned
vehicle in California did not constitute Nevada’s consent to suit in
California state courts.”359

17 Arizona v.

425 U.S. 795 (1976)

New Mexico

Arizona moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against New
Mexico for imposing an allegedly discriminatory tax on Arizona
electricity generating utilities operating in New Mexico. The Court
denied leave because the pending state court challenge to the tax
filed by the utilities in New Mexico provided an appropriate forum to
resolve the issues with an available appeal to the Supreme Court.

18 Pennsylvania v.

426 U.S. 660 (1976)

New Jersey

Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
New Jersey and Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont move for
leave to file a bill of complaint against New Hampshire challenging
the constitutionality of commuter income taxes. The Court denied

357. Id., at 209.
358. Id. at 209.
359. Id. at 210.
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leave per curiam by a vote of 4-2 on the grounds that no sovereign
or quasi-sovereign interests were implicated by New Jersey and
New Hampshire’s collection of commuter income taxes.
19 New York v.

429 U.S. 810 (1976)

New Jersey

New York moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against New Jersey
challenging the constitutionality of commuter income taxes.360 The
Court summarily denied leave with a citation to Pennsylvania v.
New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976).

20 California v.

437 U.S. 601 (1978)

Texas

The Court denied leave to file a bill of complaint to determine the
domicile of Howard Hughes after his death for tax purposes per
curiam with concurring opinions by Justice Brennan (noting that
statutory interpleader was available to resolve dispute), Justice
Powell (same), and by Justice Stewart with Justice Stevens (noting
statutory interpleader was available and that Texas v. Florida was
wrongly decided). The Court granted leave upon refiling.361

21 New Mexico v.

444 U.S. 895 (1979)

Texas

New Mexico moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Texas seeking “to enjoin enforcement of a Texas PUC order
prohibiting any Texas electric utility from interconnecting in
interstate commerce unless specifically allowed by the Texas PUC
or FERC.”362 The Court summarily denied leave.

22 California v.
Texas

450 U.S. 977 (1981)

California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Texas

450 U.S. 1038 (1981)

seeking “to enjoin Texas from quarantining California fruits and
vegetables because of [a] Mediterranean fruit fly infestation” and
moved for a temporary restraining order.363

The Court first

granted the temporary restraining order but then summarily
denied leave and vacated the temporary restraining order.
23 California v.

454 U.S. 886 (1981)

Texas

California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Texas,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina seeking to enjoin
those states from “quarantining California fruits and vegetables
because a of Mediterranean fruit fly infestation.”364 The Court
summarily denied leave to file.

24 California v.
West Virginia

454 U.S. 1027 (1981)

California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against West
Virginia “to establish breach of contract covering football games

360. Id. at 208.
361. McKusick, supra note 328, at 208; California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164
(1982).
362. Id. at 209–10.
363. Id. at 210 .
364. Id. at 210.
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between San Jose State University and the University of West
Virginia.”365 The Court summarily denied leave to file. Justice
Stevens dissented from the denial because the Justice Harlan’s
reasoning in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. that the original
jurisdiction over controversies between states and citizens of others
states is discretionary does not apply to controversies between states.
25 Oklahoma v.

460 U.S. 1020 (1983)

Arkansas

Oklahoma moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “Arkansas and
various municipalities and private companies to enjoin discharge of
waste into Illinois River.”366 The Court summarily denied leave.

26 Puerto Rico v.

464 U.S. 1034 (1984)

Iowa

Puerto Rico moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Iowa
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel “extradition of a Puerto
Rican fugitive.”367 The Court summarily denied leave.

27 Arkansas v.

465 U.S. 1018 (1984)

Oklahoma

Arkansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Oklahoma

challenging

the

“constitutionality

of

‘retaliatory’

highway use tax on Arkansas-based motor carriers operating in
Oklahoma.”368 The Court summarily denied leave.
28 Pennsylvania v.

465 U.S. 1097 (1984)

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Oklahoma

challenging

the

“constitutionality

of

‘retaliatory’

highway use tax on Pennsylvania-based motor carriers operating
in Oklahoma.”369 The Court summarily denied leave.
29 Pennsylvania v.

472 U.S. 1015 (1985)

Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “against 38
states to challenge their liquor ‘price affirmation’ systems.”370

Alabama

The Court summarily denied leave.
30 South Dakota v.

485 U.S. 902 (1986)

Nebraska

South Dakota moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri “in nature of a quiet title action’ to
determine rights of South Dakota to waters of Missouri River as
against Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri.”371 The Court summarily
denied leave.

31 Louisiana v.

488 U.S. 990 (1988)

Mississippi

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Louisiana moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Mississippi seeking settlement of a portion of its Mississippi River
boundary.372 The Court summarily denied leave over Justice

Id. at 209.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 209.
McKusick, supra note 328, at 208.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 207.
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White’s impassioned dissent lamenting that “this is no way to treat
a sovereign State that wants its dispute with another State settled
in this Court.”
32 Arkansas v.

488 U.S. 1000 (1989)

Oklahoma

Arkansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Oklahoma seeking “to enjoin application of Oklahoma’s water
quality standards to point sources within Arkansas.”373

The

Court summarily denied leave.
33 Texas v.

515 U.S. 1184 (1995)

Louisiana
34 Southeast

Texas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Louisiana.
The Court summarily denied leave.

533 U.S. 926 (2001)

The Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management

Interstate Low-

Commission moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against North

Level Radioactive

Carolina for breach of an interstate compact for radioactive waste

Waste

management compact and seeking to enforce its sanctions against

Management

North Carolina. The Court summarily denied leave. The Court

Commission v.

granted leave in the controversy upon its refiling by Alabama,
Florida, Tennessee, Virginia and the Commission.374

North Carolina
35 Arkansas v.

546 U.S. 1166 (2006)

Oklahoma
36 Mississippi v.
Memphis

Arkansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against
Oklahoma. The Court summarily denied leave.

130 S. Ct. 1317 (2010)

Mississippi moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against the
city of Memphis. The Court summarily denied leave with citations
to Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003); Colorado v.
New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982).

373. McKusick, supra note 328, at 210.
374. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2304–05 (2010) (“In July
2000, seeking to enforce its sanctions resolution, the Commission moved for
leave to file a bill of complaint under our original jurisdiction. . . . North
Carolina opposed the motion on the grounds that the Commission could not
invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, and we invited the Solicitor General to
express the views of the United States. . . . The Solicitor General filed a brief
urging denial of the Commission’s motion on the grounds that the Commission’s
bill of complaint did not fall without our exclusive original jurisdiction over
'controversies between two or more States.' § 1251(a).
We denied the
commission’s motion.”).
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